Board of Contract Appeals General Services Administration Washington, D.C. 20405 DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION: March 13, 2000 GSBCA 15097-TD THE WRITING COMPANY, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, Respondent. Jerroll M. Sanders, President and CEO of The Writing Company, St. Louis, MO, appearing for Appellant. Edward N. Ramras, Office of Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Service, Department of the Treasury, Washington, DC, counsel for Respondent. Before Board Judges DANIELS (Chairman), BORWICK, and GOODMAN. GOODMAN, Board Judge. This appeal was filed by The Writing Company by notice of appeal dated August 9, 1999. The appeal arises from a contract between appellant and the respondent, Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service (IRS). In an initial conference with the parties, respondent indicated to the Board that it intended to file a motion to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction, alleging that the appellant had neither filed a claim pursuant to the Contract Disputes Act of 1978, 41 U.S.C.  601-613 (1994 & Supp. III 1997) (CDA), nor received a contracting officer's appealable final decision on a claim. The Board directed the parties to submit the appeal file, so that the Board would have sufficient information to make a determination on the jurisdictional issue. Thereafter, the respondent filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. For the reasons stated below, we grant the motion and dismiss the appeal. Findings of Fact 1. Appellant was the subcontractor under Contract TIRNO-98-C-0041 (the contract) for the rewriting and redesign of the IRS computerized notices to taxpayers. The contract was originally awarded on March 3, 1998 as a sole source, Section 8(a) letter contract with the Small Business Administration (SBA) as the prime contractor and appellant as the subcontractor. Appeal File, Vol. 1, Exhibit 1. 2. The amount initially obligated by the agency under the contract was $200,000, and the completion date was July 1998. The contract was modified on May 8, 1998 to increase the obligation to $485,558. Appeal File, Vol. 1, Exhibit 3. 3. The amount obligated under the contract was increased incrementally to $1,144,538. Appeal File, Vol. 1, Exhibit 4. The completion date was extended to October 1, 1999. Id. Exhibit 9. 4. Appellant sent a letter dated January 28, 1999 to the contracting officer. The letter read in relevant part: As you know, the purpose of the Contract Disputes Clause is to allow for an equitable resolution of contract-related issues that are not resolved in the normal course of business. . . . During the course of this contract, The Writing Company has informed you of several issues we believe do not comply with Federal Acquisition Regulation[][FAR]. To date many of these issues have not been resolved. . . . Since October 1998, . . . our firm has received directives from the COTR [contracting officer's technical representative] and from Contracting that conflict with FAR provisions. The specific actions and directives that we believe violate FAR are as follows: Unilateral Alteration to Project Management Scope . . . -The Writing Company was afforded substantial project management latitude to accomplish this task . . . . While management embraced this approach, selected stakeholders disagreed with the decision to outsource . . . . The existing scope allowed the Writing Company to develop 104 notices during the prior phase and will enable us to produce the remaining notices by July 31, 1999, and also will enable IRS to fulfill its promise to Congress. Absence of a Project Timeline . . . Every Project requires a delivery schedule. For four months . . . The Writing Company has operated without a delivery date and a time line. . . . Misrepresentation of Selected Stakeholders with the Intent to Deceive: Subpart 33.2. While The Writing Company is very concerned with the mischaracterization of our firm's performance, we are more concerned about how such misrepresentations affect the decisions IRS managers make. . . . A continuous stream of innuendo has conveyed an impression of The Writing Company that is grossly inaccurate and egregious. . . . To ensure that The Writing Company's performance is accurately recorded, we request that: an objective third party assess the performance of all persons involved in this project. Government provide in writing all allegations levied against The Writing Company to date, and The Writing Company be given an opportunity to formally respond to such allegations. The COTR and the other stakeholders be expressly prohibited from commenting on The Writing Company's performance, unless discussing issues that have been placed in writing and confirmed as legitimate by Contracting. Government issue to The Writing Company an acceptance report for the deliverables provided to the Government in September 1998. A review in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act, of any performance related documents listed in the Government's files, including any and all