Board of Contract Appeals General Services Administration Washington, D.C. 20405 _________________________________________________________________ DENIED: June 24, 1998 _________________________________________________________________ GSBCA 12961 HERMAN B. TAYLOR CONSTRUCTION CO., Appellant, v. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, Respondent. Christina Stone of Ogden, Lieberman, Gaughan & Stone, Houston, TX, counsel for Appellant. Kevin M. Myles, Office of Regional Counsel, General Services Administration, Fort Worth, TX, counsel for Respondent. Before Board Judges BORWICK, NEILL, and HYATT. BORWICK, Board Judge. Herman B. Taylor Construction Co., appellant, appeals from the General Services Administration's (GSA's or respondent's) default termination of its contract for renovation of the Unites States Courthouse and Post Office Building in Galveston, Texas. For the reasons explained below, we sustain the contracting officer's termination for default. Findings of Fact The contract I. The contract was for renovation of the United States Courthouse and Post Office Building in Galveston, TX, which the Government built in 1935 and contains more than 110,200 square feet of gross area. Appeal File, Exhibit 1 at 01010-2 ( 1.2D). The seven- story building houses courtrooms, lobbies, workrooms, offices and other related spaces for the United States Courts, the Department of Justice, the Postal Service and other agencies. Id. The building occupies an entire city block of the west end of the "Strand" historic district of Galveston. Id. 2. The contract consisted of four components. Appeal File, Exhibit 1 at 01010-2 ( 1.2D). The first involved the replacement and enhancement of the major building support systems, including heating, ventilating and air conditioning (HVAC), electrical, lighting, and water distribution systems. The second component involved identification and partial abatement of asbestos containing materials in the mechanical and electrical rooms and plumbing pipes, ceiling plenums, and exposed locations throughout the building. The third involved upgrade and enhancement of the existing fire safety systems. This work included the addition of fire sprinklers throughout the building, installation of smoke detectors in the elevator lobbies, replacement of the standpipe systems, construction of a dedicated fire control center and replacement of the stair railings system. The fourth component involved miscellaneous architectural improvements and alterations, including landscaping and site improvements. Appellant was to perform the work in specified phases, with all inside work being performed outside normal working hours. Id. at 01010-3 ( 1.2E). Termination for default grounds 3. On March 16, 1994, the contracting officer sent a cure notice to appellant. The contracting officer identified three "failures" which he considered were endangering performance of the contract: (1) appellant's failure to attend in the last three weekly meetings with GSA's construction manager, (2) appellant's failure to produce a schedule of work for project completion, and (3) appellant's failure to prosecute the work diligently. As to the last, the contracting officer alleged that appellant had reduced his work force, hindering the progress on the job. Appeal File, Exhibit 18. 4. Appellant replied to the cure notice. As to the meetings issue, appellant noted that GSA's construction manager had no substantive issues to discuss. Concerning alleged failure to make progress, appellant noted that its work was five months ahead of the construction schedule. As for the alleged reduction of the work force, appellant noted that it had been waiting since December for the Government's punch list, and could not continue to completion without the punch list. Appeal File, Exhibit 20. 5. In its letter of June 10, 1994, terminating the contract for default, the contracting officer stated in pertinent part: I am in receipt of your letter dated June 9, 1994, whereby you advised me that you are withdrawing your workmen from the subject project. The workmen did not work the night of June 9, 1994. This is an act of repudiation of the contract and is a basis for default termination with common law remedies. The Department of Labor has also noted Davis-Bacon Act violations on the subject contract. In accordance with FAR 52.222-12þContract Termination-Debarment (FEB 1988), you are terminated for default. A cure notice for your failure to timely perform and to make progress on the contract was previously sent to you on March 16, 1994. As of this date you have failed to act to correct the concerns expressed therein. In view of the foregoing, we have no alternative but to terminate your right to proceed for default effective June 10, 1994. The Repair and Alterations for the U.S. Post Office/Courthouse, Galveston, TX will be procured elsewhere, and your firm will be liable for the reprocurement and excess costs. The Government reserves all rights and remedies provided by law under the subject contract. Appeal File, Exhibit 45. 