______________________________________________ GSBCA 12120 GRANTED IN PART; GSBCA 12163, 12175, 12349, 12351, 12403, 12406, 12811 DENIED: May 12, 1997 ______________________________________________ GSBCA 12120, 12163, 12175, 12349, 12351, 12403, 12406, 12811 FIRE SECURITY SYSTEMS, INC., Appellant, v. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, Respondent. John M. Frazier of Peatross, Greer & Frazier, Shreveport, LA; and Terrence M. O'Connor, Alexandria, VA, counsel for Appellant. Robert C. Smith and Martin A. Hom, Office of General Counsel, General Services Administration, Washington, DC, counsel for Respondent. Before Board Judges BORWICK, NEILL, and HYATT. NEILL, Board Judge. This series of claims involves the installation of a fire protection system in the federal building and courthouse in Honolulu, Hawaii, by appellant, Fire Security Systems, Inc. (Fire Security), under a contract awarded to appellant by the General Services Administration (GSA). As a result of problems which arose during the course of contract performance, several claims have been filed. Fire Security has appealed from the contracting officer's decisions concerning those claims. The Board, after consolidating the claims, held a hearing on them in San Francisco, California. By agreement of the parties, the hearing, briefing, and, therefore, this decision are limited to the issue of entitlement. We consider and decide each claim in turn. Our first two findings of fact apply to all the appeals addressed in this decision. Other findings are grouped under the heading of the case to which they most specifically pertain, but they may also be applicable to the other cases discussed in this opinion. Findings of Fact 1. On August 10, 1989, appellant was awarded a fixed-price contract by GSA for replacement of the fire alarm and sprinkler systems in the Prince Kuhio Federal Building and the U.S. Courthouse in Honolulu, Hawaii. Appeal File, GSBCA 12120, Exhibit 1 at 01010-1. 2. Appellant received the notice to proceed on November 3, 1989, with all work to be completed within 720 days. Appeal File, GSBCA 12120, Exhibit 4. GSBCA 12406: Class A/B Wiring Findings of Fact The Contract Requirement for Class A Wiring for All Devices 3. The contract specification dealing with the fire alarm and detection systems has a section entitled "Communication with Addressable Devices." Within that section is a provision entitled "wiring type." It reads: "Class A communications will be provided for all devices shown on drawings." Appeal File, GSBCA 12120, Exhibit 1 at 16721-8. 4. This contract requirement for class A wiring to the devices in the alarm system is in contrast to class B wiring. An expert called by appellant and recognized by the Board as an expert in fire protection engineering testified on the difference between these two types of wiring. He first explained that, in fire alarm systems, there is a fire control panel, sometimes called the "transponder," which is located on each floor of the building in which the alarm system is installed. From floor to floor, the transponders report through a central command station which is located in the building and manned twenty-four hours a day. Any happening anywhere along the fire alarm system will be reported to one of these panels. Wires run from the transponder to various addressable devices on that floor. An addressable device is one which possesses a unique address which specifically identifies it and its position in the system. Periodically, every ten to twenty seconds, the devices report their status to the control panel. Some of these addressable devices are "initiating devices" i.e. devices which will actually report a fire. For example, devices such as manual boxes, smoke detectors, and heat detectors are considered initiating devices. Other devices may be "indicating devices," such as speakers or strobe lights. These devices do not set the alarm in motion but, rather serve to notify occupants of the existence of a fire. Transcript, Vol. 1 at 54-57, 59-61, 64, 98, 199-200. 5. To illustrate the specific difference between class A and class B wiring, appellant's expert explained that two wires go out from the transponder to each initiating device located on a particular floor. For the class A circuit, however, the two wires running from the transponder and connecting the various initiating devices eventually loop back to the same panel. Thus, there is a total of four wires in a class A circuit running from the transponder. Appellant's Trial Exhibit 3. The advantage of a class A circuit is that, if there is a break or short circuit in the wiring, all devices on the circuit can still report back to the transponder. By contrast, in a class B circuit, the two wires running from the panel and connecting the various initiating devices do not loop back to the transponder; they end with the last device on that particular string of devices. If there is a break or short circuit in that line, therefore, all devices connected to that line beyond the point of break or ground will not report an alarm even if the device is activated. Transcript, Vol. 1 at 59-63. 6. Contract drawing 9EO.02 is the fire alarm schematic diagram. This drawing shows the fire alarm riser diagram and a typical multiplex circuit. Both the riser diagram and multiplex circuit depict class A wiring. Respondent's Trial Exhibit 3; Transcript, Vol. 2 at 187-88, 258-59. 7. The contract specification dealing with the fire alarm and detection system also has a section concerning testing of the system after installation. Appeal File, GSBCA 12120, Exhibit 1 at 16721-27. This provision states: [E]ach device in the system shall be tested in an open circuit and ground fault condition at the location of the device to ensure the proper signal is transmitted. Also, each device shall be tested to ensure the proper alarm signal is transmitted when the device is activated in a normal, open circuit and ground fault condition. Id. Appellant's expert in fire protection engineering confirmed that this testing requirement assumes the circuit in question is class A since only devices wired to each other and the transponder would be able to continue to function when put in an open or grounded circuit condition. Transcript, Vol. 1 at 104. A GSA fire protection engineer called by the Government agreed with this analysis. Id., Vol. 4 at 146. 8. The same GSA fire protection engineer also testified that, at the time of appellant's contract, GSA policy was to have class A wiring in its fire alarm systems. He explained that this policy is set out in the GSA Safety and Environmental Management Program Handbook. Transcript, Vol. 4 at 141. An edition of this handbook, dated August 2, 1988, is contained in the record for this case. It does, in fact, state: Alarm-initiating circuits (except smoke detector only circuits) must be capable of operating during a single break or single ground fault condition . . . . Appellant's Supplemental Appeal File, GSBCA 12163, Exhibit 20 (PBS P 5900.2C at 51). Review of the Fire Alarm System Design 9. Appellant's electrical subcontractor, Synergy Systems Corporation (Synergy), sought the assistance of an independent contractor to design and help with the installation of a fire alarm system which would meet the contract specifications. Transcript, Vol. 1 at 226-27. The president of Synergy managed all on-going construction projects for the company. He testified that it was his task to receive the submittals of Synergy s subcontractor and forward them to Fire Security. Id. at 222-23, 229-30. The project manager for Fire Security testified that, as part of his job, he coordinated the flow of paperwork for the project. He was responsible for seeing that submittals received from subcontractors were forwarded to GSA and to the architectural and engineering (A&E) firm hired by GSA to review the submissions. These submittals went concurrently to GSA and the A&E firm. Once reviewed, they came back from the A&E firm through GSA. Id., Vol. 3 at 122-24. Synergy's president confirmed that, following review of the submittals on design of the fire alarm system, the submittals were passed back to the designer in this manner. Id., Vol. 1 at 230-31. T-Tapping 10. The fire alarm system designer testified that he found the contract provisions on wiring for the devices to be conflicting. Specifically, he found the requirement for class A wiring of the devices in conflict with a provision of the specification concerning "t-tapping." Transcript, Vol. 2 at 207- 08. The t-tapping provision reads: The communication format must: be a poll/response protocol to allow t-tapping of the wire to addressable devices; and be completely digital. Appeal File, GSBCA 12120, Exhibit 1 at 16721-7. 