Board of Contract Appeals General Services Administration Washington, D.C. 20405 GSBCA 14386, 14387 DENIED; GSBCA 14899 GRANTED IN PART: February 11, 2000 GSBCA 14386, 14387, 14899 TWIGG CORPORATION, Appellant, v. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, Respondent. Maurice J. Mountain, McLean, VA, counsel for Appellant. Martin A. Hom, Kevin J. Rice, Gerald L. Schrader, and Joseph L. McCann, Office of General Counsel, General Services Administration, Washington, DC, counsel for Respondent. Before Board Judges DANIELS (Chairman), DeGRAFF, and GOODMAN. DANIELS, Board Judge. While Twigg Corporation (Twigg) was renovating a building under a contract with the General Services Administration (GSA), difficulties arose with regard to installation of the fire alarm system. In this opinion, we consider and resolve three claims relating to that system, two by the contractor and one by the Government. Findings of Fact General contract provisions 1. The contract in question was for the renovation of the low-rise portion of the Columbia Plaza office complex in Washington, D.C. The contract was awarded to Twigg on August 9, 1994, and work under it was originally to have been completed by August 11, 1995. Respondent's Stipulations 1, 2.[foot #] 1 2. As part of the contract, Twigg was required to design and provide a new, complete multiplex/addressable voice fire alarm system. Respondent's Stipulation 3. Twigg subcontracted with Jenkins Electrical Contracting (Jenkins) to install this system. Jenkins in turn contracted with Tenn Pro-Tec (Tenn) to prepare requisite submittals, supply the equipment for the system, and make the final connections. Respondent's Stipulation 4; Transcript at 107-09. The contract required that the fire alarm system be installed in accordance with the drawings and specifications included in the contract and publications referenced in it. Respondent's Stipulation 5. Contractor's submittals 3. The contract also required Twigg to make written submittals, including shop drawings, regarding the fire alarm system. Appeal File,[foot #] 2 Exhibit A-1 at 16723-8 to -9. These submittals, like others under the contract, had to be made to GSA's architect-engineer for this project, Girard Engineering, PC (Girard), and could be approved or disapproved by that firm. In addition, specifically for the fire alarm system, "[b]efore any work is commenced, the submittal must be approved by the GSA Regional Safety and Environmental Management Division." Id. at 01300-2, 16723-8 to -9. (We refer to this unit as the Safety Division in this opinion.) The contract provided that "[a]pproval of drawings and schedules will be general and shall not be construed as permitting any departure from the contract requirements." Id. at 23 of Construction Contract Clauses (Fixed Price). Only the agency's contracting officer or an individual delegated authority by her could approve such a departure. Id. at 01300-2. 4. Twigg's first set of fire alarm shop drawings was received by Girard on November 18, 1994. Respondent's Stipulation 9. The architect-engineer returned the drawings on December 12, 1994. Girard made two pages of comments and placed a GSA stamp on one of those pages. It returned these comments to Twigg after having checked an entry on the stamp entitled "Revise as Noted," but not having checked the entry "Resubmit." Appeal File, Exhibit 13 at 1-2. These entries amount to a version of a marking permitted by the contract, "Approved as Noted," meaning "[w]ork may proceed, provided it complies with notations and ----------- FOOTNOTE BEGINS --------- [foot #] 1 The only stipulations cited in this opinion are those which have been proposed by GSA and agreed to by Twigg. [foot #] 2 GSA submitted a separate appeal file for each of the three cases addressed in this opinion. All references to an appeal file in the opinion are to the appeal file for GSBCA 14386, except for those instances in which another file is cited. ----------- FOOTNOTE ENDS ----------- corrections on submittal and with Contract Documents." Twigg Corp. v. General Services Administration, GSBCA 14387, 98-2 BCA 29,803, at 147,621; see Appeal File, Exhibit A-1 at 01300-8; Transcript at 52. Charles Jenkins, Jenkins' president, understood from Girard's entries on the stamp that "[t]he equipment was basically approved, except for what they had noted and what comments they had noted." Transcript at 119. 5. The Board heard expert testimony from a registered fire protection engineer called by Twigg, Thomas C. Brown. Mr. Brown was qualified as an expert in writing and analyzing specifications for fire alarm systems and in reviewing fire alarm submittals. Transcript at 17, 28-29, 32-34. Mr. Brown testified that most of Girard's comments were "very broad in nature and several of them would have required . . . substantial reapplication[] engineering of the product." Id. at 47. He believed that the contractor should have understood that complying with the comments would require significant changes and should have addressed the areas discussed in the comments before installing the system. Indeed, Mr. Brown testified, the contractor could have been in "big trouble" if it did not address the comments before beginning work on the system. Id. at 48-51, 89-93. 6. During the fall of 1995, GSA realized that its Safety Division had not yet reviewed Twigg's fire alarm system submittals. By this time, work on the system was more than half complete. Appeal File, Exhibit 43 at 21; Transcript at 296, 301. The agency asked for a copy of the submittals, and Twigg supplied, on December 19, the exact same submittal it had made to Girard a year earlier. Appeal File, Exhibit 49. 7. Klinker & Associates, Inc. (Klinker), a fire protection engineering consulting firm, reviewed the fire alarm submittals for the GSA Safety Division. Klinker provided thirty-four detailed comments on the December 19, 1995, resubmittal. The first of them was that the contractor still needed to comply with the comments contained in Girard's letter of December 12, 1994. Respondent's Stipulation 15; Appeal File, Exhibit 51. Twigg has stipulated, and Mr. Brown agreed, that all thirty-four of the comments are valid and merely required the contractor to comply with contract specifications. Respondent's Stipulation 16; Transcript at 57. The comments were provided by the GSA Safety Division to Twigg on January 17, 1996, with the notation, "Submission is disapproved; Resubmission is required." Appeal File, Exhibit 51 at 1. 8. In comment 13, GSA called to Twigg's attention a need to "[p]rovide details on the wiring used for the fire alarm system to assure that it meets the requirements of paragraph 3.2C of section 16723 [of the contract]." Appeal File, Exhibit 51 at 3. That paragraph specifies the use of various types of wiring for various purposes, including, "Notification appliance circuits shall be solid copper No. 12 AWG [American wire gauge] size conductors at a minimum." Id., Exhibit A-1 at 16723-22 to -23. The types of wiring to be used on this project had not been addressed in either the contractor's initial submittal or Girard's review of it. Twigg Corp., 98-2 BCA at 147,620; Transcript at 72-73. 9. Notwithstanding the GSA Safety Division's disapproval of the contractor's fire alarm system submittal, Jenkins' president decided to make every effort to complete the system by the then-specified project completion date, at the end of March 1996. Mr. Jenkins wanted to avoid having to pay liquidated damages which GSA might impose if the system were finished after that date. Transcript at 136. 