_________________________________________________ GRANTED IN PART: March 17, 1997 _________________________________________________ GSBCA 13125 ADELAIDE BLOMFIELD MANAGEMENT COMPANY, Appellant, v. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, Respondent. Darryl L. Thompson, Anchorage, AK, counsel for Appellant. Nora A. Huey, Office of General Counsel, General Services Administration, Washington, DC, counsel for Respondent. Before Board Judges DANIELS (Chairman), BORWICK, and NEILL. BORWICK, Board Judge. Adelaide Blomfield Management Company (appellant or Ms. Blomfield) appeals from the failure of the contracting officer to issue a decision on appellant's claim for restoration costs. The respondent is the General Services Administration (GSA), which entered into a five-year firm term lease with appellant for premises at Ninth and Barrow Streets in Anchorage, Alaska, for housing of federal agencies. As part of the lease requirements, appellant made considerable improvements to the space. The cost for this build-out was included in the base rent. The lease, when executed, did not contain a restoration clause. After the lease was signed, and well into the build-out process, GSA and appellant negotiated supplemental lease agreements (SLAs) one and two, which listed certain additional minor improvements to be included in the built-out space. During the negotiations for those SLAs, appellant proposed, and the GSA contracting officer accepted, a restoration clause which was placed on the first page of SLA one and incorporated by reference in SLA two. The Government stayed in the building for the five-year term and mid-way through one option period and then vacated the space. Appellant filed a restoration claim of $1,201,513, contending that the restoration clause applied to the whole building. The Government concedes that it failed to restore in accordance with the clause, but maintains that the scope of the restoration clause is limited to the items called out in SLAs one and two. We held a two week hearing on this matter commencing on April 16, 1996 and have had the benefit of the parties' briefs. We agree with the Government. We grant the appeal in part and award appellant $11,578.25, plus interest as allowed by the Contract Disputes Act of 1978. Findings of Fact Pre-lease negotiations and terms of lease 1. The building was constructed in 1977 and owned by Blomfield Properties. Respondent's Exhibit 26 at 15; Transcript at 209. The State of Alaska leased the premises from that date until 1984. Transcript at 18. Through a divorce settlement, Ms. Blomfield obtained the building. Id. at 209. 2. Before the build-out, the building was vacant. It had a central corridor for utilities and bathrooms and two vacant, thirty-two feet wide bays on either side of the central corridor. Appellant's Exhibit 1; Transcript at 26. The building had drop ceilings on each floor, heating, ventilating and air-conditioning (HVAC) outlets, and a main electricity conduit in each ceiling. Appellant's Exhibit 1; Transcript at 31-32. 3. On October 26, 1984, GSA issued solicitation for offers (SFO) 10PEL-85-51 for a minimum of 23,820 and a maximum of 25,300 net usable square feet of space for a five year term with one five year renewal option. Appeal File, Exhibit 1 at 22. 4. The SFO contemplated a significant build-out of interior space to house tenant agencies. Appeal File, Exhibit 1 at 30. The SFO required the lessor to provide, as special requirements, a computer room with separately zoned HVAC, a conference room with separate HVAC, and office and storage space for the United States Forest Service. Lessor was also required to provide a laboratory, a special office, and storage space for the Soil Conservation Service. Id. at 5-6. The SFO stated that GSA would provide layout drawings and necessary finish specifications to the lessor ninety days prior to the delivery date specified in the lease contract or letter of award. Id. at 32. 5. The SFO also required permanent partitions surrounding stairs, corridors, elevator shafts, toilet rooms and janitor closets. Appeal File, Exhibit 1 at 30. The SFO was to be priced on the assumption that the Government would require interior partitions to be provided at a ratio of one linear foot for every ten square feet of space provided, extending from the finished floor to the finished ceiling. Id. at 31. The lessor was to provide 3,700 square feet of vinyl asbestos floor tile, with the remainder of the space being carpeted. Id. 6. In submitting its offer, appellant understood that its building would need to be "completely retrofitted" for this lease. Transcript at 29. Appellant understood that it would have to build-out the space in accordance with the government design, and that it would use the unit costs for adjustments in its offer to price the build-out, after performing a take-off from the government plans. Id. at 30. 