11. Appellant's expert explained that t-tapping typically occurs when the configuration of a building is changed, or for some other reason, there is a need to add detectors or initiating devices. This can be done by joining or "t-ing" the two wires from the additional device or string of devices onto the two wires connecting the devices of an already existing circuit. Because this new device or string of devices is not looped back to the transponder, it is considered to be a class B circuit. When a class B circuit is joined to a preexisting circuit, that circuit -- even if originally a class A circuit -- can no longer technically be considered a class A circuit. The reason for this is that, owing to the addition of the new class B circuit, not every device on the enlarged or enhanced circuit is capable of functioning in an open or ground fault condition. Hence, even where the original circuit was a class A circuit, it must now be downgraded to a class B circuit notwithstanding the fact that all the devices on the original circuit are still capable of functioning in the event of a break or short in the wiring. Transcript, Vol. 1 at 80-88. 12. According to appellant's expert, in the fire protection field, t-tapping is for class B circuits or systems. On encountering a requirement for t-tapping in a contract specification, he would assume that the wiring is going to be of the class B type. Transcript, Vol. 1 at 90. Initial Shop Drawings 13. The fire alarm system designer testified that, after reviewing the contract specification on the system and noting an apparent conflict regarding the requirement for class A wiring and the requirement to allow t-tapping, he was uncertain as to whether he should design a system using class A or class B wiring. He states that he conferred on the matter with Synergy's president. In response to that conversation, he went ahead and designed a system using class B wiring throughout. Transcript, Vol. 2 at 208-09. The designer explained that he did this because it would be less expensive for the contractor to install class B wiring. When asked why it would be cheaper, he replied: Because of the quantity of wire, conduit sizes, because of backtracking and maybe even longer conduit runs to make it easier. Id. at 209. 14. Synergy's president testified that he did not become aware that there was a question about whether to go with class A or class B wiring until after the first shop drawings of his subcontractor were returned with comments (Finding 22) from the Government's A&E contractor. Transcript, Vol. 1 at 231-33. 15. On April 10, 1990, Fire Security forwarded Submittal 13 for review. Appeal File, GSBCA 12406, Exhibit 1; Respondent's Supplemental Appeal File, Exhibits 31, 35; Appellant's Supplemental Appeal File, GSBCA 12175, Exhibit 22. This submittal included the fire alarm shop drawings, a list of materials, and the manufacturer's literature for a Notifier brand fire alarm system. Appellant's Supplemental Appeal File, GSBCA 12175, Exhibit 22. The design shown on the shop drawings in this submittal used class B wiring throughout. Transcript, Vol. 2 at 210. Review of the Initial Shop Drawings 16. Randall Lamb Associates (RLA), respondent's A&E contractor for this project, was responsible for writing the contract specifications and drawings. Transcript, Vol. 4 at 228. The specifications for the fire alarm system were done in-house, but the sprinkler specification was subcontracted to EDS Associates (EDS). Id. RLA was also responsible for reviewing Fire Security's submittals to ensure compliance with these specifications. Id. at 231-32. 17. RLA had drafted the fire alarm specifications around a Simplex brand fire alarm. Transcript, Vol. 2 at 122. Upon review of Fire Security's Submittal 13, RLA, by letter dated April 23, 1990, advised the GSA construction engineer monitoring this project that it needed additional information on the Notifier system proposed by appellant to determine if the system met the salient characteristics listed in the specifications. Appeal File, GSBCA 12406, Exhibit 2. The construction engineer passed on the request to Fire Security by letter dated April 25. In the letter, he advised appellant that the information being sought must be submitted before the review of Submittal 13 could be completed. Id., Exhibit 3. 18. Approximately one month later, appellant, by letter dated May 24, 1990, provided a comparison of the Simplex and Notifier systems. Respondent's Supplemental Appeal File, Exhibit 8. This comparison was transmitted as Submittal 13-R1. Id. 19. After reviewing Submittal 13-R1, RLA still questioned whether the proposed Notifier system met all the salient characteristics listed in the fire alarm specifications. It, therefore, sought further clarification by letter dated June 25, 1990. Appeal File, GSBCA 12406, Exhibits 4, 5. 20. In response to RLA's further inquiry, appellant submitted answers to RLA's questions and a Notifier program manual. This submission was designated Submittal 13-R2 and is dated July 23, 1990. Appellant's Supplemental Appeal File, GSBCA 12175, Exhibit 22; Respondent's Supplemental Appeal File, Exhibits 9, 31. 21. Shortly after receipt of Submittal 13-R2 on July 24, 1990, RLA s employees completed their review of the manufacturer's literature and the shop drawings in Submittal 13. The document portion of Submittal 13 bears an RLA stamp directing the contractor to "revise and resubmit" and is dated 7/27/90. Appeal File, GSBCA 12406, Exhibit 1 at 6 (unnumbered). The primary reviewer for Submittal 13 explained that the date on the stamp indicates the day when the review was completed. Transcript, Vol. 2 at 158, 161. The shop drawings for Submittal 13 bear a similar RLA stamp with the date 7/30/90. Appellant's Supplemental Appeal File, GSBCA 12406, Exhibit 1, Sheet 1. 22. Among the review comments appearing on the shop drawings for Submittal 13, which were returned to Fire Security, are two written comments beside RLA's stamp on sheet one. The comments read: * CLASS "A" WIRING TO ALL DEVICES * TRANSPONDERS ON EACH FLOOR Appellant's Supplemental Appeal File, GSBCA 12406, Exhibit 1, Sheet 1. The same comments appear again on sheet ten, which contains the riser diagram. Id., Sheet 10. Return and Revision of Fire Alarm System Design 23. Submittal 13 was returned to appellant on August 7, 1990. Appeal File, GSBCA 12406, Exhibit 1; Respondent's Trial Exhibit 1; Respondent's Supplemental Appeal File, Exhibit 31; Appellant's Supplemental Appeal File, GSBCA 12175, Exhibit 22. The reviewed material was passed on to Synergy, whose president, by letter of transmittal dated August 15, sent the materials on to Synergy s subcontractor responsible for the system design. Synergy's letter reads: Please revise drawings and one line riser to comply with A/E comments. Please comply with comments noted on submittals. Appellant's Supplemental Appeal File, GSBCA 12406, Exhibit 17. 24. By fax transmittal dated August 19, the system designer replied to Synergy's president. The designer wrote: "Class A wiring required to all devices". This is an addressable system that only requires 2 wires to each initiating device with "T" tapping acceptable by code. I cannot find anywhere in the specifications where Class A wiring is required but if they want to have it[,] there must be a change order since the wire quantity will increase by over 50% and in many areas the conduit size will also increase. We will also have to double the amount of transponders since speakers, telephones and strobe lights will require 2 circuits per transponder module for Class A verses [sic] 1 for standard wiring. Appellant's Supplemental Appeal File, GSBCA 12406, Exhibit 18. 