6. The contract contained the standard form default clause, which provided in pertinent part: FAR 52.249-10-DEFAULT (FIXED PRICE CONSTRUCTION) (APR 1984) (a) If the Contractor refuses or fails to prosecute the work or any separable part, with the diligence that will insure its completion within the time specified in this contract, including any extension, or fails to complete the work within this time, the Government may, by written notice to the Contractor, terminate the right to proceed with the work (or the separable part of the work) that has been delayed. . . . (b) The Contractor's right to proceed shall not be terminated nor the Contractor charged with damages under this clause, ifþ (1) The delay in completing the work arises from unforeseeable causes beyond the control and without the fault or negligence of the Contractor. . . . Appeal File, Exhibit 1, GSA Form 3506 at 42. Failure to diligently prosecute the work 7. The contract required appellant to commence work no later than thirty calendar days after it received the notice to proceed and, with appellant's award on the basis of bid alternate one, to complete the work ready for use not later than 756 days--two years and one month--thereafter. Appeal File, Exhibit 1 at 0800-1 ( 2.C), 01030-2 ( 3.1A). 8. The contract contained the following Payments clause, which provided in pertinent part: FAR 52.232-5--PAYMENTS UNDER FIXED-PRICE CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS (APR 1989) (a) The Government shall pay the Contractor the contract price as provided in this contract. (b) the Government shall make progress payments monthly as the work proceeds, or at more frequent intervals as determined by the Contracting Officer, on estimates of work accomplished which meets the standards of quality established under the contract, as approved by the Contracting Officer. . . . . (e) If the Contracting Officer finds that satisfactory progress was achieved during any period for which a progress payment is to be made, the Contracting Officer shall authorize payment to be made in full. However, if satisfactory progress has not been made, the Contracting Officer may retain a maximum of 10 percent of the amount of the payment until satisfactory progress is achieved. Appeal File, Exhibit 1, Standard Conditions, GSA Form 3506 at 35. Schedules 9. The contract completion date was October 1, 1994. Appeal File, Exhibit 1; Appellant's Exhibit 6. As of April 20, 1994, GSA noted on its construction progress report that the estimated contract completion date was May 31, 1994, and that the project was 96.70% complete. Appellant's Exhibit 1. 10. Despite the high completion percentage of the existing work, GSA was concerned that the work had many defects and omissions (D & Os) and correcting the D & Os would take more money than was left in the contract appropriations. Transcript at 55-56. At appellant's insistence that the project was substantially complete, GSA developed a D & O list of approximately ninety pages of remaining work, which was valued at $190,000. Id. at 57; Appellant's Exhibit 11. A significant defect in that list concerned delays in the installation of the fire alarm system in the basement. Transcript at 58; Appellant's Exhibit 11, Room 727, Item 11. As to that item, the delay in the installation was caused by GSA's delay in providing a change order for redesign of the fire alarm system's graphics panel to incorporate the new generator building and relocation of sprinkler heads. Appellant's Supplemental Appeal File, Exhibit 9; Transcript at 238-39, 1002-03. Delay in finalizing the redesign of the fire alarm system would also cause delay in finish painting and electrical work. Transcript at 837. The contracting officer confirmed the delay to the fire alarm system prevented the Government from declaring the work substantially complete. Id. at 307. 