10. The contractor made another submittal on February 12, 1996. Appeal File, Exhibit 53. On February 23, that submittal was disapproved. Again, GSA sent the contractor thirty-four detailed comments prepared by Klinker; many of them, including the one noting a need to comply with Girard's 1994 comments, were restatements of January 17 comments whose impact had not been addressed by the contractor. Respondent's Stipulation 17; Appeal File, Exhibit 61. Mr. Brown agreed that all of the February 23 comments were valid and in accordance with contract specifications. Transcript at 71. 11. There followed a steady stream of resubmittals and rejections accompanied by detailed comments: resubmittal on March 26, 1996, rejection (with twenty-nine comments) on April 3; resubmittal on April 16, rejection (with forty-eight comments) on May 6; resubmittal on May 24, rejection (with twenty-five comments) on June 6; resubmittal on June 17, rejection (with twenty-seven comments) on July 8. Respondent's Stipulations 19, 20, 22, 23, 28, 30; Appeal File, Exhibits 88, 107, 120, 141. Mr. Brown acknowledged that all of GSA's comments were valid and directed to compliance with contract specifications. Transcript at 92; see also id. at 601 (testimony of Klinker's Joseph Dafin that all comments were consistent with contract requirements). At long last, the contractor's resubmittal of July 12, 1996, was approved (though even then, only "as noted") on July 23. Respondent's Stipulation 30; Appeal File, Exhibit 152. In Mr. Brown's opinion, the submittal review process took about twice as long as it usually does, and the principal reason for the long duration was that the contractor's original submittal was insufficiently detailed and its responses to GSA/Klinker comments were not always complete or responsive. Transcript at 79, 81. Inspections 12. The contract contains an Inspection of Construction clause which includes these paragraphs: (b) The Contractor shall maintain an adequate inspection system and perform such inspections as will ensure that the work performed under the contract conforms to contract requirements. . . . (c) Government inspections and tests are for the sole benefit of the Government and do not -- (1) Relieve the Contractor of responsibility for providing adequate quality control measures; . . . [or] (2) Constitute or imply acceptance. . . . . (f) The Contractor shall, without charge, replace or correct work found by the Government not to conform to contract requirements, unless in the public interest the Government consents to accept the work with an appropriate adjustment in contract price. . . . (g) If the Contractor does not promptly replace or correct rejected work, the Government may (1) by contract or otherwise, replace or correct the work and charge the cost to the Contractor or (2) terminate for default the Contractor's right to proceed. Appeal File, Exhibit A-1 at 33 of Construction Contract Clauses (Fixed Price). 13. Klinker performed GSA's field inspections of the fire alarm system -- principally through Joseph G. Dafin, one of the firm's fire protection engineers. Respondent's Stipulation 35; Transcript at 546, 549-50. Mr. Dafin noticed at his first inspection, on March 13, 1996, that the installation of the system was deficient in several regards. Appeal File, Exhibit 66. In particular, the contractor had installed wiring which did not meet contract specifications: the wire was stranded and 14 AWG, rather than the solid, 12 AWG called for. Id. at 2-3; Transcript at 552-55. (In the AWG system, the larger the number, the smaller the diameter of the wire. Twigg Corp., 98-2 BCA at 147,623 n.3. Thus, the installed wire was too narrow, as well as being stranded, not solid.) Mr. Dafin pointed out the problem to Dana Wilson, Jenkins' project superintendent. Transcript at 613- 14. The GSA Safety Division urged on March 22 that the wire be "removed and replaced as soon as possible." Appeal File, Exhibit 75. At a subsequent inspection, on March 25, Mr. Dafin noted other deficiencies in the system and reached agreement with the contractor as to the type of wire to be used. Id., Exhibit 78. Mr. Dafin's criticisms were valid and were directed to compliance with contract specifications. Respondent's Stipulation 37. 14. Jenkins removed and replaced the wire by the contract completion date. Transcript at 150. To accomplish this task, the company had to place a special order for acceptable wire and have its workers spend a considerable amount of time pulling out old wire and pulling in new. Id. at 151, 325. 15. The contract provided for two types of testing of the fire alarm system -- preliminary tests and a final acceptance test. The preliminary tests were "to ensure that all devices and circuits are functioning properly." They had to be witnessed by the contractor, an authorized representative from each supplier of equipment, and a member of the GSA fire alarm shop. Within two weeks of completion of the preliminary testing, the contractor had to submit "as-built drawings" which showed the system as installed, including "complete wiring diagrams showing connections between all devices and equipment, both factory and field wired." The drawings had to be provided in a specified computer-readable format. The final acceptance test could not be scheduled until these drawings were received by GSA. The final test was to be witnessed by "a member of the GSA Safety . . . Division, GSA Fire Alarm Shop and the GSA Inspections Branch, Professional Services Division. At this time, any and all required tests shall be repeated at the discretion of the Government." Testing was to determine, among other things, that "the control unit is in the normal condition as detailed in the manufacturer's operating and maintenance manual." Appeal File, Exhibit A-1 at 16723-9, -10, -25. 16. During May, June, and July of 1996, the contractor conducted preliminary tests with agency personnel present. Transcript at 165, 335-36, 374-75; Appeal File, Exhibits 124, 140. On July 15, Jenkins told Twigg that the preliminary testing of the fire alarm system was complete and asked that the final acceptance test be scheduled promptly. Transcript at 375; Appeal File, Exhibit 148. 17. On August 29, 1996, GSA warned Twigg that it had not submitted as-built drawings of the system, and that the final acceptance test consequently could not be scheduled. Appeal File, Exhibit 163. A week later, the agency told the contractor that redlined contract drawings did not meet the contract requirement for computer-readable as-builts. Id., Exhibit 168; Respondent's Stipulation 42.[foot #] 3 Twigg submitted some computerized drawings on September 18, but those drawings were illegible when printed. Appeal File, Exhibit 173; Respondent's Stipulation 43. There is no evidence that Twigg ever produced a legible, computer-readable set of as-built drawings for the fire alarm system; indeed, two witnesses testified that such drawings were never submitted. See Transcript at 453, 637, 642. ----------- FOOTNOTE BEGINS --------- [foot #] 3 The redlined drawings consisted of contract drawings on which contractor personnel wrote with a red pencil to show where wiring and devices were installed. Transcript at 346. These had been provided to GSA by July 23. Appeal File, Exhibit 152 at 1. ----------- FOOTNOTE ENDS ----------- 18. In early November 1996, although Twigg had not provided legible, computer-readable as-built drawings, Klinker's Mr. Dafin attempted to conduct a final acceptance test of the fire alarm system. Mr. Dafin determined that "[t]he system is not ready for Government acceptance at this time, due to various operational problems." He compiled a list of forty-nine such problems. Appeal File, Exhibit 182; Transcript at 557-61, 564. 