25. The designer of the fire alarm system testified that after conferring with Synergy's president, he decided to propose a hybrid system for wiring which would utilize class A wiring through the risers and class B wiring to the devices on the floors. Transcript, Vol. 1 at 221-22, Vol. 2 at 210-11. He further testified that he discussed this change by phone with the RLA employee who had previously reviewed the drawings. He contends that this RLA employee told him to "make the proposed changes and submit them." Id., Vol. 2 at 213. When specifically asked if the RLA employee told him he accepted the proposal, this witness replied: "No. He said to submit it." Id. at 218. The RLA employee with whom the system designer claims to have spoken has no recollection of any such conversation. Id. at 181, 185. Submission, Review, and Return of Submittal 13-R3 26. By transmittal letter dated September 24, 1990, Fire Security forwarded to RLA operating manuals and revised fire alarm system shop drawings. Appellant's Supplemental Appeal File, GSBCA 12175, Exhibit 22; Respondent's Supplemental Appeal File, Exhibit 31. During this same period, Fire Security also submitted to RLA a package of manufacturer's product data relating to Notifier fire alarm equipment. Respondent's Supplemental Appeal File, Exhibit 11. These submissions constitute appellant's Submittal 13-R3. The revised shop drawings in this submittal proposed the hybrid wiring system with class A wiring in the risers and class B wiring to the devices on each floor. Transcript, Vol. 2 at 211-19; Appellant's Supplemental Appeal File, GSBCA 12406, Exhibit 19. 27. The president of Synergy testified that, after initial submission of the revised design in Submittal 13-R3, he remained concerned about its approval. As a result, while the submittal was under review, he urged the system designer to discuss the revisions with RLA's principal reviewer. Transcript, Vol. 1 at 262-63, Vol. 2 at 222. Three brief fax transmittals to the system designer from Synergy's president, one dated November 9, 1990, another dated November 14, and a third dated November 19, do, in fact, urge the designer to call the reviewer. Appellant's Supplemental Appeal File, GSBCA 12406, Exhibits 23-25. 28. The designer testified that he did contact the RLA reviewer somewhere around mid-November 1990. The record contains a fax transmittal dated November 19, 1990, from the system designer to the president of Synergy which supports this assertion. It reads: Finally spoke to [the principal RLA reviewer] today after trying for many days last week and went over the submittals and answered all of his questions so we should be getting back approved copies soon. He said he would also send drawings indicating what type of graphic annunciators they would like to have. When you receive the information please forward me a copy so I can make the required layout and submit for approval. Appellant's Supplemental Appeal File, GSBCA 12406, Exhibit 26. In his testimony concerning this conversation with the RLA reviewer, the system designer was unable to recall whether the reviewer said that the design proposed in Submittal 13-R3 was "fine." Rather, he recalls answering questions put to him by the reviewer and expecting afterwards that the submittal would be approved. Transcript, Vol. 2 at 224. The RLA reviewer has no recollection of this conversation. Id., Vol. 2 at 185. 29. The shop drawings and the product literature for Submittal 13-R3 both bear an RLA "Received" date stamp of "Sep. 25, 1990." Appellant's Supplemental Appeal File, GSBCA 12406, Exhibit 2, Sheet 1; Respondent's Supplemental Appeal File, Exhibit 11; Transcript, Vol. 2 at 17. On the same sheet with the receipt stamp is another RLA stamp which directs the contractor to "Make Corrections Noted." This second stamp, in each case, is initialed by the RLA employee primarily responsible for review of appellant's submissions on the fire alarm system. After his initials is the date "11-19-90," the date on which he states he completed his review of these documents. Transcript, Vol. 2 at 168-70. On the product literature page with the RLA stamps is a handwritten note under the reviewer s initials which reads: "Provide layout of equipment in security office . . . ." Respondent's Supplemental Appeal File, Exhibit 11. 30. As in the case of the comments provided after review of the original shop drawings in Submittal 13, there is a review comment on the riser diagram which appears on sheet ten of the revised shop drawings for 13-R3. It refers to an initiating device loop on the second floor which is circled. The comment reads: "Class A wiring (Typ)". Appellant's Supplemental Appeal File, GSBCA 12406, Exhibit 2, Sheet 10. 31. Appellant's expert, who was recognized by the Board as an expert not only in fire protection engineering (Finding 4), but also in the review of submittals and shop drawings in connection with fire alarm systems, interpreted the review comment on sheet ten of the revised shop drawing in Submittal 13-R3 to mean that the reviewer was asking for class A wiring to the devices on each floor typically. Transcript, Vol. 1 at 129. 32. The record contains a transmittal sheet from GSA to appellant returning the materials of Submittal 13-R3. The sheet lists three sets of documents. The first set of documents is composed of the shop drawings. The action said to be taken on these is: "Approved as Noted." The second set of documents is composed of the Notifier operating manuals. The action listed for these materials is simply: "Not Reviewed." As to the third listed set of documents, the product data, the action taken is listed as: "Approved as Noted." The date of review and approval appearing on this transmittal sheet is December 3, 1990. Appellant's Supplemental Appeal File, GSBCA 12175, Exhibit 22. A contemporaneous log kept by appellant during the course of this project indicates that the drawings and operation manuals for Submittal 13-R3 were received by Fire Security on December 3, 1990. Transcript, Vol. 3 at 128, 134; Respondent's Supplemental Appeal File, Exhibit 31. A second log, allegedly more accurate but created at a later date by appellant's project manager, shows that Submittal 13-R3 was returned to Fire Security on January 14, 1991. The project manager explained that in preparing this second submittal log, he rejected the return date of December 3, shown in the first log based on the submittal's actual "received stamps." Transcript, Vol. 3 at 130-31; Respondent's Supplemental Appeal File, Exhibit 31; Appellant's Supplemental Appeal File, GSBCA 12125, Exhibit 22. Submittal 13-R3 with the received stamp of January 14, 1991, however, has not been put into evidence. 33. A Fire Security transmittal letter dated January 14, 1991, and addressed to Synergy for the attention of the company president, purports to send one copy of the "Returned Submittal For F[ire] A[larm]." This transmittal letter notes that the enclosed is "Approved as noted" and requests that Synergy provide a layout of equipment in the security office as soon as possible. Respondent's Trial Exhibit 2. The president of Synergy, when shown this letter, stated that he did not recall ever having seen it before. It was the testimony of this witness that he never received Submittal 13-R3 back from Fire Secutity after it had been reviewed by RLA. Transcript, Vol. 2 at 12-14. His testimony remained unchanged even after being shown the Fire Security transmittal letter of January 14. Id. at 19. 