_____________________ DENIED: July 2, 1997 _____________________ GSBCA 13345 TWIGG CORPORATION, Appellant, v. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, Respondent. John E. Belt, Falls Church, VA, counsel for Appellant. Kathleen M. McCartney, Office of Regional Counsel, General Services Administration, Washington, DC, counsel for Respondent. Before Board Judges DANIELS (Chairman), BORWICK, and DeGRAFF. DeGRAFF, Board Judge. The General Services Administration (GSA) and Twigg Corporation (Twigg) entered into a contract for renovations to a building. During the course of performance, the parties negotiated a change to the scope of work required by the contract and GSA paid the agreed-upon price for the changed work. Twigg claims that GSA should pay interest on the negotiated price. GSA filed a motion for summary relief, asserting that Twigg has not presented any valid basis for the payment of interest. Because we agree with GSA, we grant the motion for summary relief, thereby denying the appeal. Findings of Fact The parties disagree as to a great many facts which are not material to the issue presented by this case. The parties agree upon the following material facts. On June 16, 1992, GSA accepted Twigg's bid to perform electrical renovations at GSA's central office building. Appeal File, Exhibit 1. During the course of performance, the parties realized that the contract documents did not accurately identify all of the electrical circuits in the building. Appeal File, Exhibit 17 (Tab C); Supplemental Appeal File, Exhibit 1. On July 20, 1994, GSA asked Twigg to submit a proposal for modifying the contract to change the contract's scope of work. Appeal File, Exhibit 4. Twigg submitted a cost breakdown to the GSA project manager on July 21, 1994, and the parties agreed to negotiate a change order. The parties negotiated for several months. Appeal File, Exhibit 5; Supplemental Appeal File, Exhibit 9. The parties successfully negotiated a change order and Twigg submitted a certificate of cost and pricing data which GSA received on January 18, 1995. Appeal File, Exhibit 9. Twigg signed a contract modification on March 23, 1995, and the GSA contracting officer signed the modification on April 3, 1995. The modification added $289,536 to the contract price and changed the work originally required by the contract. Appeal File, Exhibit 17. The contract required GSA to make progress payments to Twigg within twenty-three days after receipt of each of Twigg's payment requests. GSA received Twigg's invoice for an amount that included the $289,536 on April 11, 1995. On April 24, 1995, Twigg initialed some changes to the invoice. Also on April 24, 1995, GSA approved Twigg's invoice for payment. GSA's Supplement (June 19, 1997). Twigg says that it received GSA's payment on May 4, 1995, and GSA does not contest this statement. Discussion Twigg submitted a claim to the contracting officer for $8,010.57. Twigg said that it was owed this amount because GSA did not process the contract modification in a timely manner. Twigg said that the parties reached an agreement concerning subcontractor costs on November 1, 1994, and that sixty days would have been a reasonable amount of time for the contracting officer to have taken to issue a modification and to pay Twigg. Twigg claimed interest from January 1, 1995 (sixty days after November 1, 1994), until May 4, 1995, when Twigg received payment for the contract modification. Twigg said that the decision in Gulf Coast Trailing Co., ENG BCA 6072, 94-2 BCA  26,646, entitled it to payment. Twigg later explained that it was entitled to $8,010.57 as compound interest on $289,536 pursuant to the Prompt Payment Act. When the contracting officer did not issue a decision in response to the claim, Twigg filed this appeal. GSA filed a motion for summary relief. In its motion, GSA argued that neither the decision in Gulf Coast Trailing nor the Prompt Payment Act entitles Twigg to payment. Twigg responded that it is entitled to payment pursuant to the decision in Gulf Coast Trailing. Summary relief is appropriate when there are no material facts in dispute and the moving party is entitled to relief as a matter of law. The only facts material to resolving this case are set out above, and none of these facts is in dispute. As explained below, GSA is entitled to summary relief as a matter of law. Prompt Payment Act In response to GSA's motion for summary relief, Twigg did not argue that it is entitled to payment pursuant to the Prompt Payment Act (PPA), 31 U.S.C.  3901-3907 (1994). Nevertheless, because the PPA was the foundation for the claim that Twigg submitted to the contracting officer, we will look to see whether the PPA entitles Twigg to payment. According to the PPA, GSA would owe interest if it failed to pay Twigg for its work by the "required payment date." 31 U.S.C.  3902. The "required payment date" is either the date payment is due under the contract or, if the contract does not establish a due date, thirty days after a proper invoice for the amount due is received. 