19. Mr. Dafin performed a second "final" test in March 1997. Again, he found that the system was plagued by operational problems. Many of the difficulties noted in November 1996 had not been fixed; other aspects of the system which could not have been examined in November were deficient; and still other aspects could not be examined until problems noted had been remedied. Appeal File, GSBCA 14899, Exhibit 8; Transcript at 564-70. In particular, he observed "ground faults," problems where uninsulated wires touched ground or metal, and was concerned that the system would not survive to operate over them. Transcript at 570-71; see also id. at 481. Mr. Jenkins understood that random ground faults were the most significant difficulty with the system. Id. at 184. 20. In June and July 1997, Mr. Dafin again tried to conduct a final acceptance of the fire alarm system. He found many previously-noted items uncorrected, although the contractor had assured him that they had been fixed. Appeal File, Exhibit 204; Transcript at 571-79. Again, he noted trouble indications, especially as to ground faults, which generated concern for the reliability and survivability of the system. Transcript at 579- 88; Appeal File, GSBCA 14899, Exhibit 9 at 3-4. He also commented on the lack of as-built drawings. Appeal File, Exhibit 204 at 5; Transcript at 589-91. 21. After Klinker issued a July 1997 report of Mr. Dafin's most recent inspection, GSA assigned an engineer who had served as manager of other projects, Stuart Steele, to help resolve problems Klinker had found in the fire alarm system. Transcript at 403-05. Mr. Steele met with the contractor several times in an effort to arrange a cooperative resolution, but to no effect. The contractor said the system was complete, but it had not addressed the difficulties noted by the inspector. Id. at 408. Mr. Steele eventually attempted to bring matters to a head. On December 2, 1997, he told Twigg that "[i]t [was] imperative that this problem be corrected by . . . December 5." Appeal File, GSBCA 14899, Exhibit 11 at 1. Subsequently, on December 23, the difficulties were discussed in detail and GSA agreed to conduct the final acceptance test on January 14 if the system were trouble-free by then. The system was not ready for testing by the last date, however. Transcript at 414-18, 469-70. 22. On January 30, 1998, GSA's contracting officer sent Twigg a letter "direct[ing] that the causes of the numerous trouble alarms on the fire alarm system be corrected by February 6, 1998, and that the corrections to the fire alarm punch list items be demonstrated the week of February 9th on an evening agreed upon by all parties after the system has been free of trouble alarms for 48 consecutive hours." The contracting officer warned, "Failure to comply with this directive will result in the government procuring this work from another source and charging the costs to you in accordance with [the Inspection of Construction clause of the contract, see Finding 12]." Appeal File, GSBCA 14899, Exhibit 15. 23. On February 4 or 5, Jenkins asked permission to replace boxes in which fire alarm speakers were housed. Transcript at 423, 790. GSA denied the request because the contractor had not made a submittal showing the particular box it planned to use.[foot #] 4 Agency personnel were also concerned that the contractor had made no effort to cure the problems that had caused reports of trouble, including ground faults. Mr. Steele considered these problems especially significant and doubted that a substitution of boxes would resolve them. Id. at 189-90, 423-24, 463; Appeal File, GSBCA 14899, Exhibit 16; Respondent's Stipulation 50. Mr. Jenkins alleged at hearing that replacing the boxes -- something which would have taken only a couple of days -- would have solved all outstanding problems. Transcript at 790-93. The appellant presented no evidence in support of this contention, however.[foot #] 5 24. On February 9, the system was continuing to generate what Mr. Dafin described as "unintentional trouble, remote panel, and power supply/ground fault conditions." Appeal File, GSBCA 14899, Exhibit 14; Transcript at 422, 425-26, 593-97, 669. GSA and Klinker representatives concluded that the system was not operating properly, creating questions as to reliability and survivability, and was therefore still unacceptable. Transcript ----------- FOOTNOTE BEGINS --------- [foot #] 4 Mr. Jenkins alleges that he sent Mr. Steele a letter stating the exact model number of box he planned to use. Transcript at 792-93. This letter is not a part of our record. Mr. Steele's contemporaneous response, noting that Jenkins' request is bereft of data as to the replacement box, is in the record. Appeal File, GSBCA 14899, Exhibit 16. [foot #] 5 Similarly, Mr. Jenkins asserted that problems in the system were caused by someone other than Tenn or Jenkins personnel having access to the control room and system password and apparently tampering with the system. Transcript at 795-97. Appellant has presented only supposition, not evidence, in support of this assertion. Even if someone other than Tenn or Jenkins personnel did have the password, however, the record contains no evidence -- appellant's suggestions to the contrary notwithstanding -- that such an individual used the password to tamper with the system. ----------- FOOTNOTE ENDS ----------- at 580-84, 596-98.[foot #] 6 The following day, Jenkins asked permission to bring Antronnix Inc., a supplier of the kind of system which had been installed in the building, to the site to fix the system. GSA denied the request, believing (in Mr. Steele's words) that "it was a noble gesture, but it should have been done in '96 or '97 or '98." Id. at 485; see also id. at 597 (Mr. Dafin's characterization of the conclusion on February 9: "[W]e've given these guys a lot of chances to complete and finish, and it's over."). On February 12, the contracting officer informed Twigg that due to Jenkins' lack of expertise in identifying and correcting troubles in the system, all further fire alarm corrective work would be performed by another company and costs incurred by the agency in having this work done would be charged to Twigg. Appeal File, GSBCA 14899, Exhibit 17; Respondent's Stipulation 52. Corrective work 25. GSA then had Donald Traff, a Department of State building management specialist and a highly experienced and certified fire alarm technician, with the assistance of GSA fire alarm technicians, make a complete evaluation of the ways in which the installed system did not meet contract requirements. Transcript at 428-31, 672. (The Department of State is the tenant agency in the Columbia Plaza office complex, and that department (and in particular, its Mr. Traff) had been working closely with GSA on construction progress. Id. at 667, 679, 684- 714 passim.) Mr. Traff and his associates worked systematically, circuit-by-circuit, checking individual devices. They found many problems with the wiring, especially its shielding and terminations, and also discovered that incorrect sizes of wire had been used and that some wiring which had been included in the fire alarm system should not have been part of it. These errors in the installation, Mr. Traff explained, were responsible for trouble in the system. Mr. Traff and the GSA technicians repaired simple problems and made a list of the more complex ones. Later, Mr. Traff converted the list into a scope of work. All this work was performed after regular business hours, and the men who did it were paid overtime wages for their efforts. Id. at 429, 673-77. ----------- FOOTNOTE BEGINS --------- [foot #] 6 David Tenn, Tenn's vice president, hypothesized that the problems could have been caused by something other than appellant's errors -- the vibration of air handlers working connections loose or someone's