34. The Fire Security employee responsible for monitoring the dispatch of submittals and return of them after review (Finding 9) testified that one could assume that the attachments listed in GSA's transmittal letter returning Submittal 13-R3 to Fire Security were included with the letter. Transcript, Vol. 3 at 138. However, towards the end of 1991, when a controversy arose over the wiring of the devices in the system, he was unable to find a copy of the returned shop drawings in Fire Security's files. At trial, this witness testified that he was uncertain whether the drawings were returned to Fire Security. Id. at 141. The president of Synergy contends that the marked-up shop drawings for Submittal 13- R3 did not come into Synergy's possession until September 1991. Id., Vol. 1 at 248; Appeal File, GSBCA 12406, Exhibit 14 at 2. Similarly, the system designer disclaimed ever seeing the marked-up drawings from Submittal 13-R3 prior to their being shown to him at the hearing. Id., Vol. 2 at 219-20. 35. The president of Synergy testified that, notwithstanding his earlier concern over approval of Submittal 13-R3 and the absence of any actual return of the shop drawings, he decided to go forward with the class B wiring. When asked at trial why he went ahead with the work and did not bother asking for the reviewed drawings, he replied that he had "verbal confirmation" from the system designer "that the problem had been resolved and the drawings, 13-R3, that we were building the job from would be sufficient." Transcript, Vol. 2 at 19-20. Class A and Class B Circuitry Compared 36. Appellant's expert in fire protection engineering commented on the similarities in fire alarm systems using class A circuitry and systems using class B circuitry. He explained that both types of circuitry are accepted by the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Code Number 72. He noted that this code is the most widely used and most widely recognized code on fire alarms in the country. Transcript, Vol. 1 at 108. He also explained that some fire alarm systems have both class A circuits and class B circuits. Id. at 159-60. In addition, he explained that with either type of circuitry, a break or ground fault in the system will show up on the fire control panel within ten seconds. Id. at 63. He repeated, however, that the class A circuit differs from the class B circuit in its ability to report a fire even if the initiating device activated by the fire is "downstream" of an actual break or short in the circuit. This could not occur if the circuit had class B wiring. He noted that, for a class B system to miss an alarm under similar circumstances, it would be necessary not only to have either a break or short in the circuit but also to have an actual fire. If the problem with the system is simply a break or short in the circuitry, this is readily reported for either circuit and, as a matter of fact, more easily located in a class B circuit since, in that type of circuit, all devices beyond the break or short are non-functional -- as opposed to a class A circuit where all devices remain functional. In his personal experience, this expert knew of no situation where a fire actually occurred but no alarm was given because of an existing break or short in a class B circuit. Id. at 72-75. The expert readily admitted, however, that it would be reasonable for the owner of a building to prefer a class A system over a class B system. Id. 198-99. GSA's Insistence on Class A Wiring 37. On September 16, 1991, GSA's construction engineer assigned to this project wrote Fire Security to say it had been observed that the devices for the fire alarm system were not being installed in a class A system, as required by the contract. He directed Fire Security to comply with the contract requirement. Appeal File, GSBCA 12406, Exhibit 11. 38. Synergy's on-site supervisor testified that there were various Government representatives on site during installation of the fire alarm system. This included a few visits from the GSA construction engineer assigned to the contract and, later in the project, a contractor retained by GSA to inspect for the Government. Transcript, Vol. 3 at 24-25. This on-site supervisor for Synergy, however, testified that during the installation no one mentioned that there was a problem with the wiring of the system. Indeed, he contends that it was he who called the problem to the attention of a GSA representative upon learning in the fall of 1991 how initial testing of the system was going to be conducted. Id. at 37-38. 39. By letter dated September 30, 1991, Fire Security responded to the GSA construction engineer's letter of September 16 (Finding 37), pointing out that provisions in the applicable contract specification were in conflict. The use of class A wiring between floors and class B for wiring devices on each floor was said to represent "the best compromise of the contradicting specifications" and "satisfied the A/E." Appeal File, GSBCA 12406, Exhibit 15. 40. By letter dated October 15, 1991, the GSA construction engineer responded to appellant. He denied the alleged contradictions in the contract specification and noted that if the contractor believed the specification was contradictory, it was obliged to bring this to the attention of the Government rather than resolve it unilaterally. As to appellant's contention that the "A/E" was satisfied with the compromise proposed by the system designer, the GSA construction engineer denied that RLA had ever approved use of class B wiring. He noted, instead, that the record shows that the contractor's submissions showing class B wiring had repeatedly been approved with the note that they should conform to the contract-required class A system. Appeal File, GSBCA 12406, Exhibit 16. 41. By letter also dated October 15, 1991, the construction engineer denied a request from Fire Security, dated October 9, 1991, requesting acceptance testing for the fire alarm system. The request was denied on the ground that the "alarm devices are not installed in a Class 'A' system as required in your contract." Respondent's Supplemental Appeal File, GSBCA 12811, Exhibit 5. 42. Shortly thereafter, by letter dated November 11, 1991, Fire Security requested GSA's construction engineer to reconsider his position on the wiring. The letter sets forth appellant's position that the system, as installed, meets the contract requirements and that any direction to install class A circuits to each individual device will be in violation of the specification and require a change order authorizing delay and additional costs in excess of $180,000. Appeal File, GSBCA 12406, Exhibit 21. The record shows that before answering this letter, GSA did confer with RLA and a fire protection engineering consultant. The consultant, after reviewing the contract documents and various submissions from Fire Security, Synergy, and the system designer, concluded that GSA was correct in its interpretation. Id., Exhibit 22. RLA, likewise supported GSA s construction engineer. Id., Exhibit 23. 43. By letter dated December 6, 1991, GSA's construction engineer reaffirmed his earlier position and directed appellant to comply with the contract requirements. On the issue of t-taps, the letter specifically notes: The issue of "T-Tapping" is not the principal issue involved in this matter. Your contract requires a class "A" system that may support "T-Taps". You are not required to install "T-Taps", and the installation of either two or four wire taps is a future consideration. The system, as installed, does not comply with your contract requirements, and will not comply with the operation or testing protocol as specified. There is no record that any questions concerning the resolution of apparently equal-but-different requirements was ever brought to the attention of the government, and on every submittal that was reviewed it was noted that a Class "A" system was required. Appeal File, GSBCA 12406, Exhibit 24 at 2. 44. In late January 1992, appellant sought clarification from GSA's construction engineer on whether all devices in the fire alarm system should have class A wiring or only the alarm initiating devices. Appellant's Supplemental Appeal File, GSBCA 12406, Exhibit 64. GSA elected to insist on class A wiring only for the initiating devices. GSA officials believed the contract and RLA's comments on Submittal 13 did indeed call for class A wiring for all devices. Nevertheless, they recognized that the review comment: "Class A wiring (Typ)" on sheet 10 of Submittal 13-R3 technically referred only to an initiating device loop. See Finding 30. Because this review comment could, strictly speaking, have been construed as referring only to initiating devices, the decision was made to compromise and insist on class A wiring only for initiating devices. Transcript, Vol. 4 at 204-05, Vol. 5 at 141-42. 