31 U.S.C.  3903. An invoice is received on the later of either the date on which the designated agency office or official receives a proper invoice, or the seventh day after the date services are completed, with certain exceptions. 31 U.S.C.  3901. The contract established that payments were due within twenty- three days after GSA received Twigg's invoice. GSA received Twigg's invoice on April 11, 1995, and Twigg initialed a few changes to the invoice on April 24, 1995. Twigg received GSA's payment on May 4, 1995, twenty-three days after April 11, 1995. Even if the April 24 changes are not viewed as having moved the proper invoice date to April 24, GSA paid Twigg by the required payment date and so Twigg is not entitled to the payment of interest pursuant to the PPA. Gulf Coast Trailing In Gulf Coast Trailing, a contractor submitted a claim to a contracting officer pursuant to the Contract Disputes Act (CDA), 41 U.S.C.  601-613 (1994). The agency agreed to settle the claim, and six months later, the agency modified the contract to incorporate the terms of the settlement. Fourteen months after the modification was issued, the agency paid the amount of the settlement. Section 12 of the CDA, 41 U.S.C.  611, provides that agencies shall pay interest on amounts due to contractors from the date the contracting officer receives a claim from the contractor. Relying upon section 12 of the CDA, the Corps of Engineers Board of Contract Appeals awarded Gulf Coast Trailing interest on the settlement amount beginning sixty days after the parties agreed upon a settlement. According to the board, sixty days would have been a reasonable time for the agency to take to pay the settlement amount. The board did not award interest from the date the claim was submitted through the date that the claim was settled, because the board found that the contractor gave up its right to interest for that period when it signed the modification. Gulf Coast Trailing was awarded CDA interest based upon the fact that it submitted a CDA claim to the contracting officer. Unlike the contractor in Gulf Coast Trailing, Twigg did not submit a CDA claim to the contracting officer for the cost of the changed work. Instead, on July 21, 1994, Twigg submitted to GSA's project manager a cost breakdown in response to GSA's request for a proposal for modifying the contract to change the contract's scope of work. Twigg's submission did not constitute a claim, for purposes of the CDA. Essex Electro Engineers, Inc. v. United States, 960 F.2d 1576 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 953 (1992). Because Twigg did not submit a CDA claim for the cost of the changed work, Twigg is not entitled to interest pursuant to the CDA. Even if Twigg's cost breakdown constituted a claim, Twigg would not be entitled to CDA interest. In its motion for summary relief, GSA stated that Twigg failed to submit a certified claim as required by section 6 of the CDA. 41 U.S.C.  605. In response to GSA's motion, on November 27, 1995, Twigg supplied a certification of its July 21, 1994 cost breakdown. Because a certification was required, interest did not begin to accrue on any amount due until Twigg submitted a properly certified claim. Fidelity Construction Co. v. United States, 700 F.2d 1379 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 826 (1983). If Twigg's cost breakdown could be considered a claim for the cost of the changed work, Twigg is entitled to no CDA interest because GSA paid Twigg for the changed work in May 1995, before Twigg submitted its certification. Thus, when Twigg certified its July 21, 1994 proposal, there was no amount due upon which interest could begin to accrue. Decision Twigg is not entitled to recover interest pursuant to either the Prompt Payment Act or the Contract Disputes Act. GSA's motion for summary relief is GRANTED and the appeal is DENIED. ______________________________ MARTHA H. DeGRAFF Board Judge We concur: _______________________________ ________________________________ ANTHONY S. BORWICK STEPHEN M. DANIELS Board Judge Board Judge