acceptance reports, as well as any memorandums from the COTR or other stakeholders. Unilateral Nullification of the Escalation Clause. The Escalation process places the burden of prompt response on the notice owner. Alleviating this provision has significantly increased redesign task duration, since phone calls are not promptly returned - and in some instances, not returned at all. While the escalation process is not the friendliest process, it produces results. Also, The Writing Company always uses the process respectfully. Unilateral Process Revision. When this contract was negotiated, we (the Government and The Writing Company) bilaterally agreed to a process. The Government unilaterally changed the process. . . . [I]n addition to extending the notice development time frame, the process endorsed by the Government more than doubles the resources that must be assigned to the project. . . . Unilateral Change to the Scope of Work . . . . The Writing Company is preparing a revised price proposal addressing these changes . . . . Changes Made to Prototype Notices . . . . The Writing Company has been damaged by these actions . . . . Remedy is sought. Other issues According to the Notice Redesign Contract, the Government was to deliver to the Contractor all documents needed for Notice Redesign. As of January, 1999, some of the required documents still have not been provided. . . . We seek an immediate response to the aforementioned. Appeal File, Vol. 4, Exhibit 7. 5. Neither the appellant's letter dated January 28, 1999 nor any of the attachments to the letter contained a request for payment of a sum certain or any dollar amounts due as the result of the allegations set forth in the letter. 6. The contract incorporated by reference a Termination for Convenience clause, FAR 52.249-6 (Alternate IV) (Sept. 1996). Appeal File, Vol.1, Exhibit 1 at 20. The clause reads in relevant part: "The Government may terminate performance of work under this contract in whole . . . if . . . [t]he Contracting Officer determines that a termination is in the Government's interest." Id. 7. By letter dated February 24, 1999, the contract was terminated for the convenience of the Government by the contracting officer. Appeal File, Vol. 4, Exhibit 1. 8. Following the termination, appellant and respondent attempted to negotiate a modified contract, with the possibility of partial reinstatement of the contract if agreement could be reached. Notice of Appeal at 2. 9. On April 26, 1999, the IRS submitted to the appellant a reinstatement offer. Appeal File, Vol. 5, Exhibit 36. 10. On April 28, 1999, appellant submitted a counterproposal. Appeal File, Vol. 5, Exhibit 34. 11. By letter dated May 12, 1999, the IRS responded to appellant's counterproposal. Notice of Appeal, Attachment 4. 12. The negotiations were not successful, and the contract was not reinstated in whole or in part. 13. By letter to appellant's president and chief executive officer (CEO) dated May 14, 1999, respondent's Assistant Commissioner for Procurement, Gregory D. Rothwell, stated: As promised during our telephone conversations of May 11, 1999, I am responding to your letter of January 28, 1999. Your letter raised several issues and concerns regarding the contract and its administration. Many of your concerns in your letter center around changes that were made to the contract terms and conditions, either by the Contracting Officer or by the Contracting Officer's Technical Representative (COTR). We believe that these changes were proper, pursuant to the contract clause entitled "Changes" (FAR 52-243) which permits the Government to make changes either unilaterally or bilaterally to the contract specifications. I do not believe that these changes operated to the financial detriment of your firm. Furthermore, your letter does not request any monetary adjustment to the contract. Clearly, better communications between the Government and your firm would have resolved or lessened many of the concerns expressed in your letter. Appeal File, Vol. 5, Exhibit 28; Notice of Appeal, Attachment 1. 14. By letter dated May 20, 1999 to the appellant's president and CEO, the Director of IRS's Office of Contract Administration, John T. Smith, stated: Confirming our discussion of May 19, I am responding to your request for a "Contracting Officer's Final Decision" regarding your correspondence dated January 28, 1999. Since your letter of January 28, 1999, many of the issues have been overcome by events and there have been numerous telephone conversations between you and members of this organization that have resulted in conflicting requests. Prior to issuing any formal Contracting Officer Decision, it is requested that you clearly articulate in writing the issues you consider open and needing to be addressed. Appeal File, Vol. 5, Exhibit 24; Notice of Appeal, Attachment 2. 15. By letter dated June 22, 1999, appellant questioned the veracity of statements made in the COTR's Inspection Report dated September 28, 1998. Appeal File, Vol. 5, Exhibit 17. 