11. The other items in the D & O list were finish work type items. For example, GSA's inspector noted "hinge pin installed upside down," Appeal File, Exhibit 11, Hardware Package 6, Door 102, Item 2, and "incomplete paint finish," id., Hardware Package 8, Door 105, Item 1. On the first floor, the inspector noted that "at both northeast and southeast stair enclosures, wall construction needs to be completed around the fire house cabinets." Id., First Floor Notes, H08279.02. Appellant's principal testified that when he received the punch list items on May 5, correction of the items in the D & O list were about fifty percent complete and it would not have taken a full crew to complete the remaining items. Transcript at 842. Appellant's project superintendent testified that before the termination, appellant had completed sixty percent of the punch list items in accordance with contract requirements. Id. at 1001. 12. On May 10, 1994, the contracting officer, based on the advice of the COTR, advised appellant that with a "full crew" the punch list items and other remaining base bid and modification work could be completed within forty-five calendar days, or by June 24, 1994. GSA demanded a schedule for completion no later than May 24, with all remaining work to be complete for final inspection no later than June 27. The Government, however, never issued a contract modification stating a completion date earlier than October 1. Transcript at 146. 13. GSA's reference to a full crew, in its letter of May 10, reflected its concerns about appellant's staffing of the job during the later stages of construction. The contracting officer testified that appellant reduced its labor to as few as five employees during its last weeks on the project, leaving GSA with no confidence that appellant could complete the work in a timely manner. Transcript at 55. The COTR testified that appellant's crew decreased drastically after January 1994. Id. at 629-30. Progress payments and alleged abandonment 14. On December 2, 1993, GSA withheld $35,687.77 from progress payments for failure to make satisfactory progress on the third floor. Appellant's Supplemental Appeal File, Exhibit 4; Transcript at 311. However, on December 21, the COTR waived the schedule for the third floor in order to let tradesmen working on the fifth and sixth floors use the third floor work as fill-in work while other trades finished their work on those floors. Appellant's Supplemental Appeal File, Exhibit 16. As of March 27, 1994, however, appellant had completed 97% of the work to be done on that floor, although only 73.4% of the construction time had elapsed. Appellant's Exhibit 5. 15. On March 28, 1994, appellant submitted pay application seventeen for $148,867.69. By check dated March 25, the Government, without explanation, paid $96,353.64 of the pay request. If the Government had taken proper retainage, the payment would have been $133,980.93. Appellant's Supplemental Appeal File, Exhibit 4. The check of March 25 was the last payment on this contract appellant received from the Government. Transcript at 1039. On May 27, 1994, appellant submitted pay application eighteen for $63,149.48, Appellant's Exhibit 12, of which the Government agreed to pay only $20,419.60. Appellant's Exhibit 13. Upon learning that the Government was going to cut the requested payment to that amount, appellant withdrew its crew from the job until the Government processed the payment. Appeal File, Exhibit 41. The Government offered to increase the payment amount to $40,000. Transcript at 1034. Appellant's bookkeeper explained that the proposed payment was not sufficient to cover contract work subcontractors had performed between the date of the last payment and submission of pay application eighteen; appellant needed at least $70,000. Id. at 1039-40. Appellant notified the Government that it would withdraw its workers from the project until the Government paid appellant for the work in place. Appeal File, Exhibit 41. Davis-Bacon Act 16. The contract contained the following clauses regarding construction contract labor standards, reproduced here in pertinent part: FAR 52.222-4 CONTRACT WORK HOURS AND SAFETY STANDARDS ACTþOVERTIME COMPENSATION (MAR 1986) (a) Overtime requirements. No Contractor or subcontractor contracting for any part of the contract work which may require or involve the employment of laborers or mechanics . . . shall require or permit any such laborers or mechanics in any workweek in which the individual is employed on such work to work in excess of 40 hours in such workweek unless such laborer or mechanic receives compensation at a rate not less than 1 « times the basic rate of pay for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours in such workweek. . . . . FAR 52.222-6 DAVIS-BACON ACT (FEB 1988) (a) All laborers and mechanics employed or working upon the site of the work will be paid unconditionally and not less often than once a week, and without subsequent deduction or rebate on any account (except such payroll deductions as are permitted by regulations issued by the Secretary of Labor under the Copeland Act . . . , the full amount of wages and bona fide fringe benefits (or cash equivalents thereof) due at the time of payment computed at rates not less than those contained in the wage determination of the Secretary of Labor which is attached hereto and made a part hereof. Appeal File, Exhibit 1, GSA Form 3505 at 1. 