having disconnected a wire while conducting a test. Transcript at 776-81. On cross-examination, however, he admitted that many other causes could have been responsible for the problems as well. Id. at 784-85. There is ___ no reason for us to believe that any of the potential causes as to which Mr. Tenn speculated, for the purpose of absolving appellant of responsibility for the problems, actually existed. ----------- FOOTNOTE ENDS ----------- 26. The scope of work necessary to complete the fire alarm system was then sent by GSA to Antronnix. After receiving a quotation from this firm, a GSA contracting officer issued to it a purchase order for performance of the work. Transcript at 506- 07, 680-81; Appeal File, GSBCA 14899, Exhibits 18-20. Antronnix completed the work, and thereafter the system functioned properly and did not report further trouble alarms. Transcript at 435, 681; Appeal File, Exhibit 213. The claims GSBCA 14386 27. In this decision, we consider three claims related to the facts described above. Two of these claims were made by Twigg; the third was made by GSA. The first of Twigg's claims, which is the subject of GSBCA 14386, was initially characterized by Twigg as for Jenkins' costs (plus Twigg's markups) resulting from "delays attributable to the Government." Appeal File, GSBCA 14387, Exhibit 32 at 1. Jenkins stated more specifically, "It is [Jenkins'] position that the first submittal was approved and [Jenkins] is asking for compensation for the time delay Jenkins . . . incurred from this." In addition, "GSA delayed Jenkins . . . from the final testing until they had the [computer-readable as- built] Drawings which clearly is not part of the specifications testing." Id. at 5. The claim was in the amount of $158,011, calculated as follows: Jenkins' costs Submittals 500 man-hours x $30/hour $ 15,00 0 Overtime 25,750 Extended supervision 960 man-hours x $30/hour 28,80 0 Time to retest for Klinker 160 man-hours x $30/hour 80 man-hours x $14/hour 5,920 Lost time for escorts 80 man-hours x $30/hour 2,400 Computer-readable as-built drawings 4,100 Time to retest for District of Columbia Government 80 man-hours x $30/hour 2,400 Repair to printer, firemen's phone, keyboard (estimate) 3,500 Subtotal $ 87,870 Jenkins' markups (insurance, profit, overhead, FICA, FUTA[foot #] 7) 39,01 2 Jenkins' total $126,882 Twigg's markups (overhead, commission, bond premium) 31,12 9 Total amount of claim $158,011 Id. at 1, 3, 6. The contractor appealed from the contracting officer's deemed denial of this claim. Appeal File, Exhibit 211. 28. The appellant's evidence in support of this claim consists almost entirely of Mr. Jenkins' testimony at hearing. We examine the claim, element-by-element, with reference to this testimony. Mr. Jenkins said that the first element, submittals, represented his estimate -- not based on any records -- of the time he spent processing the fire alarm submittals. Transcript at 226-27. Mr. Jenkins acknowledged that if the GSA Safety Division had reviewed submittals contemporaneously with Girard, he would have had to devote to this process the same amount of time that he ultimately spent. Id. at 762. He also admitted that the submittals were prepared by Tenn and that he gave only cursory review to them before sending them forward. Id. at 109, 222-24. Mr. Jenkins does not keep timesheets for himself. Id. at 224. He made no analysis of the time he devoted to each submittal. The five hundred-hour estimate includes attendance at job progress meetings which involved subjects other than the fire alarm system, driving between his office and Twigg's, and frustration and anger with the process. Id. at 227-29. Jenkins does not pay Mr. Jenkins, its owner, a salary or wages; the claimed hourly rate is that of Dana Wilson, Jenkins' superintendent for this project. Id. at 224-26, 741-42. 29. The second element of the claim is overtime pay to Jenkins' personnel. Mr. Jenkins was unable to identify the period of time in which the overtime costs were incurred. He first suggested March and April of 1996, then said the period was possibly January to April 1996, and later said some of the overtime could have been worked after April 1996 -- possibly as late as January 1997. Transcript at 230-36. Ultimately, he testified, "All I can tell you is there was a lot of overtime worked on that job." Id. at 238. Mr. Jenkins kept no record of which overtime hours were expended on which aspects of the job, and he acknowledged that some of the costs included in this claim could be related to removal and reinstallation of wiring and others could be related to work that did not involve the fire ----------- FOOTNOTE BEGINS --------- [foot #] 7 "FICA" is the Federal Insurance Contributions Act, 26 U.S.C. ch. 21; "FUTA" is the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, 26 U.S.C. ch. 23. ----------- FOOTNOTE ENDS ----------- alarm system at all. Indeed, the claim may encompass all overtime billed to the job. Id. at 232, 237. Jenkins has already been paid through a contract modification for overtime worked on the first and third floors of the Columbia Plaza complex during March and April 1996, and some of the firm's work on those floors involved the fire alarm system. The modification states expressly that it includes work to "[c]omplete the fire alarm system installation . . . by 3/31/96." Appeal File, GSBCA 14387, Exhibit 29. Mr. Jenkins was unable to differentiate the overtime for which Jenkins has already been paid from this element of this claim. Transcript at 745-60. 30. The element entitled "extended supervision" consists of Mr. Jenkins' estimate of the time, beyond what Jenkins had planned, that Dana Wilson spent on the job. Mr. Jenkins was unable to identify the additional months Mr. Wilson devoted to the job, however, or to say how much of the time was devoted to the fire alarm system and how much to other tasks. Appellant did not submit for the record any documents which might help to resolve this difficulty. Transcript at 241-42. 31. Mr. Jenkins explained that the costs listed as "time to retest for Klinker" are overtime labor costs, and he was not sure whether they were separate from the overtime element of the claim. Transcript at 248. He did not know how he estimated this time. Id. at 251. 32. Mr. Jenkins explained the "lost time for escorts" element in this way: "There [were] a couple [of] nights that we actually showed up and [GSA or its construction quality manager] would have no escorts so we couldn't go up and do the work that we were scheduled to do. . . . I paid my people. They couldn't do their work but I paid them." Transcript at 196-97. Mr. Jenkins did not know on which days or times this problem occurred. He admitted that this element may include payments for time spent for other purposes. He has daily reports which contain information relevant to these matters, but did not use them in estimating the amount for lost time for escorts. Id. at 257-59, 377. The reports are not in evidence. 33. As to the element relating to computer-readable as- built drawings, Mr. Jenkins said that the $4,100 claimed represented the cost of having drawings made twice. He recognized that he was obligated by contract to provide one set of drawings, however, so he eliminated the cost of the less- expensive set, $1,600, from the claim. Transcript at 197-98. He could not find invoices to support his allegation that the other set cost $2,500, however. He also acknowledged that the amount may include costs of time that he and Mr. Wilson devoted to getting the drawings produced -- possibly as much as forty-eight hours -- and said that such costs should be deducted from the claim. Id. at 253-57, 273. 