45. In early February 1992, the president of Synergy wrote to Fire Security's president to advise him that a crew would be leaving for Honolulu on February 10 to install extra wiring per the construction engineer's directive. The letter restates Synergy's contention that the work done to date is in compliance with the contract requirements and advises appellant that a claim for this extra work will be presented as soon as possible. Appeal File, GSBCA 12406, Exhibit 25. Appellant's Claim 46. In March 1993, Fire Security presented GSA with a certified claim for $240,821 for the additional class A wiring. Appeal File, GSBCA 12406, Exhibit 30. By letter dated March 30, 1993, the contracting officer advised Fire Security that a decision on the claim would be issued on or before July 30. Id., Exhibit 31. 47. A contracting officer's decision denying Fire Security's claim was issued on July 30, 1993. Appeal File, GSBCA 12406, Exhibit 34. In denying appellant's claim, the contracting officer stated that from a reading of the contract in its entirety, it was clearly apparent that the contract requires a system which utilizes class A wiring. The contracting officer recognized that the configuration actually used met NFPC standards but pointed out that class B wiring provided a lesser reliability than that specified and required by GSA for the protection of the occupants in the building. The contracting officer also noted that twice appellant had been apprised "via the submittal process" that a class B wiring system was unacceptable. On the matter of t-tapping, the contracting officer observed that the contract specifications require the system to possess the capability of accommodating t-tapping for the future addition of addressable devices. The contract did not entail the installation of t-taps but rather the installation of a system which utilized a class A wiring configuration. Appellant's apparent assumption, therefore, that the installation of t-taps was of greater importance than the installation of a class A system was incorrect. In view of this error, appellant's disregard of RLA's notation on design submittals, and appellant's failure to seek clarification from the Government on this matter, the contracting officer concluded that the cost of correcting the nonconforming alarm system wiring should be borne by appellant and not by the Government. Appeal File, GSBCA 12406, Exhibit 34. 48. By letter dated August 17, 1993, Fire Security appealed this decision. Board Correspondence File, GSBCA 12406. Discussion Did the Contract Call for Class A Wiring to Devices? The first and fundamental issue to be addressed in this dispute regarding wiring of the alarm system is, of course, whether class A wiring was required for the system's addressable devices. In her final decision, the contracting officer contends that the contract, when read as a whole, clearly requires a class A system. Finding 47. We agree. In describing wiring type, the contract specifies class A. Finding 3. Furthermore, the typical multiplex circuit in the bid drawings is a class A circuit. Finding 6. In addition, the procedure to be used for acceptance testing assumes class A wiring. Finding 7. Appellant contends that this requirement for class A wiring of the devices is contradicted by reference in the system specification to t-tapping. According to appellant's expert, "t-tapping" means class B circuits. Finding 12. The Government maintains that appellant has misread the contract provision concerning t-tapping and has made more of this issue than it should. Finding 43. We agree with this as well. The contract provision which gives rise to the stir over t-tapping simply states: The communication format must: be a poll/response protocol to allow t-tapping of the wire to addressable devices; and be completely digital. Finding 10. We find no requirement in this provision for t-tapping in the required system. Rather, the plain meaning of this provision is that the communication format must be a poll/response protocol which allows t-tapping of the wire to addressable devices. Appellant's expert has convinced us that t-tapping is essentially a procedure used after installation of a system when, for one reason or another, the need arises to modify or expand the original system. See Finding 11. Although calling for a class A wired system, the Government recognized that the system might require modification at some later date. Accordingly, the contractor is required to use a protocol that can still be relied on to function effectively even when or if additional devices are later included in an original circuit through t-tapping. We find nothing in the testimony of appellant's expert which would suggest that this type of modification could not be done to a system which originally had all class A wiring. We recognize that future t-taps onto a class A circuit may result in that circuit being classified thereafter as a class B circuit even with the original devices still displaying the characteristics of a class A circuit. See Finding 11. However, the presence of a class B circuit in a system which was originally all class A wiring does not appear to present any insurmountable technical problem. We have also been told by appellant's expert that a fire alarm system can contain both class A and class B circuits. Finding 36. Moreover, while ensuring the delivery of a more robust system which permits t-tapping, the agency has not committed itself to the use of t-taps for future modifications. The Government's reading of the t-tap provision as referring to future changes in the system rather than the present system to be installed has much to recommend it. Most importantly, it is supported by the plain meaning of the provision itself. Furthermore, unlike appellant's interpretation, the Government's reading of this provision of the specification avoids conflict with other provisions in the same specification calling for class A wiring. It is, therefore, to be preferred. Fortec Constructors v. United States, 760 F.2d 1288, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 1985); United States v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 713 F.2d 1541, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Hol-Gar Manufacturing Corp. v. United States, 351 F.2d 972, 979 (Ct. Cl. 1965). We, therefore, do not see the allegedly blatant contradiction in the specification which appellant and, in particular, the system designer claim to be present as a result of concurrent mention of t-tapping and class A wiring in the system specification. Nevertheless, if a contradiction was thought to be present, it was incumbent on appellant to seek a clarification from the Government. Interwest Construction v. Brown, 29 F.3d 611, 616 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Community Heating & Plumbing Co., v. Kelso, 987 F.2d 1575, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1993). The same can be said of reference in the specification to a "2-wire circuit" and a "2-wire smoke detector." At the hearing, appellant's expert testified that these references indicate class B wiring and are, therefore, clearly in conflict with the requirement elsewhere in the specification for class A wiring. Transcript, Vol. 1 at 102. If it is as the expert alleges, then such apparent contradictions should have been promptly identified and called to the Government's attention. Despite the alleged conflict posed by mention of t-tapping and other characteristics of class B wiring side by side with an express requirement for class A wiring in the same system specification, neither Fire Security nor its subcontractors sought clarification