17. The contract also contained the following clauses: FAR 52.222-12 CONTRACT TERMINATION - DEBARMENT (FEB 1988) A breach of the contract clauses entitled "Davis-Bacon Act"[,] "Contract Work Hours and Safety Standards Act". . . may be grounds for termination of the contract, and for debarment as a Contractor and subcontractor as provided in 29 CFR 5.12. FAR 52.222-14þDISPUTES CONCERNING LABOR STANDARDS (FEB 1988) The United States Department of Labor has set forth in 29 CFR Parts 5, 6, and 7 procedures for resolving disputes concerning labor standards requirements. Such disputes shall be resolved in accordance with those procedures and not the Disputes clause of this contract. Disputes within the meaning of this clause include disputes between the Contractor (or any of its subcontractors) and the contracting agency, the U.S. Department of Labor, or the employees or their representatives. Appeal File, Exhibit 1, GSA Form 3505 at 4. 18. On November 7, 1994, the Department of Labor's (DOL's) Employment Standards Administration's Wage and Hour Division advised the contracting officer that it had conducted an investigation of appellant's performance on the contract. Its investigation revealed that appellant failed to pay the proper wage rates, fringe benefits, and overtime compensation, and that appellant misclassified its laborers' employment and failed to maintain accurate time and payroll records. The DOL determined that appellant owed $62,935.19 in Davis-Bacon Act back wages due sixteen employees and $4,153.88 in Contract Work Hours and Safety Standards Act back wages due five employees. The DOL requested GSA to withhold $67,089.07 from funds due appellant. Appeal File, Exhibit 95. 19. At the hearing on the merits of this appeal, one painter testified that he was paid $9.00 per hour the first week, with an increase to $12.02 per hour. Transcript at 199-200. For painters, the wage scale with fringe benefits was $15.32 an hour. Appeal File, Exhibit 1, DOL General Wage Decision TX91-10 at 2. This painter worked weekends beyond the forty-hour work week. Transcript at 212. However, he was not paid overtime for weekend work, id. at 212; instead, he was paid a flat $100 a day for the weekend work, which amounted to $10.50 per hour. Id. at 215. 20. On December 20, 1994, DOL advised appellant in pertinent part: As you are aware, the Wage and Hour Division conducted an investigation of your firm during its performance on the cited project. The investigation revealed violations of the labor standards provisions which, if not satisfactorily explained, would appear to constitute a disregard of your obligations to your employees within the meaning of Section 3(a) of the Davis-Bacon Act. The following is a summary of the investigation findings based on the record presently constituted. According to the applicable wage decision (TX91-10) employees performing work as carpenters, plasterers, and painters were to receive $16.61, $17.59, and $15.32 per hour including fringes, respectively. The investigation disclosed that you misclassified many of these employees who performed this work as laborers and paid these employees rates between $7.50 and $14.60 per hour. In addition, the investigation revealed that you failed to record all hours worked by the employees and some employees who worked on the subject projects were not reported on the certified payroll. Furthermore, employees were not paid proper overtime compensation for those hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week. In some instances, the employees received a separate check for overtime hours which were only paid at the straight time rate. As a result of the foregoing back wages were computed in the amount of $67,089.07 for sixteen (16) employees. Of this amount, $62,935.19 was found due sixteen (16) employees for prevailing wage violations, and $4,143.88 was found due five (5) employees for overtime violations. The record indicates that you have refused to pay these back wages. . . . . Upon careful review of the investigation report, I find reasonable cause to believe that the violations of the Davis-Bacon Act, as amended, as described above, constitute a disregard of your obligations to your employees within the meaning of the Section 3(a) of the [Davis-Bacon] Act. However, in view of