34. Jenkins never incurred the $2,400 claimed for time to retest the fire alarm system for the District of Columbia Government or the $3,500 claimed for repairs to the fire alarm printer, firemen's phone, and keyboard. Respondent's Stipulations 54, 55; Transcript at 193-94. Appellant asserts that these items were included in the claim, which was submitted before all Jenkins' work on the project was complete, because Jenkins expected to incur the costs. Appellant's Posthearing Brief at 49. Appellant does not now seek these portions of its claim. Id. at 50. GSBCA 14387 35. Twigg's other claim, considered here in GSBCA 14387, is for costs Jenkins incurred in removing what Twigg characterized as "previously approved wire" and replacing that wire "at considerable expense." That "considerable expense" was alleged to be $109,451, including markups. The claim did not explain how this figure was derived. Appeal File, GSBCA 14387, Exhibit 34. Twigg appealed from the contracting officer's deemed denial of this claim. Id., Exhibit 35. 36. At hearing, appellant's counsel "stipulated that the wire [Jenkins originally installed] was nonconforming [with contract specifications]" and added, "we are dropping our claim with respect to any additional costs for procuring the conforming wire." Transcript at 75; see also id. at 199-200 (testimony of Mr. Jenkins). Appellant now seeks "only the $384 in premium wages paid to each of the 32 men involved in the two-week effort of replacing the non-conforming wire." ($384 is the product of sixteen overtime hours times an overtime rate of $24 per hour. Appellant's Posthearing Brief at 53.) The total amount of these wages is $12,288. With Jenkins' markups for insurance, profit, overhead, FICA, and FUTA ($5,456) and Twigg's subsequent markups ($4,353), the total amount now sought through this claim is $22,097. Appellant's Posthearing Brief at 54. 37. As with the claim at issue in GSBCA 14386, appellant presented no documentary evidence in support of the wiring claim. The only evidence relevant to the amount sought consists of testimony by Mr. Wilson and Mr. Jenkins. Mr. Wilson told the Board that he kept records of which crews were working on which locations within the project on which days, but he did not note on those records how much work was devoted to which aspects of the job, and in any event, the records were never introduced into evidence. Transcript at 377-78, 381. Mr. Jenkins was not sure whether the labor component of the wiring claim included both straight time and overtime, and he was unable to recall exactly how many hours were involved in rewiring the fire alarm system. Transcript at 202, 744. Neither witness explained the derivation of the specific numbers asserted in appellant's brief. Further, as already noted in Finding 29, Mr. Jenkins could not say how much of the overtime worked by his personnel during the relevant time period was related to this claim and how much to the other claim, or whether Jenkins' overtime costs which have already been paid by GSA are encompassed in one of the outstanding claims. Finding 29.[foot #] 8 GSBCA 14899 38. After Antronnix had finished all work necessary to bring the fire alarm system into conformity with contract specifications, the contracting officer issued a final decision making a Government claim to Twigg for the costs of completing the job. This claim, which is dated January 15, 1999, is in the amount of $31,650.60. The claim consists of four elements: Antronnix' generating as-built drawings, replacing garage and stairway speaker boxes, repairing the third and fourth floor speaker circuits, and modifying the computer room fire alarm panels -- $20,220 Antronnix' installing fire protection devices in the fire pump room -- $2,290 Mr. Traff's overtime pay -- $3,009.60 GSA fire alarm shop -- $6,131 Appeal File, GSBCA 14899, Exhibit 22. Twigg's appeal from this decision has been docketed as GSBCA 14899. 39. We credit Mr. Traff's testimony that the tasks described by him in the scope of work statements provided to Antronnix were necessary to make the fire alarm system function properly, and that Antronnix actually performed the work described. Transcript at 679-82, 734; see also Appeal File, Exhibit 213. The record contains the scope of work statements, ----------- FOOTNOTE BEGINS --------- [foot #] 8 We note additionally that the record contains no support for the appellant's theory that thirty-two men each worked on the rewiring part of the job. As close as we can come to finding such support is Mr. Wilson's testimony that at the time the rewiring was performed, Jenkins had about forty men on the project. Transcript at 325. Mr. Wilson did not say how many of the men were working exclusively on rewiring, or what hours each of them devoted to this task. The only place in the record in which we have found the exact number of thirty-two Jenkins personnel being on the job is in the exhibit which contains the contract modification for additional work (some of which involved the fire alarm system) on the first and third floors. The thirty-two men were on Jenkins' payroll for the two-week pay period ending March 27, 1996. Jenkins alleged that it paid these men $7,670.45 in overtime wages. This amount, plus markups, was included in the amount paid to Twigg in the contract modification. Appeal File, GSBCA 14387, Exhibit 29; Transcript at 745-60. ----------- FOOTNOTE ENDS ----------- Antronnix' quotation for performance of the tasks, and the purchase order GSA issued to this firm in the amount of $20,220. Appeal File, GSBCA 14899, Exhibits 18-20. The contracting officer testified that Antronnix was also paid not only this amount, but also an additional $2,290 to fix other punch list items under the Twigg contract. Transcript at 507-08. 40. The record contains documentation supporting the amount claimed as Mr. Traff's overtime pay. The documentation consists of Mr. Traff's timesheets for the period of time after February 6, 1998 (when Twigg had to complete its work on the fire alarm system, Finding 22) and authorizations for him to receive "premium compensation." Each of the authorizations shows the type of work to be performed as testing, compilation of deficiencies and omissions, and/or repairs involving the fire alarm system at Columbia Plaza. Appeal File, GSBCA 14899, Exhibit 21; see also Transcript at 678 (Mr. Traff's confirmation that the exhibit shows the overtime he spent on the project of identifying and repairing problems with the fire alarm system). 41. Only scant evidence supports the amount claimed for the cost of wages paid to GSA fire alarm technicians who assisted Mr. Traff in examining and repairing the system after GSA assumed responsibility for completing it. This evidence is the contracting officer's testimony that the sum in question was submitted to her by the GSA fire alarm shop. Transcript at 509. She acknowledged that documentation of the amount is not included and that she has not personally seen any documentation. Id. at 525-26. Discussion We consider in this opinion three claims, two by the contractor and one by the Government, all relating to work on the fire alarm system in a building being renovated for the Government. As to each of these claims, the claimant has the "essential burden of establishing the fundamental facts of liability, causation, and resultant injury." Wunderlich Contracting Co. v. United States, 351 F.2d 956, 968 (Ct. Cl. 1965); see also Servidone Construction Corp. v. United States, 931 F.2d 860, 861 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Stroh Corp. v. General Services Administration, GSBCA 11029, 96-1 BCA 28,265, at 141,131. In each of the cited cases, the tribunals placed the burden on the claimant, who was the contractor. The logic of the decisions imposes the burden on whichever party is the claimant -- which, in GSBCA 14899, is the Government. See International, Inc., ASBCA 43060, 95-2 BCA 27,720, at 138,140; Cochran Construction Co., ASBCA 40294, 90-3 BCA 23,239, at 116,609. The claimant not only "bears the burden of proving the fact of loss with certainty," but also has "the burden of proving the amount of loss with sufficient certainty so that the determination of the amount of damages will be more than mere speculation." Lisbon Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 828 F.2d 759, 767 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (quoting Willems Industries, Inc. v. United States, 295 F.2d 822, 831 (Ct. Cl. