____________________________ October 21, 1997 ____________________________ GSBCA 13804-RELO In the Matter of JEAN M. EVEREST Jean M. Everest, Crofton, MD, Claimant. Michael G. Sullivan, Assistant Inspector General for Auditing, Department of Veterans Affairs, Washington, DC, appearing for Department of Veterans Affairs. WILLIAMS, Board Judge. Claimant seeks reimbursement of $1,689.25 for the shipment of a privately-owned vehicle, temporary quarters subsistence expenses (TQSE), and en route expenses incurred during a permanent change of station. The claim was denied by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), Austin, Texas, and filed with the General Accounting Office (GAO) on July 3, 1996. Background On August 21, 1995, claimant was notified that she was receiving a promotion and transfer from Dallas, Texas, to Washington, D.C. Claimant learned of this while on temporary duty in Washington, D.C, and began searching for permanent quarters in that area as her transfer date of September 17, 1995, was less than a month away. Claimant, who suffered from diseases which restricted her physical activity, lived with her mother-in-law who had only limited wheelchair mobility and was largely confined to a medical bed. Claimant required a home which could accommodate these conditions. She located a home in Crofton, Maryland, which was available for immediate occupancy. Claimant contracted to purchase this home and scheduled the closing for September 29, 1995. Prior to transferring to Washington, D.C., claimant asked agency officials in the VA Finance Center, Travel Section, Austin, Texas, whether she could receive TQSE while she rented the home she eventually planned to occupy permanently, during the period of September 14 to 29, 1995, the date of the closing. Claimant explained that she was unable to locate a hotel which could accommodate her mother-in-law's physical disabilities. In addition, claimant asked whether she could be reimbursed for the cost of a professional service to drive her car from Dallas, Texas, to Crofton, Maryland, since claimant had to accompany her mother- in-law, who could not tolerate a three-day car trip, on an airplane. Claimant's spouse drove one of their cars, and she needed a service to drive the other. Claimant was informed by the VA Finance Center that both TQSE for the September 14 to 29 rental of the home and the cost of the driving service could be reimbursed. However, when claimant completed the reimbursement vouchers, she was informed by the agency that $1,689.25 in reimbursement had been suspended. Specifically, the agency suspended payments of $1,234.33 for TQSE due to claimant's intent to occupy the Crofton, Maryland, home permanently. The agency suspended $109.92 for en route expenses, and $345 for the shipment of a privately-owned vehicle, as such vehicles cannot be shipped at Government expense. Claimant states that she relied in good faith on the advice given to her prior to the move by the VA Finance Center, and that she would have made alternate plans had she known that these expenses would not be covered. She requests that the Board either overturn this decision or refer her claim to Congress under the Meritorious Claims Act, 31 U.S.C.  3702(d). The VA's Assistant Inspector General for Auditing also requested that the Board favorably adjudicate this claim or refer it to Congress. Discussion The reimbursement of TQSE and the shipment of a privately- owned vehicle are governed by separate provisions of the Federal Travel Regulation (FTR). First, with regard to the $1,234.33 of TQSE for the period September 14 to 29, 1995, 41 CFR 302-5.2(f) states in pertinent part that "the period of eligibility (for reimbursement) shall terminate when the employee or any member of the immediate family occupies permanent residence quarters or when the authorized period of time expires, whichever occurs first." Additionally, FTR 302-5.2(c) states that "occupancy of temporary quarters that eventually become the employee's permanent residence shall not prevent payment of the temporary quarters allowance if, in the agency's judgment, the employee shows satisfactorily that the quarters occupied were intended initially to be only temporary." Here, claimant has not demonstrated that the quarters were intended initially to be only temporary. To the contrary, from the time claimant first located the house, she intended to occupy it permanently. Further, the closing date for claimant's purchase of the home was scheduled before she moved in -- again indicating that claimant intended to occupy the home permanently. Elizabeth J. Franchi, GSBCA 13678-RELO (June 26, 1997). The second expense for which reimbursement was initially authorized but later denied was the shipment of a privately-owned vehicle from Dallas, Texas, to Crofton, Maryland, at a cost of $345. The applicable statute, 5 U.S.C.  5727(a), states: "except as specifically authorized by statute, an authorization in a statute or regulation to transport the effects of an employee or other individual at Government expense is not an authorization to transport an automobile." The FTR echoes this statute, but further specifies that "transportation of privately-owned vehicles may be authorized in connection with a transfer or assignment to an official station outside of the continental United States." 41 CFR 302-10.2(a). As the Comptroller General has recognized, "[t]here is no authority for the Government to bear the expense of shipping [a privately-owned vehicle] within the continental United States." Shiela H. Gilette, B-241952 (Apr. 16, 1991); Timothy A. Towns, 58 Comp. Gen. 249 (1979). Here, reimbursement for the transportation of claimant's privately-owned vehicle via a driving service must be denied as such reimbursement is not authorized under existing statutes and regulations. The agency also disallowed $109.92 of the $932.74 claimant requested for en route expenses, stating: "[A]llowing the lesser amount, actual cost vs. method specifically authorized on the travel authority, citing MP-1 [VA Manual of Policy], part II, Chapter 2, para. 8C(2)." The cited agency policy, "Methods of Transportation," provides that official business travel shall be by the method of transportation "most advantageous to the Government" and that the traveler shall be responsible for any additional cost resulting from use of a method of transportation other than that specifically authorized, approved, or required by regulation, e.g., contract air service. Neither claimant nor the agency has explained what the $109.92 represents or why this amount should be reimbursed. On the record before us, there is no basis for allowing the $109.92 in en route expenses. Claimant contends that she relied in good faith on the erroneous authorizations initially provided by the VA Finance Center, and that she would have made alternative plans had she been informed correctly. While it is unfortunate that claimant relied on these initial authorizations, it is well established that agency error does not provide a basis for reimbursement. Federal Crop Insurance Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 384 (1947); Kevin S. Foster, GSBCA 13639-RELO, 97-1 BCA  28,688 (1996). Alternatively, claimant requests that if the claim cannot be adjudicated favorably under the existing regulations, the Board present the claim to Congress under the Meritorious Claims Act, 31 U.S.C.  3702(d). This statute states in pertinent part that "the official responsible under subsection (a) for settling the claim shall report to Congress on a claim against the Government that is timely presented under this section that may not be adjusted by existing appropriation, and that the official believes Congress should consider for legal or equitable reasons." Pub. L. No. 104-316, 202(n), 110 Stat. 3826, 3843 (1996). Under 31 U.S.C.  3702(d), the Administrator of General Services is the "official responsible" for settling relocation claims against the Government. While the Administrator of General Services has delegated the authority to this Board to settle these claims, he has not delegated his authority under the Meritorious Claims Act. William Archilla, GSBCA 13878-RELO, 97-1 BCA  28,799. Thus, this Board does not have the delegated or statutory authority to present this claim to Congress. Decision The claim is denied. We are forwarding our decision in this case to the Administrator of General Services, for his consideration under the Meritorious Claims Act. See Joseph A. Curtis, GSBCA 13823-RELO, 97-1 BCA  28,935. ______________________________ MARY ELLEN COSTER WILLIAMS Board Judge