the serious nature of the imposition of the ineligibility sanctions, I am at this time offering you an opportunity to request a hearing before one of the Department of Labor's Administrative Law Judges pursuant to sections 5.11(b) and 5.12(b) of Regulations, Part I, for a determination of the issues in this case, including the amounts of the back wages due and whether debarment action should be taken under Section 3(a) of the Davis-Bacon Act. . . . . If I do not hear from you within [thirty days], my decision concerning the back wage findings shall be final with respect to you and we will proceed to notify the contracting agency that action should be taken to disburse the monies being withheld under the contract to the underpaid employees. Appeal File, Exhibit 99. 21. On January 11, 1994, appellant wrote DOL disputing the allegations and requesting a hearing before a DOL administrative law judge. Appeal File, Exhibit 101. On November 3, 1997, a DOL Administrative Law Judge convened a hearing on the alleged Davis-Bacon Act violations. Respondent's Post-Hearing Exhibit 1. At the beginning of the second day of the hearing the parties entered consent findings. Id. 22. The consent findings provided in pertinent part: 1. The parties agree that [appellant's] employees named in attached exhibit "A" . . . shall be paid a total of $33,869.54. 2. The Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Division is currently withholding $67,739.07 on the subject contract. 3. The Department of Labor shall disburse $33,869.54 to the employees listed . . . and release the remainder to the contractor absent retention under some other legal authority. . . . . 5. The Department of Labor enters this agreement with the position that Davis-Bacon and Contract Work Hours and Safety Standards Act violations occurred. [Appellant] enters this agreement with the position that Davis-Bacon and Contract Work Hours and Safety Standards Act violations did not occur; and, neither this agreement to release back wages nor execution of this agreement shall constitute or be construed as liability or an admission on the part of the Contractor of any violation of the Davis-Bacon Act and Contract Work Hours and Safety Standards Act or its implementing regulations. Respondent's Post Hearing Exhibit 1. On December 17, the DOL Administrative Law Judge issued a decision and order approving consent findings, which states that "the consent findings constitute my findings of fact and conclusions of law and represent a full, final and complete adjudication of this proceeding." Id. Discussion The Government has the burden of proving that a default termination is warranted because it is a "drastic action . . . which should be imposed (or sustained) only for good grounds and on solid evidence." J.D. Hedin Construction Co. v. United States, 408 F.2d 424, 431 (Ct. Cl. 1969); Pro-Des, Inc. v. General Services Administration, GSBCA 13165, et al., 96-2 BCA  28,510, at 142,377-78. Alleged failure to diligently prosecute work and alleged abandonment The Government argues that appellant was properly terminated for appellant's failure to prosecute the work with the diligence that would ensure its completion within the time specified in this contract. Respondent has not proven that ground of default. This contract was difficult to perform. It required appellant to renovate major building systems of a seven-story building at night without disrupting tenant operations. Finding 2. At the time of termination, the project was 96.7% complete and was about five months ahead of schedule. Finding 9. The COTR was convinced that appellant could complete the project by June 27. Finding 12. Although the Government was concerned about insufficient funding to enable appellant to correct the items noted in the D & O list, finding 10, budget concerns are not specified grounds for default under the Termination for Default clause. A significant defect as stated in the D & O list concerned the installation of a complete fire alarm system, and the associated delay in finish painting and electrical work. Finding 10. That delay was caused by the Government delay in approving the redesign of the fire alarm graphics panel. Id. When the Government terminated the contract for default, about 50% of the defects in the D & O list had been rectified. Finding 11. The Government has not shown that appellant would have been unable to correct remaining D & Os for which appellant was responsible between June 10 and October 1, 1994. Respondent has not demonstrated that appellant abandoned the contract. To show abandonment, respondent must demonstrate that appellant manifested a positive, unequivocal