_________________________________________________________________ RESPONDENT S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DENIED: July 21, 1997 _________________________________________________________________ GSBCA 12915-R HERMAN B. TAYLOR CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, Appellant, v. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, Respondent. Christina Stone of Ogden, Lieberman, Gaughan & Stone, Houston, TX, counsel for Appellant. Kevin M. Myles, Office of Regional Counsel, General Services Administration, Fort Worth, TX, counsel for Respondent. Before Board Judges BORWICK, NEILL, and HYATT. BORWICK, Board Judge. Respondent seeks reconsideration of our decision in Herman B. Taylor Construction Co. v. General Services Administration, GSBCA 12915, 96-2 BCA  28,547. There, we awarded appellant $62,046.57 for the cost of a change order and a suspension of work plus interest as allowed by the Contract Disputes Act of 1978 (CDA), 41 U.S.C.  611 (1994). For the following reasons, we deny the motion. In its motion, respondent argues that it has paid appellant $31,370.41, that only $17,268.16 is "due" and that "reduction of judgment" is required. Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration at 3. Our decision determined the amount to which appellant is entitled for the change order and suspended work. Nothing in our decision prevents the Government from adjusting the amount due based on partial amounts already paid for that work. Respondent's motion also seeks reconsideration concerning certification issues. In an earlier decision in this appeal, we found defective appellant's attempted certification of its claim dated May 10, 1993, for $105,229.28. In accordance with amendments to the CDA, we allowed appellant to submit a corrected certification before the Board issued its decision. Herman B. Taylor Construction Co. v. General Services Administration, GSBCA 12915, 95-1 BCA  27,406. We also denied respondent's motion for a more definite statement, observing that the issue was well defined, as appellant sought $81,137.75, which was the difference between the total of $37,404.65 the Government had offered and $118,542.40, which was appellant's then most recent pricing of the change. Id. at 136,629. Appellant had submitted two certifications, one dated October 4, 1994, signed by Mr. Al LeMay, appellant's Vice President, and a second certification dated March 10, 1995, signed by Mr. Taylor, appellant's principal. The certification of October 4, 1994, mentioned no sum. The certification of March 10, 1995, stated that "the amount requested, being $81,137.75, accurately reflects the contract adjustment for which I believe the government is liable." Appellant's Reply, Exhibit D. Respondent argues--for the first time in its motion for reconsideration--that the certification of October 4, 1994, is defective because it was certified by a person without authority, and that interest should run only from March 10, 1995, the date of the later certification. Respondent is wrong. As amended by the Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992 (FCAA), the CDA provides that: The certification required by paragraph (1) may be executed by any person authorized to bind the contractor with respect to the claim. 41 U.S.C.A.  605(c)(7) (West Supp. 1996). The Executive Branch amended the FAR, effective October 29, 1992, to make the FAR consistent with the statute. FAR 33.207 and Federal Acquisition Circular 90-20, reprinted in CCH,  99,785 The FCAA also provides: If any interest is due under section 12 of the Contract Disputes Act of 1978 on a claim for which certification under section 6(c)(1) is, on or after the date of enactment of this Act found to be defective [sic] shall be paid from the later of the date on which the contracting officer initially received the claim or the date of the enactment of this Act. Pub.L. 102-572, 106 Stat. 4506, 4518,  907(a)(3). As far as the certification authority issue raised by respondent is concerned, the certification of March 10, 1995, signed by appellant's principal, is concededly correct. We need not decide whether the earlier certification signed by appellant's Vice President is sufficient. This is so because interest runs from the time the contracting officer initially received the original claim, namely May 19, 1993, not when she received the corrected certification relating to that claim. Appellant is entitled to interest from the time the contracting officer initially received the claim. For the first time in the motion for reconsideration, respondent argues that "the only claim properly filed with the Board and submitted for consideration was dated July 18, 1996." Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration at 4. Respondent maintains that "although this aspect alone may not greatly alter the Board's findings and decision on the amount of award, it needs to be addressed so that the record is clear as to jurisdiction and when certification took place." Id. at 5. The FAR regulation implementing the CDA defines a claim as a demand for the payment of money in a sum certain. 41 CFR 33.201 (1994). Construing this regulation, the Federal Circuit has held that a CDA claim is valid if the contractor submits the demand as a matter of right, in writing to the contracting officer, and if the demand includes a sum certain. H.L. Smith Inc. v. Dalton, 49 F.3d 1563 at 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1995). The initial claim of May 10, 1993 met these requirements. Respondent implies that a sum in a claim must match any sum in a certification. First, there is no absolute requirement that the certification of the claim specify the sum sought. See Bannum Inc. v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 672, 676 (Fed. Cl. 1995) (certification filed after submission of multiple claims not defective for failure to mention specified sum, when there is no basis for doubt as to the amount certified). Second, we fail to see how the insertion of a sum renders an otherwise valid certification invalid. It is clear that appellant was certifying its claim relating to delays and re-design of the generator building at issue in this appeal. Each of the certifications expressly states that the certification relates to that claim. Finally, respondent argues that we should reconsider that portion of our decision awarding appellant monies for backfill work, which respondent argues was base bid work. Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration at 5. "Arguments already made and reinterpretations of old evidence are not sufficient grounds for granting reconsideration." Board Rule 132. We considered this issue earlier after reviewing the evidence and the briefs submitted in the appeal; respondent advances no grounds for reconsideration. Decision Respondent's motion for reconsideration is DENIED. _________________________ ANTHONY S. BORWICK Board Judge We concur: __________________________ __________________________ EDWIN B. NEILL CATHERINE B. HYATT Board Judge Board Judge