_____________________ June 26, 1997 _____________________ GSBCA 13938-TRAV, 13939-TRAV, 13940-TRAV, 13941-TRAV 13942-TRAV, 13943-TRAV, 13944-TRAV, 13945-TRAV In the Matters of BERNADETTE HASTAK, WILSON E. TELLER, CLAUDE A. BURNETT, BEATRICE MUSSER, KEIKO HOLMES, JAYSHREE JOSHI, OWEN J. TAYLOR, DENNIS SCOBIE Bernadette Hastak, Jacksonville, FL, Claimant in GSBCA 13938- TRAV. Wilson E. Teller, Orange, FL, Claimant in GSBCA 13939-TRAV. Claude A. Burnett, Middleburg, FL, Claimant in GSBCA 13940- TRAV. Beatrice Musser, Atlantic Beach, FL, Claimant in GSBCA 13941- TRAV. Keiko Holmes, Jacksonville, FL, Claimant in GSBCA 13942-TRAV. Jayshree Joshi, Jacksonville, FL, Claimant in GSBCA 13943- TRAV. Owen J. Taylor, Orange Park, FL, Claimant in GSBCA 13944-TRAV. Dennis Scobie, Jacksonville, FL, Claimant in GSBCA 13945-TRAV. Harry G. Mason, Assistant Regional Counsel, Internal Revenue Service, Atlanta, GA, appearing for Department of the Treasury. DeGRAFF, Board Judge. Claimants are auditors employed by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in its Jacksonville (Florida) district. They belong to a collective bargaining unit that is represented by the National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU). In October 1995, the IRS in Jacksonville issued a memorandum concerning the IRS's travel handbook. The handbook sets out a general rule for computing mileage when an employee is assigned to a temporary duty station and commutes from home to that temporary duty station in a privately owned vehicle. The handbook also explains when the IRS can grant a waiver of the general rule. In claimants' view, the October 1995 memorandum changed the agency's prior interpretation of the rule concerning reimbursement for mileage expenses, particularly the portion of the rule that addresses waivers. After the October 1995 memorandum was issued, the IRS denied claimants' requests for waivers of the general rule set out in the travel handbook, which meant that claimants were reimbursed less than the amounts they claimed for mileage expenses. On November 13, 1995, Local Chapter 16 of the NTEU filed a grievance on behalf of all bargaining unit employees in the Jacksonville district concerning the mileage reimbursement memorandum. On December 12, 1995, Local Chapter 87 of the NTEU also filed a grievance concerning the mileage reimbursement memorandum on behalf of other employees in north Florida. The collective bargaining agreement between the IRS and the NTEU defines a grievance as including any complaint by an employee or the union concerning any matter relating to the employment of the employee, or any claimed violation, misinterpretation, or misapplication of any law, rule, or regulation affecting conditions of employment. The collective bargaining agreement sets out procedures for resolving grievances. In summary, the agreement provides that a grievance will be considered by management at three levels and, if the union or the employees are not satisfied with the manner in which the grievance is resolved, they can ask for binding arbitration. The collective bargaining agreement states that its procedures are the only procedures available to employees for dealing with grievances, with certain exceptions not relevant here. The union and the employees were not satisfied with the outcome of the three-step grievance process, and NTEU's counsel invoked binding arbitration proceedings. The NTEU and the IRS selected an arbitrator, but have not yet scheduled a hearing. Discussion Claimants ask us to settle their claims for mileage expenses, which are a form of travel expenses, pursuant to our authority to settle claims concerning expenses incurred by federal civilian employees for official travel. General Accounting Office Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-316,  202(n), 110 Stat. 3826, 3843 (1996). The IRS asks us to dismiss these claims because, says the IRS, we do not possess the authority to settle these particular travel claims. We agree with the IRS. As explained below, claimants' collective bargaining agreement grievance procedures are the exclusive administrative means available for resolving their disagreement with the IRS. The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA), Pub. L. No. 95- 454, 92 Stat. 1111 (1978) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the United States Code), "comprehensively overhauled the civil service system." Lindahl v. OPM, 470 U.S. 768, 773 (1985). The CSRA contains an "elaborate remedial system that has been constructed step by step, with careful attention to conflicting policy considerations." Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 388 (1983). The remedial system created by the CSRA allows federal employees and management to enter into collective bargaining agreements which provide procedures for settling grievances. 5 U.S.C.  7102, 7103(a)(8), 7121(a) (1994). If a grievance is not resolved using the collective bargaining agreement's grievance procedures, the union or the agency may invoke binding arbitration. 5 U.S.C.  7121(b). Either party may file an exception to the arbitrator's decision with the Federal Labor Relations Authority and in some circumstances may seek judicial review. 5 U.S.C.  7122, 7123. Section 7121(a)(2) of the CSRA provides that a collective bargaining agreement may exclude any matter from its grievance procedures. 5 U.S.C.  7121(a)(2). Section 7121(a)(1) provides that, with certain exceptions not relevant here, the agreement's grievance procedures "shall be the exclusive administrative procedures for resolving grievances" which fall within the coverage of the agreement. 5 U.S.C.  7121(a)(1). The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has considered the effect of the CSRA several times. In Carter v. Gibbs, 909 F.2d 1452 (Fed. