_____________________ July 15, 1997 _____________________ GSBCA 14033-TRAV In the Matter of SALLY N. WILLETT Sally N. Willett, New Orleans, LA, Claimant. Barry E. Hill, Director, Office of Hearings and Appeals, Department of the Interior, Arlington, VA, appearing for Department of the Interior. DeGRAFF, Board Judge. In 1996, Sally N. Willett was employed by the Department of the Interior (DoI) as an administrative law judge in Phoenix, Arizona. On July 24, 1996, DoI decided to reorganize its field offices and, as part of the reorganization, to close its Phoenix office on September 30, 1996. On July 26, 1996, DoI reassigned Judge Willett to Minneapolis/St. Paul, Minnesota, effective October 1, 1996. Before Judge Willett moved from Phoenix to Minneapolis, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) raised questions about several aspects of DoI's reorganization actions. On September 27, DoI told Judge Willett that her reassignment to Minneapolis was suspended until further notice, and that she would be temporarily detailed to Arlington, Virginia effective October 1, 1996. In a letter dated October 1, 1996, DoI told Judge Willett that she would be detailed to Arlington for an initial period of 120 days and that she should report for work there on October 7, 1996. DoI told Judge Willett that it had arranged for her to occupy an Arlington apartment with a fully equipped kitchen. DoI also told Judge Willett that her per diem rate for meals and incidental expenses would be $20.90. Attached to DoI's October 1, 1996 letter was a September 30, 1996 travel authorization that stated Judge Willett's per diem allowance would be the maximum "authorized by Federal and Departmental programs and missions." On October 7, 1996, Judge Willett reported for duty in Arlington. That same day, DoI learned that Judge Willett would be leaving to take a position with the Social Security Administration beginning October 27, 1996. Judge Willett's last day as an employee of DoI was October 26, 1996. On October 28, 1996, Judge Willett submitted a claim for travel expenses, including $38 per day for meals and incidental expenses for October 7 through October 26, 1996. DoI paid Judge Willett $20.90 per day and not the $38 per day she claimed. Judge Willett asks us to review her claim. Discussion A federal employee who travels on official business is entitled to be paid a per diem allowance at a rate not to exceed the rate established by the Administrator of General Services. 5 U.S.C.  5702 (1994). The Administrator of General Services, in the Federal Travel Regulation (FTR), established $38 as the maximum per diem rate for meals and incidental expenses (M&IE) in the Arlington, Virginia area at the time Judge Willett traveled. 41 CFR pt. 301, app. A (1996). The FTR emphasizes that the per diem rates it establishes are maximum rates, and explains that agency heads are responsible for authorizing only those per diem allowances that are justified given the circumstances of the travel. 41 CFR 301-7.2. In addition, the FTR provides that an agency may authorize a per diem rate that is less than the maximum rate in certain circumstances, such as when meals are obtained by the employee at a reduced cost. Before an employee travels, the FTR says that the agency should consider known factors that will cause the employee's per diem costs to be less than the maximum authorized rate. If any such factors exist, the agency should authorize a reduced rate that is consistent with the known expense levels. One of the examples set out in the FTR for reducing the maximum per diem rate concerns extended stays. When a travel assignment involves an extended period and an employee is able to obtain meals at a lower cost (for example, if the employee has a weekly or monthly rental), the FTR states that the per diem rate should be reduced. The circumstances in which it is appropriate to provide a reduced per diem rate are not limited to the examples set out in the FTR. 41 CFR 301-7.12. DoI issued financial administration memorandum 94-037 (FAM 94- 037) concerning reduced per diem payments. The memorandum states: This Financial Administration Memorandum (FAM) is being issued because we have received several inquiries regarding the starting date for reduced per diem in conjunction with long term (30 or more days) temporary duty or training travel. When travel assignments involve extended periods at temporary duty or training locations, the per diem rate will be reduced to 55 per cent of the full per diem rate (lodging plus M&IE) specified in the Federal Travel Regulation (FTR) for the location, unless a different rate is fully justified. Under unusual situations the reduced rate may be increased or decreased depending on the conditions and necessary cost that must be incurred by the traveler. The reduced rate should be established based on the conditions that exist when the travel is performed; thus, if a traveler is forced to incur unusual lodging and/or meal cost due to the assignment, the rate should be based on cost data provided . . . . Judge Willett says that the use of the $20.90 per diem rate is inappropriate because her stay in Arlington was not an "extended" stay, as mentioned in the FTR and FAM 94-037, because it lasted for fewer than thirty days. In addition, Judge Willett says that the use of the reduced per diem rate is inconsistent with the practice and policy of the Social Security Administration, which did not reduce her per diem rate in circumstances similar to those presented in this claim. Finally, Judge Willett says that the use of the reduced per diem rate is inconsistent with her travel authorization, which said she would receive the maximum authorized per diem allowance. DoI's payment of less than the maximum per diem rate for M&IE is consistent with the provisions of the FTR, regardless of whether Judge Willett's stay falls within the FTR's example of an "extended" stay. Before Judge Willett traveled to Arlington, DoI knew that she would be staying in an apartment that had full kitchen facilities. This meant that Judge Willett, unlike travelers who stay in hotels without kitchen facilities, could prepare her own meals and would not have to incur the cost of eating every meal at a restaurant. Because Judge Willett would be able to obtain her meals at a reduced cost, DoI knew that her per diem costs were likely to be less than the maximum authorized rate. By authorizing less than the maximum per diem rate for Judge Willett, DoI acted consistently with the FTR's admonition that agency heads should authorize only those per diem allowances that are justified given the circumstances of the travel and should not always pay the maximum per diem rate. DoI's payment of less than the maximum per diem rate for M&IE is consistent with the provisions of FAM 94-037, even though Judge Willett was on travel in Arlington for only twenty days. FAM 94-037 provides that the per diem rate will be reduced if an assignment involves an extended period at a temporary duty location. Judge Willett's assignment did involve an extended period of 120 days, even though she did not complete that assignment because she resigned her position with DoI after twenty days in Arlington. Like the FTR, FAM 94-037 says to look at the actual conditions of travel and to look at the costs that have to be incurred by the employee. Because Judge Willett's assignment was for an extended period, DoI arranged for her to occupy an apartment with kitchen facilities. One of the actual conditions of her travel was that she would be able to prepare her own meals and would not have to incur the cost of eating every meal in a restaurant. Whether DoI's practice is consistent with that of the Social Security Administration is immaterial to a resolution of Judge Willett's claim, because DoI's actions were consistent with applicable regulations. In addition, DoI's use of a reduced per diem rate for M&IE was not inconsistent with Judge Willett's travel authorization. The authorization stated that Judge Willett's per diem allowance would be the maximum authorized by federal and DoI "programs and missions." As discussed in the preceding two paragraphs, the maximum rate authorized by the FTR and by FAM 94- 037 was less than a rate of $38 per day because Judge Willett had kitchen facilities available and would not have to incur the cost of eating every meal in a restaurant. Paying Judge Willett less than the maximum per diem rate was consistent with both the FTR and DoI's policies. DoI's decision to pay Judge Willett a per diem rate for M&IE below the maximum rate of $38 was consistent with applicable regulations. Therefore, Judge Willett's claim is denied. ________________________________ MARTHA H. DeGRAFF Board Judge