Board of Contract Appeals
                 General Services Administration
                      Washington, D.C. 20405

                                             

                          July 11, 1997
                                             


                         GSBCA 13822-TRAV


                  In the Matter of KATHRYN OLSON


     Kathryn Olson, Seattle, WA, Claimant.

     Sandy Parks, Acting Director, Financial Management Division, Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, Washington, DC, appearing for Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission.

DANIELS, Board Judge (Chairman).

     This case involves a claim by Kathryn Olson, an attorney employed by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), for reimbursement of airfare charged to her
for official travel.  We find that Ms. Olson is responsible for the charge and therefore deny
the claim.

     Ms. Olson, who at the time was working in the EEOC's Los Angeles office, was asked
to participate in a trial skills workshop in Washington, D.C., during July 1995.  She agreed
to take part in the training session, but told agency officials that she had planned to be on
leave in San Francisco on the day before the session began.  The agency issued her travel
orders which state, "Employee is leaving from San Francisco and returning to Los Angeles
(official duty station) for personal convenience.  No extra air fare cost will be incurred by
government."

     At the time these orders were issued, both Ms. Olson and the EEOC understood that
the airfare to Washington was the same whether a flight originated from either Los Angeles
or San Francisco, so the financial impact of Ms. Olson's beginning her trip from the latter city
rather than the former should have been nil.  The expected cost of the air transportation from
San Francisco to Washington to Los Angeles was stated on the travel orders to be $264.

     The tickets actually purchased for Ms. Olson's air transportation, and charged to her,
cost $431.  The agency has refused to reimburse Ms. Olson for the amount in excess of the
anticipated cost, $167.

     The agency's position is grounded on the theory that the extra cost resulted from Ms.
Olson's having taken an indirect route for her personal convenience.  See 41 CFR 301-2.5(b)
(1995).  The employee responds that she left from San  Francisco to meet the Government's
needs, not for her personal convenience, and that in any event, the additional charge is in
error.

     As both sides initially believed, the flight to Washington should have cost the same
amount, regardless of its origin.  The Government contract carrier for the San Francisco-
Washington and Los Angeles-Washington routes charged a fare of $129 for each of these
flights during July 1995.  Ms. Olson's return flight to the West Coast was with this carrier,
and that ticket was priced appropriately.  The reason that Ms. Olson was charged more --
$299  [Foot # 1 ] -- for her flight east had nothing to do with an indirect route or personal
convenience.  It was that she traveled on an airline other the contract carrier, and that airline's
ticket price was considerably more than the contract carrier's.

     
****************** Footnote Begin **********
[Foot # 1 ]         Ms. Olson was also charged $3 in tax for her round-trip air travel.
****************** Footnote End ************

 Ms. Olson states that the EEOC's authorized travel office made the arrangements for air
travel and selected the flights she took in both directions; neither she nor her secretary
requested any specific flight from San Francisco to Washington.  Although this explanation
is not contested by the agency, it is not sufficient under the Federal Travel Regulation (FTR)
to serve as a basis for the employee's escaping liability for the additional cost.  The regulation
allows use of noncontract carriers only when the head of the agency (or a designee) has
approved the use as justified because the contract carrier's flights do not have available
seating, are not at appropriate times, or are more expensive (all travel requirements
considered) than a noncontract carrier flight.  41 CFR 301-15.27.  The FTR provides, "In the
absence of specific authorization or approval stated on or attached to the travel authorization
or travel voucher, a civilian traveler shall be responsible for any difference in the cost that
may result from the traveler's unauthorized use of noncontract service."  Id. 301-15.28.

     The last-cited provision of the FTR is consistent with the regulation's general "prudent
person rule" that "[a]n employee traveling on official business is expected to exercise the
same care in incurring expenses that a prudent person would exercise if traveling on personal
business."  41 CFR 301-1.3(a).  A prudent person would monitor the information provided
by travel agents or carriers to make certain that it conforms with previously provided data as
to the costs of various flights.  Ms. Olson did not do this as to her trip from San Francisco
to Washington.  Although she expected that her airfare would be $132 (half of $264), and
knew that the Government had not authorized spending more than that figure, she never
asked why the ticket was priced at $299, more than twice the anticipated amount.  Even
though the employee did not specifically request a noncontract carrier flight on this leg of her
trip, she is charged by regulation with responsibility for the additional cost associated with
the selection of that flight.






                              _________________________
                              STEPHEN M. DANIELS
                              Board Judge