________________________________________ September 4, 1997 ________________________________________ GSBCA 14207-TRAV In the Matter of GLENN S. PODONSKY Glenn S. Podonsky, Damascus, MD, Claimant. George M. Tengan, Chief Certifying Officer, Department of Energy, Washington, DC, appearing for Department of Energy. BORWICK, Board Judge. The Department of Energy (DOE) requests a decision pursuant to 31 U.S.C.  3529 (section 3529 decision) in the matter of Glenn S. Podonsky. The employee maintains that he incurred extraordinary wear and tear on his automobile as a result of fulfilling his responsibilities. DOE requests guidance on whether the expenses may be appropriately reimbursed. The employee works in DOE's offices in Germantown Maryland. He is repeatedly called upon to be in Washington, D.C. for meetings with Congressional committee staff members, assistant secretaries, and the Deputy and Under Secretaries of DOE. DOE had provided government-owned vehicles for commuting between Germantown and Washington, but in May of 1995, DOE eliminated the "U-drive" service as a cost saving measure. The employee estimates that since then, he has driven 11,000 miles for official business in his private vehicle (a 1995 Chevrolet Blazer) between Germantown and Washington. The employee states that he needed new brake shoes at a cost of $475, an expense which his automobile mechanic attributed to the result of heavy stop-and-go driving. The employee wrote the Acting Director of DOE's Capitol Accounting Center: My only viable option is to drive my personally-owned vehicle. Although the federal travel regulations provide for reimbursement of the additional mileage, they do not provide for major miscellaneous expenses that are being incurred as a direct result of extraordinary vehicle use. . . . . I regard this expense for brake shoes to be unusual necessary wear and tear on the vehicle which should be considered for reimbursement as miscellaneous expendi- tures necessarily incurred by the traveler in connection with the transaction of official business: Section 301- 9.1(e) of the Federal Travel Regulation. Statute provides: Under regulations prescribed under section 5707 of this title, an employee who is engaged on official business for the Government is entitled to a rate per mile established by the Administrator of General Services, instead of the actual expenses of transportation, for the use of a privately owned automobile when that mode of transportation is authorized or approved as more advan- tageous to the Government. 5 U.S.C.  5704(a)(1) (1994)(emphasis supplied). In addition to the rate per mile authorized under that section, an employee using a privately owned automobile may be reimbursed for parking fees; ferry fees; and bridge, road and tunnel costs. 5 U.S.C.  5704(d). The mileage reimbursement rates established by the Adminis- trator of General Services reflect the current costs of operating privately owned vehicles, including depreciation of original vehicle costs; gasoline and oil; maintenance, accessories, parts, and tires; insurance; and state and federal taxes. 5 U.S.C.  5707(a)(1)(A), (a)(2)(A). The current mileage rate for use of a privately owned automobile is $.31 per mile. 41 CFR 301-4.2(a)(1) (1996). The mileage rate reimbursement is in lieu of reimbursement of actual expenses; the only actual expenses allowed in addition to the mileage rate are parking fees, ferry fare, and bridge, road and tunnel tolls. In re New York Transit Strike, 60 Comp. Gen. 633 (1981). Here, the employee is reimbursed for the use of his car at the mileage rate, which already covers the cost of maintenance and parts for his vehicle. Further reimbursement on an actual expense basis is prohibited by statute. The employee relies on 41 CFR 301-9.1(e) of the Federal Travel Regulation (FTR) as authority for reimbursement of the alleged actual expenses of operating his automobile. The FTR implements 5 U.S.C.  5701-5709. 41 CFR 301-1.1. The regulation must be interpreted as a whole, in light of the overall regulatory and statutory scheme, and not to give force to one phrase in isolation. Campesinos Unidos v. Department of Labor, 803 F.2d 1063, 1069 (6th Cir. 1986). If a proffered interpretation of a regulation is broader than the language of the statute, the statute controls. Anixer v. Home-Stake Production, 77 F.3d 1215, 1224 (10th Cir. 1996); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 25 F.3d 1063, 1070 (D.C. Cir. 1994). While 41 CFR 301-9.1(e) allows, when approved, "miscellaneous expenditures not enumerated in this section, when necessarily incurred by the traveler in connection with the transaction of official business," that provision cannot reasonably be read to apply to that which the governing statute expressly prohibits--reimbursement of actual expenses of operating an automobile. The employee is therefore not entitled, as a miscellaneous expense, to be reimbursed his cost for the alleged extra wear and tear on the brakes of his automobile. _________________________ ANTHONY S. BORWICK Board Judge