from the Government prior to the submission of the first set of shop drawings. The system designer refers only to a brief consultation he had with the president of Synergy. Based on this conversation, he states that he went ahead and designed a system using class B wiring throughout. Rather than seek clarification, he elected to exploit what he perceived to be an inherent contradiction which would permit him to propose a less costly design. Finding 13. Was There Substantial Compliance with the Class A Wiring Requirement? Appellant's principal argument in support of its claim for the cost of replacing class B wiring to the initiating devices with class A wiring is that the system, as initially installed, was substantially the same as a class A system. The extraordinary expense associated with the replacement of the wire at such a late juncture, according to appellant, constituted economic waste and was an abuse of discretion on the part of the contracting officer. Appellant's Posthearing Brief at 13-14. In making this argument, appellant relies heavily on a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Granite Construction Co. v. United States, 962 F.2d 998 (Fed. Cir. 1992). In Granite, the contractor sought to recover from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) $3.8 million in costs associated with removal and replacement of polyvinyl chloride (PVC) waterstop. The waterstop was embedded in vertical joints between concrete monoliths required for the construction of a lock and dam. During the course of construction, the Corps discovered that 800 linear feet of the PVC waterstop already embedded in the vertical joints was not in compliance with contract requirements for tensile strength, ultimate elongation, and low temperature brittleness. The waterstop was rejected and Granite was directed to remove and replace the defective material with waterstop which complied with the contract specification. Granite proposed several remedial methods which did not require removal of the waterstop. The Corps continued to insist on strict compliance with the specifications. After a review of the entire record, the Court in Granite concluded that it was an abuse of discretion for the Government to insist on strict compliance with the contract requirements when the installed product substantially complied with the specifications. Consequently, removal of the waterstop was seen as constituting economic waste. In a situation such as this, the Court held, the only reasonable remedy available to the Government would be a downward adjustment in the contract price. Id. at 1006-07. Key to the Granite decision and its application to similar situations is the Court's conclusion that the work in question, although defective to a degree, was nonetheless adequate to serve its intended purpose and thus in substantial compliance with contract requirements. In arriving at this conclusion in Granite, the Court focused on the unrebutted testimony of an expert called by the contractor. The expert had analyzed the qualities of the embedded waterstop and compared these qualities with the conditions at the actual site. He testified that the waterstop material in question actually exceeded the required performance standards for this particular site. The Court found no rational basis to reject his testimony. Id. at 1006. In the instant case, for Granite to apply, appellant must have demonstrated that class B wiring to the devices was adequate to serve the intended purpose. Appellant contends that the testimony of its expert established that the fire alarm system it installed was substantially the same as a class A system and that in actual practice there is no difference in safety between class A and class B wiring. Appellant's Posthearing Brief at 14. The conclusions which we draw from the testimony of appellant's expert are altogether different from those drawn by appellant. From the start of his testimony, appellant's expert consistently acknowledged that there is a distinct difference between class A and class B circuits with respect to the ability of initiating devices to continue to function in the event of a break or ground in the circuit. Finding 5, 36. This feature obviously relates to system reliability. GSA, in accordance with established policy, wishes to have an alarm system with class A wiring and with the high degree of reliability which only this type of wiring provides. Finding 8. The class B wiring initially provided by appellant for the initiating devices cannot provide the requisite degree of reliability called for in the contract specification. Finding 36. In the Granite case, the contractor's expert was able to demonstrate that the waterstop provided was in fact more than adequate for the Government's intended purpose and that more exact compliance was, therefore, superfluous. In the instant case, appellant's expert has made no such showing. Accordingly, we conclude that the rationale of Granite in these circumstances is inapposite. In fairness to appellant's expert, we do not interpret his testimony even as an attempt to suggest that the class B wiring provided by appellant was adequate for the Government's intended purpose. He discussed the benefits of a class B and a class A system. He noted that a break or grounding in either type of system would be promptly reported and that repair of this condition would, in fact, be simpler in a system using class B wiring than in a system using class A wiring. In short, both systems, at least under these circumstances could be described as reliable. Nevertheless, the expert, to his credit, readily admitted that, although in his experience he had never seen a break occur at the same time that a fire was reported, if this were to occur, a class A system would in fact be more reliable. An owner's preference for such a system would, therefore, not be unreasonable. Finding 36. In short, the testimony of this expert appears to be that a class A system and a class B system are essentially equal from the standpoint of safety and reliability -- if you do not have a fire. This, however, is a significant "if" and represents a risk which GSA has reasonably elected not to take. Based on the expert's testimony, therefore, we find nothing excessive, superfluous, or unreasonable in the Government's insistence that the alarm system -- at least as originally installed by the contractor -- provide the degree of reliability which can come only from the use of class A wiring to the devices. In short, the Government sought to install a system which would prove to be the safest and most reliable, not just under ordinary circumstances, but in the event of actual fire as well. This is the degree of reliability which the Government sought in the contract specification as written. We do not interpret the testimony of appellant's expert as suggesting that the class B wiring installed by appellant in this case would provide a degree of reliability equal to or equivalent to that sought in the contract. The circumstances that would make this case similar to that which existed in Granite, therefore, simply are not found here. Consequently, the Government, in accordance with well established precedent, was entitled in this case to insist on compliance with the contract specifications and to require appellant to correct the nonconforming work. S.S. Silberblatt, Inc. v. United States, 193 Ct. Cl. 269, 433 F.2d 1314, 1323 (1970). The record shows that, as a result of this controversy, GSA ultimately elected not to insist on class A wiring for all addressable devices but only for initiating devices. Finding 43. The testimony of the Government's witnesses, however, convinces us that this decision was a compromise and not based on any belief that class A wiring was an unreasonable requirement or that class B wiring was actually sufficient for the Government's intended purpose. The Government's decision was obviously based on the practical recognition that a strong case could be made that the RLA comment applied only to initiating device circuits and that the contract right to class A