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 903 (1962)); see also Stroh Corp., 96-1 BCA at 141,131; Chemray Coatings Corp. v. General Services Administration, GSBCA 10700, 93-3 BCA 26,194, at 130,407; Richerson Construction, Inc. v. General Services Administration, GSBCA 11161, et al., 93-1 BCA 25,239, at 125,710 (1992). GSBCA 14386 The first contractor claim, which is the subject of GSBCA 14386, derives from the manner in which submittals (including shop drawings) were reviewed and approved. The contract required that fire alarm submittals be submitted to GSA's architect- engineer for this project, Girard Engineering, and reviewed and approved by both Girard and GSA's own Safety Division. Finding 3. After Twigg made its first submittal, it received in return from Girard, in December 1994, a number of the architect- engineer's comments and conditional approval to proceed with the work. The condition was that the plans be revised, taking into consideration all the comments that had been made. Finding 4. Nearly a year later, GSA realized that its Safety Division had never reviewed this submittal, and it asked Twigg for a copy of the document. Finding 6. In January 1996, the Safety Division rejected the submittal. Finding 7. By this time, the system was mostly installed. Finding 6. Twigg maintains that the agency's failure to make its own review until construction was well underway caused the contractor to incur additional costs of almost $150,000. Findings 27, 34. That the agency delayed so long in reviewing the fire alarm submittal is most unfortunate. It is conceivable that in other circumstances, this sort of delay might cause a contractor to spend money needlessly, and consequently could impose on the Government liability for those extra expenses. Here, however, the appellant has shown no link between the agency's inaction and its own costs. The contractor understood, before beginning work, that the approval it had received was conditional -- dependent on making revisions in accordance with Girard's comments. Finding 4. Those comments were significant, and, as appellant's expert witness testified, they "would have required . . . substantial reapplication[] engineering of the product." Finding 5. Again relying on appellant's expert witness, we find that the contractor should have understood the ramifications of the comments and addressed Girard's concerns before installing the system. Id. This contractor,[foot #] 9 however, paid ----------- FOOTNOTE BEGINS --------- [foot #] 9 As a board of contract appeals, our jurisdiction is to consider appeals by contractors from decisions issued by Government contracting officers. 41 U.S.C. 607(d) (Supp. III 1997). The appeals we decide here are from decisions issued by a (continued...) ----------- FOOTNOTE ENDS ----------- no heed to the comments. Even as late as February 1996, after GSA had warned earlier that compliance with Girard's comments was necessary, the contractor had still not addressed them. Findings 7, 10. Further, even if Twigg had made all revisions required by the Girard comments, that would not have absolved the contractor from complying with contract requirements that were not mentioned by Girard. The contract itself made this clear: "Approval of drawings and schedules will be general and shall not be construed as permitting any departure from the contract requirements." Finding 3. It took seven months, during which the contractor made several submittals each of which raised numerous concerns that the requirements were being ignored, before the GSA Safety Division was willing to consider a submittal conditionally approved. Findings 7, 10, 11. As to the reasonableness of the objections voiced by the agency about the submittals, we do not have to rely on the Government's assertions on the matter, for the record contains testimony by the contractor's own expert witness that those objections were valid and merely required compliance with the contract. Id. The record also contains this witness' forthright, convincing testimony that the submittal process took an inordinate amount of time, primarily because the contractor's original submittal was insufficiently detailed and its responses to GSA comments were not always complete or responsive. Finding 11. Once the inspection process began, a similar story unfolded. The system as installed was replete with deficiencies, as the engineer who performed the inspections found in March 1996, November 1996, March 1997, June and July 1997, and February 1998. Findings 13, 18-20, 24. Although the contractor understood that random ground faults were a significant problem, it never fixed them. Findings 19, 24. Furthermore, the contractor never produced something which the contract made a precondition for final testing -- a set of "as-built" drawings, in a specified computer-readable format, which showed the system as installed. ----------- FOOTNOTE BEGINS --------- [foot #] 9 (...continued) GSA contracting officer to the firm with which the agency had a contract, Twigg. Although we recognize that the work under discussion here was performed by Twigg's electrical subcontractor, Jenkins, and Jenkins' supplier, Tenn, neither Jenkins nor Tenn is a party to these appeals. In our analysis, we consider the Twigg/Jenkins/Tenn team as a whole and do not engage in the sort of finger-pointing among them that is a feature of the appellant's posthearing brief. While we sometimes refer to the team as "Twigg," we do not mean to pin blame on the general contractor, rather than its subcontractor and/or the subcontractor's supplier. If any repercussions from this decision lead to acrimony among the members of the contractor team, resultant disputes will have to be sorted out apart from this proceeding. ----------- FOOTNOTE ENDS ----------- Again, agency warnings on the subject failed to elicit an appropriate response by the contractor. Findings 15, 17. Nor did the contractor respond in a constructive way to GSA's efforts, during the second half of 1997, to arrange a cooperative resolution of all the difficulties. Finding 17. All in all, we conclude that if the contractor expended more money than it had planned on installation of the fire alarm, the principal cause of this predicament was the contractor's own lack of understanding of what needed to be done, ineptitude in performing the work, and failure to cooperate with the Government. Any excess costs cannot be traced to the agency's delay in reviewing contractor submittals. Even if we could find Government responsibility for some contractor costs, we would still not award to Twigg any of the amounts it claims in GSBCA 14386. This is because the contractor has failed to meet "the burden of proving the amount of loss with sufficient certainty so that the determination of the amount of damages will be more than mere speculation." Lisbon Contractors, 828 F.2d at 767. It is true, of course, that the proof of damages need not be exact. A reasonable basis is enough -- but some convincing basis must be