16. By letter dated July 9, 1999 to appellant, IRS's Mr. Smith stated: This letter is in response to your correspondence of June 22, 1999 regarding the Inspection Report prepared by the COTR for the September 21, 1998 deliverables. We consider the issues raised regarding the Inspection Report moot. As previously stated, the IRS found the contract as awarded to be unmanageable, and so terminated it for the convenience of the government, in accordance with the contract terms. The IRS then attempted to negotiate with The Writing Company to reinstate a more manageable contract, but your firm declined to accept the revised contract. Appeal File Supp., Exhibit 82; Notice of Appeal, Attachment 3. 17. To date, $831,982 has been paid to appellant. Respondent's Motion to Dismiss at 2. 18. Appellant has not filed a termination for convenience settlement proposal. Respondent's Motion to Dismiss at 2. 19. Appellant filed a notice of appeal with this Board dated August 9, 1999, and the appeal was docketed as GSBCA 15097-TD. 20. The notice of appeal characterized the nature of the dispute as follows: The Writing Company appeals the following: Final Decision of Contracting Officer John T. Smith, dated May 12, 1999, pertaining to the termination of the Notice Redesign Contract for Government's convenience; and the final decision of Assistant Commissioner (Procurement) Gregory D. Rothwell, dated May 14, 1999, pertaining to a dispute dated January 28, 1999. . . . As stated in the dispute dated January 28, 1999, representatives of the IRS repeatedly misrepresented The Writing Company's performance and demonstrated bad faith in the administration of the contract. In a response to our dispute dated May 14, 1999 . . . Assistant Commissioner (Procurement) Gregory D. Rothwell alleges that the termination dissolved concerns stated in the dispute. In a letter dated May 20, 1999, Contracting Officer John T. Smith fails to provide a response to The Writing Company's request for a final decision of the dispute. In correspondence dated July 9, 1999, . . . John T. Smith dismisses The Writing Company's concerns about misrepresentations and falsified documents, labeling them "moot.". . . On February 24, 1999, the IRS terminated its contract with The Writing Company using the Termination for Convenience clause. On April 26, 1999, the IRS submitted to the Writing Company a reinstatement offer. On April 28, 1999, The Writing Company submitted a counterproposal. On May 12, 1999, the Government submitted its response to the Writing Company's counterproposal. . . . On June 28, 1999, the IRS reiterated its intent to complete the contract termination process in correspondence directed to Senators Ashcroft and Bond. Also attached is a chronology of events . . . which was prepared by the Appellant. The chronology does not reflect all civil and federal violations alleged by The Writing Company. Notice of Appeal at 1. 21. The notice of appeal seeks the following relief: [A] complete and thorough evaluation of activities related to this contract so that the written and verbal record accurately portrays The Writing Company's performance. . . . [T]hat the IRS be prohibited from procuring the services described in the . . . Contract from any source other than The Writing Company . . . . [F]ull contract reinstatement; compensation for all legal fees; compensation for all hours The Writing Company's Personnel expend contesting the termination; and compensation for all other costs deemed appropriate. Notice of Appeal at 2. 22. In addition to the documents indicated above as attachments to the notice of appeal, there were two other documents attached. The first was a letter from Gregory D. Rothwell to a United States Senator in response to an inquiry from the Senator. Notice of Appeal, Attachment 5. The second was a document entitled "Foul Play at the Treasury and the IRS - Appellant's Synopsis of Events" Notice of Appeal, Attachment 6. 23. On December 22, 1999, the respondent filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. 24. On January 6, 2000, the appellant filed a response to the Respondent's motion to dismiss. 25. On January 10, 2000, appellant filed a pleading entitled "Request for Payment of Charges Outlined in Dispute." The charges discussed in the request are identical to those amounts sought in another appeal filed by appellant, docketed as GSBCA 15117-TD, and the Board assumes that the citation of the docket number on the pleading was incorrect. This pleading is deemed filed in GSBCA 15117-TD. Discussion Respondent's Motion To Dismiss The Government's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction contains four grounds. The Government asserts that 1) the termination for convenience is not appealable, 2) the Board has no jurisdiction because a valid claim has not been filed pursuant to the Contract Disputes Act and no contracting officer's decision has been issued, 3) appellant has failed to prove bad faith on the part of the Government, and 4) appellant requests relief which is not within the power of the Board to grant. Appellant's Assertion of Jurisdiction Appellant's position as to the jurisdiction of