and unconditional intent not to perform the contract in any event or at any time. A.J.C.A. Construction v. General Services Administration, GSBCA 11541, et al., 94-2 BCA  26,949. Furthermore, under the Progress Payment clause, the contractor is entitled to payment for satisfactory work that meets the standard of quality with retainage protecting the Government against failure or default. Overhead Electric Co., ASBCA 25656, 85-2 BCA  18,026, at 90,474- 75. When unjustified Government withholding has prejudiced the contractor, leaving the worksite is not cause for default. Nexus Construction Co. ASBCA 31070, 91-3 BCA  24,303, at 121,462-63; Overhead Electric Co. The record demonstrates that appellant walked off the job when the Government wrongfully withheld sums from pay applications seventeen and eighteen, which sums were necessary for appellant to pay its subcontractors. Finding 15. GSA has not demonstrated that the work covered by those pay applications failed to meet the standard of quality established by the contract and that appellant was therefore not entitled to full payment for the work covered by those pay applications. GSA argues the default is justified because appellant did not provide a completion schedule and that appellant's principal failed to attend meetings. GSA has not shown that those alleged problems adversely affected the progress of the work. Davis-Bacon and Contract Work Hours and Safety Standards Act violations This contract required appellant to pay its workers overtime wages in accordance with the standard Contract Work Hours and Safety Standards Act clause and, per the standard form Davis- Bacon Act clause, regular wages set forth in the DOL's wage determination. Finding 16. This contract also provided that violations of those clauses may be grounds for termination of the contract. Finding 17. Under the Contract Disputes Act, boards of contract appeals have exercised jurisdiction over, and have denied appeals of, terminations for default based upon Department of Labor findings of Davis-Bacon Act violations. For example, a board sustained a termination for default based upon undisputed, detailed factual findings of DOL's Wage and Hour Division that the contractor had violated the Davis-Bacon Act. Quality Granite Construction Co., ASBCA 43846, 93-3 BCA 26,073, reconsideration denied, 94-1 BCA  26,430, aff'd, Quality Granite Construction Co., Inc. v. Aspin, 26 F.3d 138 (table) (Fed. Cir. 1994); see also Hellas Painting Contractor, ASBCA 31656, 87-1 BCA  19,427. Although in this appeal DOL's findings were six months after GSA's termination letter, the termination is amply supported by DOL's subsequent findings, which were as detailed as those in Quality Granite. The DOL found that appellant failed to pay the proper wage rates, fringe benefits, and overtime compensation, and that appellant misclassified its laborers' employment and failed to maintain accurate time and payroll records. The DOL determined that appellant owed $62,935.19 in Davis-Bacon Act back wages due sixteen employees and $4,153.88 in Contract Work Hours and Safety Standards Act back wages due five employees. Findings 18, 20. We note that this case is somewhat stronger than Quality Granite in that in Quality Granite, the DOL's findings were subsequent to the contracting officer's default termination, which did not mention labor standards violations. Here, the contracting officer's termination letter stated that the DOL had "noted" Davis-Bacon Act violations. The case of Emerald Maintenance v. United States, 925 F.2d 1425 (Fed. Cir. 1991) and its progeny are not to the contrary. Emerald Maintenance considered the case of a contractor who challenged at a board the DOL's prevailing wage determination. The court held that under the FAR 52.222-14þDisputes Concerning Labor Standards clause, the DOL possessed exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute about wage rates. We have followed Emerald Maintenance. See JL Associates, Inc. v. General Services Administration, GSBCA 11992, 93-3 BCA  25,939. Boards have also followed Emerald Maintenance in the context of termination for default disputes, when the default grounds were not supported by DOL findings. See Richard Lobato Remodeling LLC, ASBCA 49968 (Feb. 17, 1998) (in appeal of termination for default, Government's evidentiary burden not satisfied upon motion for summary relief in absence of DOL determination); National Interior Contractors, Inc., ASBCA 47131, 96-2 BCA  28,460 (motion for summary relief denied when alternative default termination ground--alleged Davis-Bacon violation--not supported by DOL findings; board lacked jurisdiction to consider