7. The parties negotiated the terms and conditions of the lease. On January 18, 1985, the contracting officer, Mr. John Mauthe, sent Ms. Blomfield a copy of the lease reflecting agreed-upon basic terms and conditions. Respondent's Exhibit 11. In response, appellant's attorney returned a copy of the lease executed by Ms. Blomfield, and a redlined copy of the lease containing detailed changes made by the lessor to the basic terms and conditions of the lease contained in paragraphs nine through twelve of the lease. Respondent's Exhibit 12. 8. The changes were specific and detailed. For example, GSA's proposed paragraph eleven provided, "Actual effective date of this lease will be upon completion of initial space alterations by the Lessor and acceptance by the Government." Respondent's Exhibit 11. Appellant's proposal for paragraph eleven provided, "Notwithstanding Paragraph 3, the Government's obligation to pay rent shall not commence until completion of initial space alterations by the Lessor and acceptance by the Government, which acceptance shall not be unreasonably withheld. Occupancy of the premises shall constitute acceptance." Respondent's Exhibit 12. In negotiating the lease, appellant did not insist that a restoration clause be inserted. Transcript at 591. 9. In his price negotiation memorandum (PNM) the contracting officer noted that "[a] number of minor changes and clarifications to our standard lease terms were proposed by Mrs. Blomfield's attorney. With one exception they had no bearing on the essential terms." Respondent's Exhibit 2. The contracting officer believed that the exception--proposed changes in paragraph twelve in the lease establishing firm start and ending dates for the lease term--would be "unimportant when weight [sic] against the delay involved in continuing negotiations." Id. The Government therefore accepted appellant's version of the changes, which became part of the lease. Id.; Appeal File, Exhibit 1 at 2. 10. The parties executed the lease on February 15, 1985. Appeal File, Exhibit 1 at 1. The lease contained no restoration clause. Id. The build-out of the space was the responsibility of the appellant. Appeal File, Exhibit 1 at 28 ( 49); Respondent's Exhibit 10 (Deposition of Contracting Officer John G. Mauthe) at 39-40. Construction of the build-out began on February 15 and ended on or about May 1. Transcript at 600. Negotiation of supplemental lease agreement one 11. On February 27, 1985, appellant wrote GSA and stated that provision of a number of Wang and Harris central processing unit (CPU) outlets; cathode ray tube outlets; printer outlets; power conditioner connections; emergency power-off switches; special wiring; 20 AMP, 110v outlet feeds from the power conditioner; and Harris CPU outlets were in excess of the bid requirements. Appellant estimated $22,476 as the cost to be charged for those extras. Respondent's Exhibit 17. Appellant proposed that "GSA further agrees to pay all cost[s] at the end of the lease to remove all extras and replace outside door at the end of their tenancy." Id. 12. By cover letter of April 11, 1985, the contracting officer forwarded duplicate copies of proposed SLA one, "covering above standard electrical work" in the leased premises, to appellant, and requested appellant to sign both copies and return them to GSA "[i]f it is in accordance with your understanding." Respondent's Exhibit 14. Proposed SLA one provided that the Government would pay appellant $22,476 for installation of: 1 Wang CPU outlet 30 Wang CPU outlets 5 Wang CRT floor outlets 2 Wang Printer outlets 53 DC CRT outlets 11 DC CRT floor outlets 2 DC CPU outlets 3 DC Printer outlets 1 Harris CPU outlet 5 Harris CRT outlets 1 Harris Printer outlet 1 Power conditioner connection at BOM computer room 1 Power conditioner connection at SCS computer room 3 Emergency Power Off Switches Id. 13. On April 30, 1985, Ms. Blomfield returned proposed SLA one to the contracting officer with the following sentence written and initialed by Ms. Blomfield: "Building to be brought back to original condition at end of lease." Appeal File, Exhibit 1 at 45. Ms. Blomfield placed this phrase directly after the standard phrase in the SLA "All other terms and conditions of the lease shall remain in force and effect." Id. The contracting officer executed SLA one on May 6, 1985 at a cost of $22,476. Id. Negotiation of supplemental lease agreement two 14. On March 27, 1985, the contracting officer requested appellant to provide an offer for additional alterations to the leased premises: (1) eight foot galvanized chain link fence; (2) soundproofing in photocopy room; (3) paging system; (4) installation of steel door on third floor; (5) two separate light switches in photographic interpretation room; and (6) installation of dead bolt locks in twenty-three rooms. Respondent's Exhibit 16. The contracting officer asked for a detailed cost breakdown to speed the award of the supplemental lease agreement. Id. On April 8, appellant's property manager, Mr. John Blomfield (Ms. Blomfield's son), submitted a quotation for the job, and inserted the language "Building to be brought back to original condition at end of lease" in the quotation. Appeal File, Exhibit 1 at 48. The contracting officer negotiated prices for each item with appellant's construction contractor, Respondent's Exhibit 10 at 55-56, and sent