this Board over its appeal is based upon assertions in its notice of appeal and response to the Government's motion to dismiss. In its notice of appeal, appellant states that the basis of this Board's jurisdiction is appellant's letter to the contracting officer dated January 28, 1999, which it characterizes as a "contract dispute," and letters dated May 12, 1999 from John T. Smith and May 14, 1999 from Gregory T. Rothwell, which appellant characterizes as contracting officer final decisions. In its notice of appeal, appellant also enumerates various remedies which it seeks. Findings 20, 21. Contrary to the position taken in its notice of appeal, appellant now asserts that the respondent did not issue a final decision in response to its January 28, 1999 letter. Response to Respondent's Motion at 7. Appellant's response to the motion to dismiss contains additional allegations which it believes serve as the basis for jurisdiction, reiterates the remedies requested in the notice of appeal, and seeks additional remedies. This Board's Analysis of the Jurisdictional Issue We must first determine if appellant's letter of January 28, 1999 is a claim pursuant to the Contract Disputes Act (CDA), and whether an appealable contracting officer's decision was issued in response to same. We will then review the additional allegations in the appellant's notice of appeal and response to respondent's motion to dismiss to determine if the information presented therein supports jurisdiction by this Board. Finally, we will address the remedies sought by appellant in this appeal. Appellant's January 28, 1999 letter was not a "claim" pursuant to the CDA Appellant characterizes its letter dated January 28, 1999 as a "dispute." Appellant asserts that this document was a request for a contracting officer's final decision. We must examine the contents of that letter to determine if it meets the statutory and regulatory requirements of a "claim" pursuant to the CDA and relevant regulations. The CDA requires that: All claims by a contractor against the government relating to a contract shall be in writing and shall be submitted to the contracting officer for a decision. 41 U.S.C.  605(a). Although the term "claim" is not defined in the CDA, the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) defines it as: a written demand or written assertion by one of the contracting parties seeking, as a matter of right, the payment of money in a sum certain, the adjustment or interpretation of contract terms, or other relief arising under or relating to the contract. . . . A voucher, invoice, or other routine request for payment that is not in dispute when submitted is not a claim. 48 CFR 33.201 (1998). The CDA grants this Board jurisdiction over appeals from contracting officer decisions: Each agency board shall have jurisdiction to decide any appeal from a decision of a contracting officer (1) relative to a contract made by its agency, and (2) relative to a contract made by any other agency when such agency . . . has designated the agency board to decide the appeal.[] 41 U.S.C.  607(d). Accordingly, presentation of a claim to a contracting officer is a jurisdictional prerequisite to proceeding at the Board. Buckner and Moore, Inc. v. General Services Administration, GSBCA 13403, 96-1 BCA  28,021 (1995). Appellant's January 28, 1999 letter does mention the Disputes clause of the Contract and requests a response. Finding 4. However, the letter does not meet the statutory and regulatory requirements of a "claim," as it omits essential requirements as discussed below. The letter is not a monetary claim as it does not demand a sum or sums certain According to the FAR, a claim is a written demand which seeks as a matter of right either a payment of money, the adjustment or interpretation of contract terms, or other relief arising under or relating to a contract. The three basic requirements for a claim for monetary relief are: (i) a written demand, (ii) seeking, as a matter of right, (iii) the payment of money in a sum certain. D.L. Braughler Co. v. West, 127 F.3d 1476, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1997). In its letter of January 28, 1999, appellant describes various topics which allegedly impacted its contract performance and caused increased efforts and damages for which it will request monetary relief in the form of repriced work. These are: unilateral nullification of the escalation clause, unilateral process revision, unilateral change to the scope of work, and changes made to prototype notices. Finding 4. Despite the assertion of financial impact, appellant did not quantify the amounts allegedly due. Finding 5. While claimant makes a demand for money, it has failed to set forth a sum certain. A demand which fails to set forth a sum certain is not a claim under the CDA. Paul A. Preston v. General Services Administration, GSBCA 14517, 99-2 BCA  30,515. Accordingly, appellant's letter, if viewed as a written demand seeking a payment of money, does not meet the requirements of a claim. The remaining issues raised by appellant in its letter