advanced. Bruce Construction Corp. v. United States, 324 F.2d 516, 518-19 (Ct. Cl. 1963); Wunderlich Contracting, 351 F.2d at 968; Piracci Corp., GSBCA 6007, 82-2 BCA 16,047, at 79,605. Every single element of the claim at issue in this case is highly questionable. The first element, submittals, consists of five hundred hours of the time of Charles Jenkins, the president of Twigg subcontractor Jenkins, multiplied by thirty dollars. Neither the number of hours nor the hourly rate is supportable. The problems with the hours themselves are manifold. Mr. Jenkins admitted that he would have spent an equal amount of time on fire alarm submittals no matter when the GSA Safety Division had performed its review. He also testified that he gave only cursory review to the submittals (which were prepared by Tenn); that his estimate includes work on other matters and frustration and anger with the process; and that he keeps no time sheets for himself and made no analysis of the time he devoted to each submittal. The hourly rate is not that of Mr. Jenkins; the firm's president is not paid wages or salary. Finding 28. The idea that the agency's delay in reviewing submittals cost $15,000 in Mr. Jenkins' time is beyond mere speculation -- it is a wild guess, and a poor one at that. The amount sought in overtime pay to Jenkins' personnel is for an indeterminate period of time, and the overtime may have been worked on tasks other than installation of the fire alarm system. It is entirely possible that GSA has already paid, through a contract modification, for some or all of the overtime costs asserted. The contractor submitted no documentation for this element (or any other) of the claim, so we have no good way of knowing with any reasonable degree of certainty what the element encompasses or whether it is duplicative of previously- paid amounts. Finding 29. Similarly, "extended supervision" took place over an indeterminate period of time and may have been devoted to tasks other than the ones at issue here; "time to retest for Klinker" may be duplicative of the overtime element; and "lost time for escorts" may have been claimed through other elements. Although Mr. Jenkins said that he has documentation relating to at least the last of these elements, he did not use it in making the estimates on which the claim is based, and there is no documentation in the record about any of the elements. Findings 30-32. The final element relates to computer-readable as-built drawings. Because a third-party's efforts were apparently necessary to produce these drawings, one might expect an invoice as documentation of the costs. Appellant did not provide any such invoice, however, and in testifying in "support" of the element, Mr. Jenkins admitted that perhaps some of the costs should be deducted from the claim. Finding 33. In short, GSBCA 14386 would be denied as to quantum even if it had been granted as to entitlement. GSBCA 14387 The contractor's second claim, considered under docket number GSBCA 14387, has been revised in the course of these proceedings to involve only overtime costs associated with removing and replacing wire which did not conform with contract requirements. Findings 35, 36. Appellant makes the following arguments in support of this claim: "[Jenkins] had no reason to question the appropriateness of using this stranded wire on the [fire alarm system] speakers since it reasonably appeared to [Jenkins] that both the Government (through Girard's approval stamp) and the equipment supplier [Tenn] were in agreement on this point." Appellant's Posthearing Brief at 56. Further, GSA inspectors had observed Jenkins' personnel installing wire that did not conform with specifications, but said nothing about the problem. Id. at 25 (no citations to record). The failure of the inspectors to tell the contractor about the problem "suggest[s] that it would be unfair under these circumstances to require the full brunt of this wire problem to fall solely on the shoulders of the Contractor." Id. at 56. We disagree with this analysis. First, there is no relationship whatsoever between Girard's conditional approval of the original submittal and the wire installed in the system. The submittal did not say anything about the wire that would be used, Finding 8, so Girard's approval could not have applied to the wire. No approval of submittals could have permitted any departure from contract requirements, Finding 3, and the type of wire to be installed was specified in the contract, Finding 8. Second, as the contract made clear, any inspection conducted by GSA did not constitute or imply acceptance of work performed. Finding 12. An inspector's silence cannot be construed as an implied repudiation of contract requirements. Fire Security Systems, Inc. v. General Services Administration, GSBCA 12120, et al., 97-2 BCA 28,994, at 144,406. Thus, even if it is true (and there is no evidence on this point) that GSA inspectors observed non-conforming fire alarm wire and said nothing about it, this does not help the contractor's case. Third, we decide the case on the basis of legal rights and responsibilities, not what might be thought to be fair in an abstract sense. Whether parties should share costs of resolving problems, to be "fair," is a subject for discussion during contract performance, not during litigation. Griffin Services, Inc. v. General Services Administration, GSBCA 14643, 99-2 BCA 30,556, at 150,907. By now, the parties agree that the contractor installed, as part of the fire alarm system, wire which did not conform with contract specifications. Finding 36; see also Findings 8, 13. The contractor has acknowledged its responsibility for the cost of removing and replacing this wire. Finding 36. The only issue for us to decide is whether the Government is responsible for the overtime labor costs associated with this activity. Id. We are not persuaded that it should have to pay for the work's having been performed on an overtime basis. It is true that the work was done in a short space of time, at the end of March 1996. Findings 9, 13, 14. It is also true that the immediate precipitating event for this hurried action was comments by the GSA Safety Division and its contract inspector. Finding 13. We see no reason why the contractor should have waited until the end of March to do the work, however. Twigg was responsible at all times for installing the specified wire in the fire alarm system. Additionally, as early as mid-January 1996, GSA had given Twigg a list of detailed comments regarding problems with the contractor's approach to the job, and one of those comments was that Twigg needed to ensure that wire installed in the system had to comply with contract requirements. Finding 8. Had the contractor paid attention to these comments, it would have realized, well before the end of March, that it needed to install different wire from the kind it had been using. The only reason that the removal and reinstallation of wire had to be performed on an overtime basis is that the contractor ignored both the longstanding contract requirements and the agency's warning. As with the other contractor claim, even if this claim could be granted as to entitlement, it would be denied as to quantum. The record contains absolutely no support for the specific number of hours or the overtime hourly rate advanced by appellant. We have no idea which employees worked which hours on which days on which aspects of the electrical work (including the fire alarm system). We do not know the hourly rates at which these employees were paid. We do not even have any justification for any gross figures encompassing all the rewiring overtime work done by Jenkins' employees. And as with the other claim