appellant the unsigned copy of SLA two, in which the Government agreed to pay $15,417.80, Appeal File, Exhibit 3 at 68. In exchange, appellant was to "provide and install the following, in accordance with [appellant's] attached offer dated April 8, 1985." Id. On April 30, Ms. Blomfield signed the SLA and returned it to the contracting officer, who executed it on May 6. Id. 15. Ms. Blomfield testified, at the hearing on the merits of this appeal, that in inserting the restoration provision, it was her intention "from the beginning [of lease negotiations] that the building be restored." Transcript at 216-17. Ms. Blomfield could not precisely fix the date of her conversations about restoration with the contracting officer, but stated that "this would have been brought up . . . at the end of the negotiations, after I was meeting with my attorney at those times." Id. at 220. She testified that during these negotiations she "let [the contracting officer] know that I was appalled with the other building [leased to the Government], that I was really wanting to protect myself, and that I wanted the building [to be] leasable. . . . I was required to do a lot of things, and in turn, I felt they would be required to do the same things at the end of the lease, to bring it back up to that clean place." Id. at 220-21. Parties' understanding of restoration clause 16. Ms. Blomfield testified that what she meant by "original condition" was the building's condition before the build-out, with two empty bays, without load-bearing partitions, so that appellant could have flexibility in releasing the building. Transcript at 582. Ms. Blomfield admitted that if she communicated that notion to the contracting officer she "didn't do it adequately," but that she "thought that [it] was understood." Id. She also testified that her notion of "original condition" would not have been communicated at "one particular time," but that it would have been communicated "during the negotiations, during the bid process, after the bid process." Id. at 583. She admitted that the first time she raised the issue of restoration with the contracting officer in writing was in April 1985. Id. at 601-02. She explained that "it was the very first opportunity I had to actually put something in writing that hadn't been put in writing before, but it had been intended." Id. 17. The contracting officer testified as follows: Q. Did John or Adelaide Blomfield ever explain to you what they meant by "building to be brought back to original condition?" A. It really wasn't discussed . . . . I believed I understood it. It seemed pretty open and above board. Q. And what did you think it meant? A. The work described above, the installation of those, . . . oh, computer outlets and all of the work that is listed up here [referring to the items in SLA one] is the work that is in question is what we are talking about, and the interpretation of this addition here which I had agreed to is simply that at the end of a lease this particular work should be restored and the --up to-- as far as the lessor was concerned, restored to the previous existing condition. But the previous existing condition being the condition of the --after-- subsequent to the initial lease. Q. So they were to -- so you thought it meant the government had to restore or fix these items -- A. Yes. Q. -- that are specifically identified on supplemental lease number one? A. Yes. Respondent's Exhibit 10 at 23-24. 18. In response to a question as to whether the contracting officer understood what Ms. Blomfield meant by restoring the building to its original condition, the contracting officer stated: I think I did know what she meant, and I certainly did appear to at that time, but I'm getting back to what I said earlier. This is a separate and distinct contract, which has nothing to do with the previous one. The fact that it says here, "All other terms and conditions shall remain in force and effect," this doesn't say that we are going to restore the entire building because of a little penny-ante alteration contract here. Respondent's Exhibit 10 at 64-65. 19. The notion of "original condition" held by Mr. Blomfield is different from Ms. Blomfield's. To Mr. Blomfield, "original condition" meant the condition of the building after the build-out, but before the Government moved in. Transcript at 634-36. The claim 20. On September 17, 1993, the Government vacated the premises. Adelaide-Blomfield Management Co. v. General Services Administration, GSBCA 12851, 95-1 BCA  27,514, at 137,113 (Finding 8). After an exchange of correspondence, on April 4, 1994, appellant submitted to the contracting officer a certified restoration claim for $1,201,513, for demolition and restoration of the premises. Appeal File, Exhibit 34 at 161. For example, appellant claimed $25,000 for removing the existing HVAC system and $150,000 for installing a new HVAC system, id. at 167, although the HVAC system was installed in 1977, eight years before GSA entered into the lease with appellant, Transcript at 684. Appellant claimed $6,560 for removing the old carpet and $72,000 for restoration of all carpet in the building, Appeal File, Exhibit 34 at 166, although not all of the carpet was new when the Government signed the lease, Transcript at 672-76. 