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 811 (1990), the Court found the statute was unambiguous when it stated that a collective bargaining agreement's procedures were the "exclusive procedures" for resolving grievances within its coverage. The Court decided that there was no support for the appellants' position that they should be permitted to maintain suit in United States district court, and held that section 7121(a) meant that district courts lacked jurisdiction to consider suits filed by federal employees whose grievances were not excluded from collective bargaining agreements. In Muniz v. United States, 972 F.2d 1304 (Fed. Cir. 1992), the Court stated: Carter v. Gibbs unswervingly endorses the proposition that mandatory dispute resolution procedures contained in a federal collective bargaining agreement constitute the exclusive means for resolution of disputes grievable under the agreement, unless the negotiated terms of the agreement exclude the dispute from the agreement's dispute resolution processes. 972 F.2d at 1309. The Court held in Muniz that a grievance was exclusively subject to a collective bargaining agreement's procedures unless the matter was "explicitly and unambiguously excluded by the parties under section 7121(a)(2) from the agreement's compulsory grievance and arbitration procedures." 972 F.2d at 1319. In 1994, section 7121(a) of the CSRA was amended to provide that a collective bargaining agreement's procedures "shall be the exclusive administrative procedures" for resolving grievances within the coverage of the agreement. The addition of the word "administrative" did not render the statute unclear or ambiguous. The statute plainly provides that, for federal employees whose grievances are not excluded from collective bargaining agreements, the agreements are the only administrative procedures available for resolving grievances. Thus, if a claim can be resolved by using a collective bargaining agreement's grievance procedures, we lack the authority to settle the claim using our administrative procedures unless the agreement explicitly and unambiguously excludes the disputed matter from its procedures. In order to determine whether we have the authority to settle the claims of these claimants, we have to determine whether the dispute between the claimants and the agency constitutes a grievance that can be resolved by the collective bargaining agreement's procedures. If so, we must then determine whether the collective bargaining agreement excludes the matter from its coverage. The collective bargaining agreement and the statute contain the same definition of grievance. A grievance includes any complaint concerning any matter relating to the employment of an employee or concerning any claimed violation, misinterpretation, or misapplication of any law, rule, or regulation affecting conditions of employment. 5 U.S.C.  7103(a)(9). Conditions of employment include personnel policies, practices, and matters affecting working conditions, unless the policies, practices, and matters relate to prohibited political activities, relate to the classification of a position, or to the extent that the matters are specifically provided for by federal statute. 5 U.S.C.  7103(a)(14). The dispute between the claimants and the IRS concerning the proper interpretation of the agency's mileage rule is a grievance that can be resolved by the collective bargaining agreement's procedures because the dispute concerns a claimed misinterpretation or misapplication of a rule affecting conditions of employment. The Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA), upon consideration of facts similar to those presented by claimants, concluded that when an agency changed its policy concerning the computation of mileage for employees who commuted from home to temporary duty stations in privately owned vehicles, the agency affected the employees' conditions of employment. Department of Defense Dependents Schools and Overseas Education Association, 50 F.L.R.A. 197 (1995). This decision is consistent with an earlier FLRA decision which held that an agency has a duty to bargain concerning mileage. American Federation of Government Employees, Meat Graders Council, AFL-CIO and Department of Agriculture, 8 F.L.R.A. 118 (1982). As noted in the preceding paragraph, conditions of employment do not include rules concerning working conditions to the extent such matters are specifically provided for by statute. The statutory authority to pay mileage allowances, however, does not specifically provide any method for computing mileage. 5 U.S.C.  5704. Local Mileage Allowances, B-252405 (Oct. 11, 1993). The dispute between claimants and the IRS must be resolved using the collective bargaining agreement's procedures, unless the matter in dispute is excluded from the agreement's coverage. The collective bargaining agreement does not exclude the matter in dispute from its coverage. The agreement excepts very few matters from its coverage, none of which is relevant to this dispute. In addition, there is no disagreement between the parties to the agreement as to its meaning. The NTEU and the IRS must believe that the dispute concerning mileage is not excluded from the agreement because they are using the agreement's grievance procedures in order to attempt to resolve their dispute. The manner in which the parties to a collective bargaining agreement interpret the agreement, as shown by their course of dealing, is persuasive evidence of the correct interpretation of the agreement. Muniz, 972 F.2d at 1320; Bonner v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 781 F.2d 202, 206 (Fed. Cir. 1986). The NTEU and the IRS could have negotiated to exclude this matter from the coverage of the collective bargaining agreement, but they did not. As a result, the dispute between claimants and the IRS must be resolved according to the procedures set out in the collective bargaining agreement. Claimants' collective bargaining agreement provides a procedure for resolving grievances and this dispute concerning mileage constitutes a grievance. Because the agreement does not explicitly and unambiguously exclude the disputed matter from its grievance procedures, those procedures are the exclusive administrative procedures for resolving this mileage dispute. We lack the authority to consider these claims and so we dismiss them. _______________________________ MARTHA H. DeGRAFF Board Judge