being resolved in this opinion, the contractor has not shown that the sum sought now has not already been paid by the agency through a contract modification. Finding 37. GSBCA 14899 The contract provided that whenever the Government found work which did not conform to contract requirements, the Government could direct the contractor to replace or correct that work without charge. If the contractor did not make the replacement or correction promptly, the Government had two options. It could either "(1) by contract or otherwise, replace or correct the work and charge the cost to the Contractor or (2) terminate for default the Contractor's right to proceed." Finding 12. GSA, through its contract inspector, Klinker, found fire alarm system work which did not conform to contract requirements on several occasions -- in March 1996, November 1996, March 1997, June and July 1997, and February 1998. Findings 13, 18-20, 24. On the last occasion, with advance warning, the contracting officer decided to invoke the first of the two remedies available to the agency whenever the contractor did not replace or correct non-conforming work promptly -- she told Twigg that GSA would replace or correct the work and charge the cost to the contractor.[foot #] 10 Findings 22, 24. The total charge imposed, through a Government claim, was $31,650.60. Finding 38. In GSBCA 14899, Twigg appeals the contracting officer's decision which makes this claim. Id. GSA had ample justification for taking the action challenged here. The contract required Twigg to install a fire alarm system in which all devices and circuits were functioning properly and the control unit was in normal condition. Findings 2, 15. The agency afforded the contractor many months to fix the problems in the system. During that time, it provided the contractor with the inspector's findings as to deficiencies and attempted to work cooperatively with the contractor to solve the problems. Findings 18-21. Although the contracting officer ultimately gave Twigg only a week to make the system work, before the Government would assume responsibility for correcting work which did not conform with contract requirements, Finding 22, that short period of time was reasonable in light of the numerous opportunities ----------- FOOTNOTE BEGINS --------- [foot #] 10 Although the term "termination for default" has been used at times during our proceedings, no such termination was made here. Instead, the contracting officer invoked the other remedy available -- assuming responsibility for performing necessary work and charging the contractor for costs incurred. Any discussion about whether tests for termination for default were properly met is inappropriate. ----------- FOOTNOTE ENDS ----------- which had previously been afforded the contractor.[foot #] 11 The requirement for a system that was free of trouble alarms, Finding 22, was also reasonable. Jenkins' project superintendent understood all along that GSA was looking for a "clean system," in which every device was tested and found operative -- not giving any indication of trouble. Transcript at 390-91. He recognized that this position made sense, testifying that if one is operating an alarm system that is protecting life and property, "You want a clean system at all times." Id. at 391. Twigg witnesses suggested that the problems the inspector observed may have been caused by something other than the contractor's errors. See Findings 23-24, nn. 5-6. We find, however, that once the Government had documented errors in the contractor's installation of the system, and had those problems fixed, the system operated properly. Findings 25-26. Thus we conclude that the contractor's missteps were the cause of the failures of the system. The Government has shown the liability, causation, and resultant injury necessary to demonstrate entitlement to recovery of the costs it incurred. Most of those costs were incurred in paying another contractor, Antronnix, for work it performed. The record makes clear that Antronnix did the work the Government said it did, that this work was necessary to meet contract requirements, and that GSA paid the firm the amount claimed for this performance. Findings 26, 38-39. Although the evidence on this point could have been more complete -- the record does not include documentation of payments made to Antronnix -- the quotations, purchase order, and contracting officer's testimony on the matter suffice. See Finding 39. Twigg maintains that GSA did not have to ask Antronnix to generate as-built drawings because Twigg had already provided such drawings, but we have found that Twigg never produced a set of drawings which met contract requirements. Findings 15, 17. Although GSA agreed to allow final acceptance testing to go forward before the as-built drawings were supplied (in spite of a contract requirement that the test would not be scheduled before the drawings were provided), Findings 15, 17, 18, this does not mean that the Government was not entitled to ----------- FOOTNOTE BEGINS --------- [foot #] 11 GSA's determination not to allow Jenkins at the last minute to replace speaker boxes, or to have a substitute for Tenn do corrective work, was also understandable. The contractor did not say what type of boxes it would employ, and the request for a substitute supplier came after the deadline fixed by the contracting officer for completion of corrective work. See ___ Findings 23-24. The law does not require the Government to allow a contractor an infinite number of chances to fix problems of the contractor's making. Cf. General Floorcraft, Inc., GSBCA 10493, ___ ________________________ 91-2 BCA 24,023 (termination for default situation). ----------- FOOTNOTE ENDS ----------- the contract-mandated drawings. We note also that Mr. Jenkins testified that the cost of the speaker boxes Antronnix installed was only $2,800, Transcript at 797, whereas Antronnix charged $12,000 for the installation, Appeal File, GSBCA 14899, Exhibit 18. The testimony is not sufficient to question Antronnix' charge; the latter amount includes labor, overhead, and profit, but the amount mentioned by the witness does not, so no comparison between the two figures is possible. Appellant has given us no reason to question the reasonableness of the sum paid by GSA to Antronnix to complete necessary work on the fire alarm system. The other costs claimed by the Government are for overtime wages paid to the State Department's Mr. Traff and two GSA fire alarm shop technicians for time those individuals spent documenting problems in the system as installed by Twigg and correcting the simplest of those problems. Findings 25, 38. The amount claimed for Mr. Traff's time is amply documented. Finding 40. As to payments to the GSA fire alarm shop technicians, however, the only evidence offered in support was the contracting officer's testimony, and the contracting officer had neither personal knowledge as to how the amount claimed was calculated nor documentation regarding that amount. Finding 41. This evidence is insufficient proof of the amount of the payments. We consequently allow the amount claimed for Mr. Traff's wages, but not that claimed for wages of the other technicians. The total amount allowed for the Government's claim is $25,519.60 -- $31,650.60 claimed less the $6,131 sought as GSA technicians' overtime wages. Decision GSBCA 14386 and GSBCA 14387 are DENIED. GSBCA 14899 is GRANTED IN PART. Twigg may not recover under either of its claims, and shall pay to GSA $25,519.60 on the Government's claim. _________________________ STEPHEN M. DANIELS Board Judge We concur: _________________________ _________________________ MARTHA H. DeGRAFF ALLAN H. GOODMAN Board Judge Board Judge