21. GSA considered that the restoration duty applied only to those items covered by SLAs one and two. Appeal File, Exhibit 15 at 113. On September 20, 1994, the contracting officer extended the time for issuing a decision on the claim to November 1, 1994, and advised appellant of GSA's position: The Government will consider payment of restoration based on waste or contractual liability and these two conditions are limited by the diminution in value rule, which you are probably familiar with. I have underlined the items on the ABMCO claim that correspond with the items on [SLAs one and two] to Lease GS-10B-05213. I have added an additional column to show the Government's estimate of the same items. These two supplements indicate restoration was expected for the items provided, so this restoration can be considered contractual. The amount claimed for alterations related to [SLAs one and two] is $25,840 without profit or overhead. ABMCO has claimed $5,000 for the elevator without any substantiating documentation. . . . The Government's estimate of the same items is $11,165, plus profit and overhead at [twenty percent] resulting in a total of $13,396. Id., Exhibit 45 at 197. GSA offered appellant that amount to satisfy appellant's claim. Id. The contracting officer did not issue a decision by the stated date, and an appeal was taken from the deemed denial of the claim. Restoration costs of items covered by supplemental lease agreements one and two 22. Respondent's estimator, Mr. Charles Clanton, provided an estimate of the cost of demolishing and restoring the items listed in SLAs one and two. The estimate for demolishing and restoring the items in SLA one was $4,885.75, rounded to $4,886. Transcript at 428. This total was composed of the following: Demolition Restoration 31 Wang outlets $488.25 $697.50 5 Wang CPU outlets (floor) 78.75 78.75 7 Wang Printer outlets 110.25 144.00 53 DG CRT outlets 834.75 1,192.50 11 DG CRT outlets (floor) 173.25 173.25 2DG CPU outlets 31.50 45.00 3DG printer outlets 47.25 47.25 7 outlets 110.25 157.50 3 emergency power off switches 55.00 67.50 3 20 Amp, 110 volt outlets 47.25 67.50 3 440 Volts, 30 outlets 94.50 67.50 2 220 mp, 110 volt outlets 31.50 45.00 Totals $2,102.50 $2,783.25 Respondent's Exhibit 4. 23. In developing this estimate, Mr. Clanton estimated the cost of removing each item and restoring the exterior surfaces to its condition before the item was installed. Transcript at 418. For example, Mr. Clanton's methodology for estimating restoration costs for the five Wang CPU outlets was to base costs on removal of the outlets, running conduit to an accessible junction box within the wall or ceiling as the case may be, and then patching the wall using a gypsum board plug and patching mud. Id. at 419-20. Removal of conduit penetrations from the floor also included cutting an X in existing carpet, putting a plate over the hole where the conduit ran, and resealing the carpet. Id. at 429. The estimate for removal of wall outlets was based on removal of the outlets, wire removal, grounding or capping the wire, patching the wall, and spot painting. Id. at 431. 24. Mr. Clanton's estimate of the cost of restoration of the items listed in SLA two is $6,662.50, composed of the following: Demolition Restoration Fence $840.00 750.00 Door leading to alley 85.00 1,100.00 Photocopier air vent 1,095.00 Steel Door 42.50 250.00 Restoring holes left by dead bolts 2,500.00 Totals $2,062.50 $4,600.00 Respondent's Exhibit 4. In addition, respondent concedes that appellant is owed another thirty dollars not included in Mr. Clanton's calculations for re-keying a lock. Respondent's Post-Hearing Brief at 40. The total demolition and restoration cost for SLA two, according to respondent, would be $6,692.50. 25. The costs for demolition of the fence was based on removal of a fence three-hundred feet in length, hauling and dumping, cutting the fence posts at the ground level, and filling the openings with asphalt. Transcript at 435. The other method is to pull out the post, but that creates greater damage to the surrounding pavement. Id. at 435, 436. The cost for restoring holes left by dead bolts in the doors is based on removal of the locks, and then placing a decorative plate over the hole left by the removal of the lock. Id. at 437. It is neither practical nor economical to put a wood plug in the hole, instead of a plate, due to the large amount of sanding needed for the surrounding door. Id. at 439. Demolition of the photocopier air vent involved costs of removing the vent and repatching the building's siding. Id. at 441. Mr. Clanton also estimated thirty dollars to re-key a lock on a door. Respondent's Exhibit 4. 