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                               June 3, 1997
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                                13644-TRAV


                   In the Matter of MICHAEL A. DILLIGAN


     Michael A. Dilligan, San Diego, CA, Claimant.

     Judy Hughes, Office of Travel Policy, Columbus Center, Defense 
Finance and Accounting Service, Columbus, OH, appearing for the
Department of Defense.

NEILL, Board Judge.

     Claimant, Michael A. Dilligan, a civilian employee of the
Department of the Navy, asks that we reconsider a decision by the
United States General Accounting Office (GAO) denying a claim he
submitted for the constructive cost of an airline ticket.  In its
decision, GAO upheld a decision of the Department of Defense
denying Mr. Dilligan's claim.  Michael A. Dilligan, Z-2869680 (Feb.
13, 1996).  On reconsideration, we grant the claim in part for the
reasons set out below.  

                                Background

     On September 29, 1994, claimant, who, at the time, was
assigned to the Pacific Fleet Technical Support Center at San
Diego, California, received travel orders directing him to perform
approximately four days of temporary duty (TDY) at the Atlantic
Fleet Technical Support Center at Portsmouth, Virginia.  His orders
authorized him to purchase his own airline ticket, not to exceed
the Government air fare of $490 for a round trip.  

     Claimant and his wife decided to combine their TDY travel with
personal travel to visit friends in Virginia.  His wife had a "2
for 1" airline coupon that had been awarded to her as a premium for
obtaining a credit card.  Using that coupon, Mr. Dilligan purchased
round trip tickets for his wife and himself from San Diego to
Washington, D.C.  From Washington, he planned to complete his trip
to Portsmouth in a rental car, dropping his wife off along the way
to visit with friends.  

     Since the coupon used to purchase the tickets had been 
awarded to his wife, the first ticket purchased by the claimant was
issued to her.  Claimant paid $464 for this ticket.  For the second
ticket, which was issued to him, he paid a service charge of $6. 
On return from his TDY, Mr. Dilligan submitted a travel voucher in
which he sought $490 for an "airplane ticket."  He explains that he
believed that the actual cost of his complete trip from San Diego
to Portsmouth was in excess of this amount but that, because of the
limitation of $490 in his orders, he did not consider he was
entitled to more than this.  Upon examining the airfare receipts,
the paying office concluded that the actual cost of the claimant's
airfare was no more than $6.  This was paid.  The remaining portion
of Mr. Dilligan's claim for the constructive cost of $490 was
denied.  In asking the agency to reconsider this decision, Mr.
Dilligan reduced his claim from $490 to $417.  This was in
recognition that the Government travel rate in effect at the time
for a round-trip from San Diego to Washington was $423.  From this
amount he subtracted the $6 he had already been paid.

     Mr. Dilligan's request to the agency for reconsideration was
denied.  He then appealed to the GAO.  As already noted, the GAO
upheld the denial of his claim.    


                                Discussion

      Key to the denial of Mr. Dilligan's claim is a provision in
statute that only "actual and necessary travel expenses" may be
allowed for Government employees.  5 U.S.C.  5706 (1994).  In
addition to relying on this provision, the agency's decision
denying the claim and the GAO decision upholding this denial also
rely on the well-established precedent regarding reimbursement of
travel costs where an employee combines personal and official
travel.  Under this precedent, reimbursement is limited to the
lesser of the constructive cost of direct routing or the actual
cost of the travel.  E.g., Elinor C. Saunders, B-253551 (Nov. 5,
1993).  

     Claimant challenges the applicability of this precedent to his
own situation.  He contends that, in the cases cited to him, the
employees simply combined personal with official travel.  By
contrast, in this case, Mr. Dilligan states that to get his own
ticket, it was necessary for him to spend actually a total of $470. 
In other words, without the actual personal out-of-pocket
expenditure of $464, the purchase of the $6 ticket would have been
impossible.

     Claimant's argument is not without some merit.  However, he
overlooks the very real fact that by making this necessary, out-of-
pocket expenditure, he also secured a ticket for his wife. 
Obviously, the real cost of her ticket cannot be allowed.  On the
other hand, the agency appears ready to enjoy a nearly free ride
for the nominal fee of $6.  We find the common sense solution to
this problem is to recognize the "2 for 1" coupon for what, in
fact, it really is, namely, an offer by the airline to transport
two passengers, each at half-fare.  In the final analysis, the real
and actual cost of each ticket should be recognized as precisely
half the total paid for both, i.e. $235.  Under law, Mr. Dilligan
is entitled to this amount, as the real actual cost of his ticket. 
Furthermore, in accordance with GAO precedent, which we elect to
follow in this case, it is this actual cost rather than the
constructive cost of direct routing to which the claimant is
entitled.  Mr. Dilligan should, therefore be paid $235 less the $6
dollars he has already received for his airfare.  

     Mr. Dilligan's request for interest on this claim is denied. 
Interest of any type may only be imposed on the Government when it
is authorized by statute or contract.  Shaw v. Library of Congress,
478 U.S. 310 (1986).  Claimant has not cited any such authorization
or agreement to us and we are not aware of any which would cover a
claim such as his.



                                   _____________________
                                   EDWIN B. NEILL
                                   Board Judge