of January 28, 1999 -- the allegations concerning the unilateral alteration to project management scope, the lack of a project delivery schedule, misrepresentation by Government representatives, and the failure of the Government to deliver necessary documents -- were not specifically mentioned as having a monetary impact on appellant. If appellant considered these matters to be the basis of monetary claims, it failed to even mention that it would seek monetary recovery for them. The effect of the termination for convenience on these matters is discussed elsewhere in this decision. If the letter is a claim for contract interpretation or adjustment, the termination for convenience renders the claim moot There were issues raised by appellant in its January 28, 1999 letter that were not specifically characterized as having a monetary impact -- the unilateral alteration to project management scope, the lack of a project delivery schedule, misrepresentation by government representatives, and the failure of the Government to deliver necessary documents. The contract contained a termination clause and the contract was terminated for convenience by letter dated February 24, 1999. Findings 6, 7. Even if these issues are construed as "requests for the adjustment or interpretation of contract terms, or other relief arising under or relating to the contract," the termination for convenience of the contract rendered such requests moot. Bulova Watch Co., ASBCA 5259, 60-2 BCA  2704. Such requests are rendered moot because, lacking a request for monetary relief, adjustment or interpretation of contract terms after termination of the contract would not afford the contractor any benefit. Appellant's notice of appeal cannot be construed as an appeal of the termination for convenience Appellant's January 28, 1999 letter was written and received by the contracting officer almost one month before the termination for convenience. Termination of a contract for convenience is not in and of itself an appealable contracting officer's decision; Larry G. Pyle, ASBCA 41155, 90-3 BCA  23,252; Baranof Mental Health Clinic, ASBCA 33172, 87-1 BCA  19,346 (1986). The appellant's appeal cannot be construed as an appeal of the decision to terminate the contract for convenience. No contracting officer final decisions were issued Despite taking the position in its response to respondent's motion to dismiss that there was no contracting officer's final decision, appellant in its notice of appeal, refers to two letters which it characterizes as contracting officer final decisions in response to its January 28, 1999 letter. The first letter, dated May 12, 1999, from Contracting Officer John T. Smith is clearly a response to appellant's counterproposal dated April 28, 1999 concerning the attempted reinstatement of the contract. It is not in response to the January 28, 1999 letter. Finding 11. The second letter, dated May 14. 1999 from Gregory D. Rothwell, while referencing the January 28, 1999 letter is not characterized by the author as a contracting officer's final decision. It references the fact that "no monetary adjustment to the contract" was requested by appellant, i.e., no sum certain was requested. Finding 13. These letters are not appealable contracting officer final decisions. The January 28, 1999 letter and respondent's response do not confer jurisdiction on this Board In summary, appellant's letter dated January 28, 1999 did not meet the requirements of a monetary claim, as no sum certain was requested in that letter. To the extent that appellant's letter was a request for "the adjustment or interpretation of contract terms, or other relief arising under or relating to the contract," such requests were rendered moot by the termination for convenience. Respondent's responses to the letter were not appealable contracting officer final decisions. Appellant's response to the Government's motion to dismiss Appellant's response in support of the Board's jurisdiction contains the following requests for remedial action and additional allegations: A request for an injunction against the termination for convenience. Appellant's Response at 2. Extensive allegations of the lack of good faith, or "bad faith" by the Government in the administration of the contract, the termination process, and the negotiations attempting to reinstate the contract. Appellant's Response at 2-5. Allegations of violations of various statutes and regulations. Appellant's Response at 5-6. Allegations that documents in the appeal file indicate that the Government should have given appellant cure notices under the default termination clause of the contract and allowed a cure period, rather than terminating for convenience, and that Government officials intentionally mischaracterized appellant's performance. Appellant's Response at 6-7. Allegations that appellant's letter of January 28, 1999 was a "Contract Dispute," that it contained information sufficient to be considered a claim under the Contract Disputes Act, and that the Government failed to issue a final decision. Appellant's Response