26. Mr. Clanton's labor estimates for electricians were based on prevailing market rates. Transcript at 420. Basically, he estimated what "you should pay" for the items. Id. at 449. Based on the above, we conclude that Mr. Clanton's estimates includes overhead and profit to be paid to a contractor performing restoration of the items on SLAs one and two. 27. We have considered the record of the case, including the testimony of Mr. Clanton. We consider Mr. Clanton's estimates as credible, reasonable, and consistent regarding the costs of restoration of the items in SLAs one and two. Building appraisals 28. Respondent's appraiser appraised the value of the building when the Government vacated it at $860,000 using the income approach (direct capitalization method). Respondent's Exhibit 26 at 79; Transcript at 1133-34. He appraised the value of the building with the items of SLAs one and two restored at $900,000. Respondent's Exhibit 26 at 107-12; Transcript at 1165. Appellant's appraiser estimated the as-is value of the building at $1,175,000 using the cost approach, $1,025,000 using the income approach, and $1,000,000 using the sales approach. Appellant's Exhibit 7 at 127, 128. To arrive at an estimate of the value of the building with the items in SLAs one and two restored, he simply increased the appraised values by $30,000, which is what he believes it would cost to remove the items installed by SLAs one and two. Id. at 129. Discussion Entitlement GSA contends that the only reasonable interpretation of the contract is that the restoration clause added in SLAs one and two applies only to the items expressly listed in SLAs one and two. Appellant argues that the scope of the restoration clause extends to the whole building; appellant argues that the Government is bound by appellant's reasonable interpretation, and that the phrase "building to be brought back to original condition" is clear and unambiguous. The principles applicable to contract interpretation are settled. The intention of both parties to a contract control its interpretation. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. United States, 444 F.2d 547, 551 (Ct. Cl. 1971). In divining the parties' intent, "contract language should be given the plain meaning which would be derived by a reasonably intelligent person acquainted with the circumstances." Rice Lake Contracting v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 144, 151 (1995). The unexpressed, subjective or unilateral intent of one party is insufficient to bind the other party. Adelaide Blomfield Management Co. v. General Services Administration, GSBCA 12851, 95-1 BCA  27,514, at 137,114; Alaska Lumber & Pulp Co., AGBCA 83-301-1, 91-2 BCA  23,890, at 119,693. How the parties acted before the onset of the controversy is given great weight. Heritage Reporting Corp., GSBCA 10396, 91-1 BCA  23,379, at 117,291. As to ambiguity, a contract is ambiguous only when it is susceptible to two or more different and reasonable interpretations, each of which is consistent with the contract language. Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. United States, 393 F.2d 807, 815 (Ct. Cl. 1968); George Bennett v. United States, 371 F.2d 859 (Ct. Cl. 1967). A contract must be read as a whole, with no part being superfluous. Hol-Gar Manufacturing Corp. v. United States, 253 F.2d 972 (Ct. Cl. 1965); A.S. McGaughan Co. v. General Services Administration, GSBCA 13367, 96-1 BCA  28,261, at 141,106 (appeal docketed A.S. McGaughan Co. v. General Services Administration, No. 96-1317 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 23, 1996)). In this matter, the clause "Building to be brought back to original condition at end of lease" is ambiguous in two respects: (1) as to scope--whether it applies to the build-out of the whole building or the build-out referenced in SLAs one and two; and (2) as to the meaning of "original condition"--whether, if restoration applies to the whole building, the phrase refers to the condition of the building before the build-out, after the build-out, or--if the clause is limited to the SLAs--to another time entirely. We conclude that the restoration clause is limited to that portion of the build-out that was added by SLAs one and two. The base lease, which included the general build-out, contained no restoration clause and thus was silent as to any duty of GSA to restore. Finding 10. The restoration clause was not inserted in the general lease, but on specific SLAs. Findings 13, 14. Those SLAs stated that all other terms and conditions of the lease remained in effect. The objective meaning of the phrase, without considering any of the surrounding circumstances, but considering only the words of the clause, and their placement in the SLAs, and the language of the lease itself, is that the scope of restoration applies only to the items specified in the SLAs. We also conclude that, in that context, the term "original condition" means the condition of the build-out before the items in the SLAs were installed. The actions of the parties confirm the above interpretation. Before award, when appellant demanded significant changes in the lease, it did so in writing and in detail. Findings 7, 8. There were no written demands for a general restoration clause before award, although appellant understood that a build-out was a significant requirement of the lease. Finding 6. The record also establishes that