alternate ground in absence of DOL finding). In this appeal, in contrast, the contracting officer's termination letter was supported, although after-the-fact, with specific and detailed findings of appellant's Davis-Bacon Act and Contract Work Hours and Safety Standards Act violations from DOL's Employment Standards Administration's Wage and Hour Division. Appellant, however, maintains that the last sentence of the fifth paragraph of the consent findings document in essence voids the DOL's findings: This is the final word from the DOL regarding whether [appellant] violated the wage rates and/or classification of laborers on this job. It is clear from the language of the Consent Findings that as a term of settlement there is no final determination that Taylor violated the Davis-Bacon Act. This agreed lack of finding [sic] is binding on the General Services Administration. . . . Thus, in the case before this Board, the DOL's agreement that "this agreement . . . shall [not] . . . be construed as liability . . ." is binding on this Board and the contracting officer in this case. Appellant's Supplemental Post-Hearing Brief at 3. Appellant, in essence, argues that the consent findings preclude and make moot the contracting officer's Davis-Bacon ground of default termination, as well as the additional ground of violations of the Contract Work Hours and Safety Standards Act. As the consent findings at issue here represent the end of an administrative adjudicatory process, case law concerning the treatment and interpretation of consent decrees in Federal courts is a useful guide to our treatment and interpretation of the consent findings in this case. A consent decree is "essentially a contractual agreement subject to continued judicial policing. The terms of a decree, unlike those of a simple contract, have unique properties. A consent decree has attributes both of a contract and of a judicial act." Aids such as the circumstances surrounding the formation of the decree help determine the purpose for which the decree was entered. Stotts v. Memphis Fire Department, 679 F.2d 541, 556 (6th Cir. 1982); reversed on other grounds sub nom. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984); see also Harris v. City of Philadelphia, 47 F.3d 1311, 1323 (3rd Cir. 1995). Consent decrees are construed for enforcement purposes as contracts and the binding substantive commands of the decree are embodied within the decree's four corners. In interpreting the decree, courts may not depart from its four corners unless the decree is ambiguous. United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681 (1971); Stotts, 679 F.2d at 557; cf. Foster v. Hallco Manufacturing Co., 947 F.2d 469, 481 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (in patent case, Court approved narrow construction of consent judgment asserted to give rise to issue preclusion). Appellant's argument ignores the first sentence of paragraph five of the consent findings document which unambiguously provides: "The Department of Labor enters this agreement with the position that Davis-Bacon and Contract Work Hours and Safety Standards Act violations occurred." Finding 22. This decree was entered after detailed findings by the DOL of appellant's Davis- Bacon Act and Contract Work Hours and Safety Standards Act violations on this contract. The clear purpose of the decree was to implement those findings and to provide substantial relief to the affected employees. While appellant is correct that the consent findings document is not an admission by appellant that the statutory violations occurred, no language in the consent finding document indicates an intent by the DOL to withdraw or modify the DOL's Wage and Hour Division's findings of appellant's Davis-Bacon Act or Contract Work Hours and Safety Standards Act violations, or for that matter, the contracting officer's default termination, which are supported by DOL's findings. In short, the contracting officer's default termination for Davis-Bacon Act violations is supported by DOL findings which are unaffected by the consent findings document. Furthermore, the Government has shown the termination for default was proper based upon appellant's violations of the Contract Work Hours and Safety Standards Act. We must therefore sustain the contracting officer's default termination of the contract based on those grounds. Decision The termination for default is sustained for the reasons stated above and the appeal is DENIED. __________________________ ANTHONY S. BORWICK Board Judge We concur: ___________________________ _____________________________ EDWIN B. NEILL CATHERINE B. HYATT Board Judge Board Judge