at 7-8. Allegations that there have been violations of the Federal Criminal False Statements Act, 18 U.S.C.  1001. Appellant's Response at 8-9. A reiteration and clarification of relief sought. Appellant requests that the contract be reinstated, and that appellant be reimbursed for all costs incurred in contesting the termination, that the IRS be prohibited from procuring similar services from other sources. Appellant also requests that this Board "thoroughly evaluate activities relating to this contract so that the written and verbal record accurately portrays The Writing Company's performance, and that appellant be authorized to bring tort actions before the Board." Appellant's Response at 9-10. A request for discovery to "evaluate the damage [appellant] has sustained from Respondent's false allegations and misrepresentations, and assign a monetary value to the tort claims it intends to bring against respondent before the Board of Contract Appeals." Appellant's Response at 10. Allegations concerning "bad faith"in appellant's notice of appeal and response to the Government's motion do not set forth a basis of jurisdiction Appellant in its notice of appeal states: "As stated in the dispute dated January 28, 1999, representatives of the IRS repeatedly misrepresented The Writing Company's performance and demonstrated bad faith in the administration of the contract." As discussed above, the January 28, 1999 letter was not a claim under the CDA. Appellant also devotes an extensive portion of its response to respondent's motion to dismiss to a discussion of "bad faith" on the part of the Government. However, in its response to the respondent's motion, the appellant's discussions focus extensively on the Government's actions gleaned from a review of the appeal file, with allegations concerning improper and illegal actions during the administration of the contract, improper Government motivation for issuing the termination for convenience, and improper Government actions during the reinstatement negotiations. Such allegations have not been presented to the contracting officer in a claim pursuant to the CDA. An appellant cannot confer jurisdiction upon a board of contract appeals by presenting issues in a notice of appeal or other pleading which have not previously been presented to a contracting officer for a decision. PRO/DES, Inc. v. General Services Administration, GSBCA 13165, et al., 95-2 BCA  27,659. Accordingly, the allegations of bad faith in the appellant's notice of appeal and response to the motion to dismiss do not confer jurisdiction upon this Board. Appellant requests relief which is not within the power of the board to grant Appellant has requested the following relief: [A] complete and thorough evaluation of activities related to this contract so that the written and verbal record accurately portrays The Writing Company's performance. . . . [T]hat the IRS be prohibited from procuring the services described in the . . . Contract from any source other than The Writing Company . . . . [F]ull contract reinstatement; compensation for all legal fees; compensation for all hours The Writing Company's Personnel expend contesting the termination; and compensation for all other costs deemed appropriate. Finding 2. With regard to appellant's request for "a complete and thorough evaluation of activities related to this contract so that the written and verbal record accurately portrays The Writing Company's performance," appellant states that: This request meets the conditions for a claim. The Contract Disputes Act states that a claim by the contractor "shall be made in writing and submitted to the Contracting Officer for a written decision." Thus appellant's Contract Dispute and subsequent notice of appeal meet stated requirements. Appellant's Response to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss at 9. As stated above, the Board's jurisdiction is from appeals of contracting officer final decisions in response to claims under the CDA. We do not sit as an investigatory body to generally evaluate the administration of a contract at the request of a contractor or the Government. Appellant's request that this Board prohibit the IRS from procuring services described in the contract from any other source is a request for injunctive relief. In its response to the Government's motion to dismiss, the appellant cites various judicial decisions by federal courts that have enjoined convenience terminations. Boards of contract appeals lack jurisdiction over suits seeking injunctive relief. Ulrich McMillan d/b/a Atrum Graphic Studios 1926, GSBCA 7029-COM, et al., 83-2 BCA  16,595. Accordingly, we cannot prohibit the IRS from procuring services described in the contract. Appellant has also requested that we order reinstatement of the contract. This is a request for specific performance of the contract. Boards of contract appeals do not have jurisdiction over such requests, and this remedy is not available here. Western Aviation Maintenance Inc. v. General Services Administration, GSBCA 14165, 98-2 BCA  29,816; Dixon Pest