Ms. Blomfield neglected to orally discuss restoration of the building during the initial lease negotiations; instead she confined her discussions to her desire for a clean, leasable building at the end of the lease. Finding 15. Appellant inserted the restoration clause during price negotiations for those SLAs, not during the negotiations for the lease of the building. Appellant urges that Ms. Blomfield made clear to the contracting officer that she had intended that the restoration extend to the whole building. It is one thing to request a clean and leasable building, quite another to demand restoration of the building. We cannot conclude from this record that Ms. Blomfield clearly and unmistakably told the contracting officer that the restoration clause applied to the entire building, or that the contracting officer had that understanding when he accepted the clause in the SLAs. Of course, Ms. Blomfield's statements as to what she really intended--her unilateral and unexpressed intent--do not bind the Government. It is evident that the contracting officer understood the restoration clause to apply only to the items listed in SLAs one and two. A general restoration clause would have been a significant amendment--perhaps the most significant--to this lease, as it would have imposed contingent liability on the Government of many hundreds of thousands of dollars. If the contracting officer had understood the restoration clause to apply to the entire building, that understanding would have been reflected in a PNM. He would have examined the advantages and disadvantages of such a clause, as he earlier did in the case of appellant's proposed amendments to paragraph eleven of the lease. Finding 9. Perhaps he would have sought a rental reduction. Certainly no prudent person would have agreed to assume such an extensive contingent liability as consideration for the minor build-outs costing $22,476 (SLA one) and $15,417.80 (SLA two). Quantum Where there has been a breach of an obligation to restore leased premises to their original condition, a landlord is entitled to recover the damages he actually suffers, which is usually the cost of the restoration. Restoration costs are considered adequate to place a landlord in the position he would have been in had the contract not been breached. In order to avoid windfall recoveries, however, the measure of the landlord's damage is not the cost of restoration where such cost exceeds the diminution in fair market value that was caused by the tenant's non-performance. A landlord must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the fair market value of the property in the condition to which the tenant had covenanted to restore it was greater than the property's fair market value in an unrestored state at the termination of the lease. San Nicolas v. United States, 617 F.2d 246, 249 (Ct. Cl. 1980). Respondent does not contest that it breached the lease by failing to restore the items installed by SLAs one and two. The only issue is how much damage respondent should pay for the breach. Appellant claimed lost rental of four months, but that portion of the claim was premised on a duty to restore the whole building. Appellant has not demonstrated that failure to restore the items in SLA one and two caused a loss of rent. Appellant maintains it is entitled to damages beyond normal wear and tear for failure to return the building in as good condition as when originally leased. Appellant's Reply Brief at 38. There is no such general clause in the lease and the restoration clause that was in the lease applied only to the items in SLAs one and two. Appellant also suggests that it is entitled to the cost of replacement doors, based in part on the unit costs for adjustment appellant stated in its build-out proposal. Appellant's Reply Brief at 41. The standard is the reasonable cost of the repairs. See Bowes v. Saks & Co., 397 F.2d 113, 116 (7th Cir. 1968). Here, the meaning of reasonable cost of repairs must be evaluated in light of the limited scope of the restoration clause, which was simply to provide for removal of those minor items installed through SLAs one and two. The clause was never intended to require replacement of building elements such as doors and windows. We conclude that based on the credible evidence of respondent's estimator, Mr. Clanton, the proven reasonable restoration costs for breach of the restoration clause were $11,578.25, which includes overhead and profit. Findings 26, 27. We have briefly described the appraisals prepared by respondent and appellant. We need not decide which appraisal is the more reliable, for neither concludes that the diminution in fair market value caused by the tenant's non-performance was less than the restoration cost of the items covered by SLAs one and two. Decision The appeal is GRANTED IN PART. Appellant is awarded $11,578.25 plus interest as allowed by the Contract Disputes Act of 1978, 41 U.S.C.  601-613 (1994). _________________________ ANTHONY S. BORWICK Board Judge We concur: __________________________ __________________________ STEPHEN M. DANIELS EDWIN B. NEILL Board Judge Board Judge