wiring for other types of devices had inadvertently been waived. Did the Government Clearly Advise Appellant that Class B Wiring was Unacceptable? In her final decision, the contracting officer states that twice appellant was apprised "via the submittal process" that a class B wiring system was unacceptable. Finding 47. Evidence in the record confirms this. With the return of Submittal 13, appellant was advised: "Class 'A' wiring to all devices." Finding 22. Synergy promptly notified the system designer of the need to revise the design to comply with RLA's comments. Finding 23. The designer's response, however, is puzzling. With regard to the requirement for class A wiring, he wrote to Synergy's president: I cannot find anywhere in the specifications where Class A wiring is required but if they want to have it[,] there must be a change order since the wire quantity will increase over 50% and in many areas the conduit size will also increase. Finding 24. We find this written statement in sharp conflict with the designer's statement at trial that, upon reading the specification initially, he found a requirement for class A wiring which, in his opinion, conflicted with a requirement in the same specification to allow t-tapping. Finding 10. Even more perplexing, however, is the designer's decision to revise the original class B system design not with class A wiring for the devices, as directed by RLA, but with class A wiring only for the risers. Finding 25. While there appears to be no question as to receipt of RLA's comments on Submittal 13, appellant's witnesses would have us believe that the comments regarding Submittal 13-R3 were not received. The Fire Security employee responsible for monitoring the dispatch and return of submittals stated that when a controversy arose over the wiring, he was unable to find the returned shop drawings. He further stated that he was uncertain as to whether they were in fact ever returned to Fire Security. Finding 34. The president of Synergy stated that the marked-up shop drawings for Submittal 13-R3 did not come into Synergy's possession until September 1991. The system designer claimed never to have seen the marked-up drawings until the time of the hearing. Finding 34. Given the record before us, we conclude that GSA did provide appellant with copies of the marked-up shop drawings from Submittal 13-R3. We base our conclusion on the GSA transmittal sheet in the record showing the return of the Submittal 13-R3 materials, on appellant's own logs showing receipt, and on the absence from the record of any evidence that Fire Security, at that time, found anything irregular or incomplete in the GSA transmittal. The testimony of appellant's witnesses may establish an unfortunate breakdown in communications between appellant and its subcontractors, but it does not convince us that the Government's comments on Submittal 13-R3 were not provided to appellant. Neither are we convinced that the instructions provided with the returned shop drawings from Submittal 13-R3 were in any way nullified by any statement, actions, or inactions of the Government's agents. The system designer alleges that he conferred with the RLA reviewer and that, based on this conversation, he expected approval. Finding 28. The president of Synergy tells us that his decision to proceed with the class B wiring stemmed from "verbal confirmation" from the designer that the problem had been resolved. Finding 35. Whatever the understanding of Synergy's president may have been, the system designer, in describing his alleged conversation with the RLA reviewer, did not testify that the reviewer himself ever indicated that the revised design was either acceptable or approved. Finding 28. Synergy's on-site supervisor testified that during installation, no on-site GSA representatives or representatives of the contractor retained by GSA for purposes of inspection indicated a problem with the wiring of the system. Finding 38. We do not view this silence as an implied repudiation of the instructions passed on to appellant in the marked-up shop drawings for Submittal 13-R3. Under the contract, appellant had an obligation to perform in accordance with the contract requirements independent of periodic Government inspections. The inspection clause of the contract expressly notes: (c) Government inspections and tests are for the sole benefit of the Government and do not -- (1) Relieve the Contractor of responsibility for providing adequate quality control measures; [or] . . . . (3) Constitute or imply acceptance . . . . Appeal File, GSBCA 12120, Exhibit 1 (Form 3506,  46). Conclusion The contracting officer was correct in denying appellant's claim for the cost of providing class A wiring to initiating devices. The contract required this wiring. Appellant was twice reminded in writing of this fact during the course of the submittal process and nothing said or left unsaid by the Government's representative nullified this direction. Appellant's decision to provide class B wiring resulted in a system which did not provide the degree of reliability the Government sought through the contract specification. The Government's insistence that appellant correct this deficiency, at least for the wiring of initiating devices was, therefore, justified. GSBCA 12175: Delay in Review and Approval of Submittals Findings of Fact (continued) Review of Appellant's Submittals Contract Provisions 49. The contract has the following provision concerning action on contractor submittals: Contracting Officer's Action: Where action and return is required or requested, the Contracting Officer will review each submittal, mark with Action, and where possible return within 2 weeks of receipt. Where submittal must be held for coordination, Contractor will be so advised. Appeal File, GSBCA 12120, Exhibit 1 at 01340-5 to 6. "Submittals" are defined in the contract as including such items as shop drawings, product data, samples, certificates of conformance or compliance, and certified test or inspection reports. Id. at 01340-1. 50. The contract specification concerning the overhead fire protection (sprinkler) system has some additional specific provisions on contractor submittals. It directs that the contractor shall prepare and submit shop drawings and obtain approval of the contracting officer prior to start of fabrication and installation. Appeal File, GSBCA 12120, Exhibit 1 at 15310-4. In a special section dealing with scheduling, the specification sets out a sequence of steps to be followed in providing the sprinkler system, the first of which is "Complete preparation and approval of all Shop Drawings and submittals." Id. at 15310-7. The contract also expressly provides that hydraulic calculations shall be a part of the contractor's submittal. Finally, the specification expressly states: "Partial submissions are not acceptable." Id. at 15310-5. The Preconstruction Conference 51. At a preconstruction conference held on November 3, 1989, the parties discussed submittals. A record of the conference states: The contractor requested that partial submittals be accepted. The contractor advised that he would like to submit two submittals for the Federal Building and one submittal for the Courthouse. [The project manager for the A&E] will advise of the acceptability of this. Appellant's Supplemental Appeal File, GSBCA 12175, Exhibit 3 at 3. The record for this preconstruction conference also indicates that the contractor agreed to look into the possibility of first installing the sprinkler system on the sixth floor so as to coordinate the work for this project with a build-out for the United States Attorney's office also scheduled for that floor. It was also explained to appellant during this conference that all correspondence for this contract should be directed to the GSA construction engineer assigned to the project, with a copy to the contracting officer. Id. Appellant's Submittals 52. The submittals which appellant apparently had in mind at the preconstruction conference concerned the design of the sprinkler system to be installed in the federal building and the courthouse. Three major submittals were, in fact, made. A submittal log prepared by appellant and backup documentation with it show that the first major submittal was Submittal 5. It was dated January 26, 1990, and consisted of twenty-one shop drawings for the sprinkler system to be installed in the federal building. With this submittal, appellant included hydraulic calculations for each drawing. Appellant's Supplemental Appeal File, GSBCA 12175, Exhibit 22 (Documentation for Submittal 5). The second major submittal was Submittal 6. It was dated March 12, 1990, and contained nine shop drawings and hydraulic calculations for each of the drawings. These drawings represented the balance of the shop drawings for the sprinkler system to be installed in the federal building. Id. (Documentation for Submittal 6). The third major submittal concerned the sprinkler system to be installed in the courthouse. It was dated June 27, 1990. This submittal, Submittal 14, consisted of five shop drawings and hydraulic calculations for each drawing. Id. (Documentation for Submittal 14). 