Control, Inc., ASBCA 41042, 91-1 BCA  23,640 (1990); Red Sea Trading Associates Inc., ASBCA 36360, 91-1 BCA  23,567 (1990). With regard to appellant's request for compensation for legal fees, the Board construes this as a request for legal fees and expenses under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 5 U.S.C.  504 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). The request is premature, as an application for such fees and expenses may be filed only after appellant prevails on the merits of an appeal. Even if appellant prevails, legal fees and expenses are not automatically recovered. Appellant must meet the size requirements for eligibility for recovery, and other requirements of the statute must be met. See, e.g., S.A. Ludsin v. General Services Administration, GSBCA 14175-C, 13777-SBA, 97-2 BCA  29,185. Appellant also requests compensation for all hours its personnel expend contesting the termination. Appellant is a pro se litigant represented by its President and CEO. No attorney has filed an appearance on behalf of appellant. The term "fees and other expenses" is defined in the EAJA to include "reasonable attorney . . . fees." 5 U.S.C.  504(b)(1)(A). We have previously held that the EAJA does not authorize payment to pro se litigants for the time they themselves devote to cases. Vehicle Maintenance Services v. General Services Administration, GSBCA 12942-C (11663), 95-1 BCA  27,513. Tort actions In its response to the Government's motion to dismiss, appellant has added an additional request for relief: [U]pon reviewing the Appeal File and discovering the extent of slander and misrepresentation, Appellant wishes to pursue, via the Board of Contract Appeals, remedies for the tortious infraction committed by respondent and its representatives[] . . . . Appellant requests discovery so that Appellant can firmly evaluate the damage it has sustained from Respondent's false allegations and misrepresentations, and assign a monetary value to the tort claims it intends to bring against respondent before the Board of Contract Appeals. Appellant's Response at 10. It is clear from appellant's response that its decision to pursue remedies for tortious infractions arises from its assessment of the actions of the Government based upon its reading of the appeal file. No claim pursuant to the CDA has been submitted to the contracting officer concerning these allegations of slander and misrepresentation. Only after the contractor has received a contracting officer's appealable final decision in response to a claim can this Board determine if it would have jurisdiction over an appeal of this nature, based upon the specific circumstances of the claim. The Board cannot "authorize" appellant to bring tort actions at the Board as appellant requests. Violations of the Federal Criminal False Statements Act In its response to the Government's Motion to Dismiss, the appellant alleges that respondent's employees have violated the Federal Criminal False Statement Act, and requests the Board to determine if such violations have occurred. As a general proposition, boards of contract appeals have no jurisdiction over violations of criminal statutes. United States v. Medico Industries, Inc., 685 F.2d 230 (7th Cir. 1982); Greenleaf Distribution Services, Inc., ASBCA 34300, 88-3 BCA  21,001. Similarly, in Cessna Aircraft Co., ASBCA 43196, 93-1 BCA  25,511 (1992), the appellant alleged that the contracting officer violated Navy regulations by deliberately falsifying the financial accounting data sheet which purportedly supported a contract modification. Appellant suggested later in its motion for partial summary judgment that what the contracting officer did was in violation of 18 U.S.C.  1001 and 1018, and an array of other felony statutes. The Board held that it had no jurisdiction to determine violations of criminal statutes under Title 18 of the United States Code. Accordingly, we have no jurisdiction to determine if the alleged criminal violations occurred. Summary Appellant's letter dated January 28, 1999 did not meet the requirements of a monetary claim, as no sum certain was requested in that letter. To the extent that appellant's letter was a request for "the adjustment or interpretation of contract terms, or other relief arising under or relating to the contract," such requests were rendered moot by the termination for convenience. Respondent's responses to the letter were not appealable contracting officer final decisions. The additional allegations submitted by appellant in its response to the Government's motion to dismiss do not confer jurisdiction upon this Board. The specific requests for relief sought by appellant in in its notice of appeal and reply to the Government's motion to dismiss are either premature or seek remedies which this Board has no authority to grant. Decision This appeal is DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION. _________________________ ALLAN H. GOODMAN Board Judge We concur: _________________________ ____________________ STEPHEN M. DANIELS ANTHONY S. BORWICK Board Judge Board Judge