53. Apart from the three major submittals concerning the sprinkler system design for the federal building and the courthouse, appellant also made other partial submittals regarding the sprinker system. In an apparent attempt to be responsive to GSA's request that work begin on the sixth floor, appellant's first submittal (Submittal 1), dated November 28, 1989, consisted of two partial shop drawings for that floor. Appellant's Supplemental Appeal File, GSBCA 12175, Exhibits 4, 5, 22 (Documentation for Submittal 1). 54. RLA promptly passed on the recently received sixth-floor shop drawings to its subcontractor, EDS (Finding 16). In doing so, RLA advised EDS that RLA did not yet have an A&E services contract for review of these and related shop drawings. EDS was cautioned, therefore, not to "review" the drawings until authorized in writing by RLA to begin. In the interest of time, however, EDS was encouraged by RLA to at least "glance" at the drawings to ascertain if any additional information would be required of appellant before approval could be recommended for the sixth floor work. Appellant's Supplemental Appeal File, GSBCA 12175, Exhibit 4. 55. Appellant's submittal log shows an additional submittal concerning the sprinkler system. This one, Submittal 3, concerned materials for the sprinkler system. It is dated December 26, 1989. The log shows that revisions of this submittal were provided on May 11, 1990, and August 15, 1990. Appellant's Supplemental Appeal File, GSBCA 12175, Exhibit 22 (Documentation for Submittal 3). Appellant's project manager testified that this submittal was not actually returned to Fire Security until after contract completion. Transcript, Vol. 3 at 146. 56. In addition to these numbered submittals concerning the proposed sprinkler system, there appear to have been a considerable number of other submissions to the professional engineer at EDS who was to assist RLA in review and approval of the sprinkler system submittals. In response to RLA's suggestion, he did undertake an informal critique of the various submittals furnished by appellant during the period from November 1989 to March 1990 -- even in the absence of a formal contract between RLA and the Government. Although aware that the sprinkler specification (much of which he had written) did not permit partial submittals (Finding 50), he nevertheless did undertake a preliminary review of the various shop drawings provided to him. He testified that he considered this review to be unofficial and nothing more than a courtesy to appellant. He further testified that he received "numerous copies of various sheets" and that he responded to these as best he could in an effort to help expedite the approval process. Transcript, Vol. 7 at 31-34, 38. He explained: There were telephone conversations. There were faxes sent back and forth, and I did everything that I could to help the situation. Id. at 38-39. The EDS engineer also testified, however, that review of these various submissions was "very difficult because you don't have the whole picture, particularly if you don't have the riser diagram and so on." Id., Vol. 6 at 178. Because he considered these submissions and resubmissions to be of an informal nature, this witness kept no log of what he received from appellant during this period. Id. Appellant's First Complaints Regarding Delay 57. By letter dated February 6, 1990, appellant's project manager wrote to the GSA construction engineer complaining of the delay in approval of the shop drawings for the sixth floor submitted in late November 1989 (Submittal 1), the product data submitted in late December 1989 (Submittal 3), and the shop drawings provided in late January 1990 (Submittal 5). Appellant advised that its May 1 start date for installation was in jeopardy and asked the engineer to review the situation and indicate when approval could be expected. Appeal File, GSBCA 12175, Exhibit 2. 58. By letter dated March 1, 1990, appellant's project manager again wrote to the GSA construction engineer concerning the delay in approval of its submittals concerning the design and the materials to be used for the sprinkler system. Appellant warned that delay in approval of the design would cause problems in scheduling crews and equipment. The letter states: "This delay will cause problems in manning of this job as we cannot keep personnel on standby for this project." Appellant's Supplemental Appeal File, GSBCA 12175, Exhibit 10. Appellant's "Almost Complete Submittal Package" 59. The EDS engineer responsible for review of the sprinkler system submittals testified that there eventually came a time in late March 1990, when Fire Security provided him with a full set of the thirty shop drawings for the sprinkler system to be installed in the federal building. Appellant's Supplemental Appeal File, GSBCA 12351, Exhibit 1. These drawings represented the sum total of all shop drawings which had been prepared by appellant during the period running from November 1989 to March 1990 and which he had received and commented on periodically over that same period of time. Transcript, Vol. 6 at 175-77. 60. Although this submittal of thirty shop drawings was five drawings short of an anticipated thirty-five drawings planned for the complete sprinkler system to be installed in the federal building and the courthouse, the EDS engineer agreed to start his official review with what he referred to in his testimony as "an almost complete submittal package." Transcript, Vol. 6 at 176-77, Vol. 7 at 39. In what he contends was less than a two-week period from the date he received the package of thirty drawings, the EDS engineer prepared and submitted to RLA a twenty-nine page written report on this submittal. The report is dated April 10, 1990, and contains the engineer's comments and recommendations concerning the individual shop drawings and the hydraulic calculations which accompanied them. Transcript, Vol. 7 at 39; Appeal File, GSBCA 12175, Exhibit 4. GSA's Rejection of the Proposed System for the Federal Building 61. Based on the comments and recommendations set out in the EDS report of April 10, 1990, the Government rejected appellant's shop drawings and calculations for the sprinkler system in the federal building. Appeal File, GSBCA 12175, Exhibits 5-6. Appellant was advised of this fact and given comments on its submittals on April 10, 1990. Id., Exhibit 7 at 2. The actual shop drawings and calculations were returned to appellant by GSA on April 10 (Submittal 1, partial drawings for sixth floor of the federal building) and April 17 (Submittals 5 and 6, drawings for other floors of the federal building and corresponding calculations). Id., Exhibit 22 (Documentation for Submittals 1, 5, 6). 62. Upon receiving word of the Government's rejection of the shop drawings and hydraulic calculations, appellant sought a meeting for the week of April 23. Appeal File, GSBCA 12175, Exhibit 5. On April 23, appellant wrote to the GSA construction engineer, explaining in some detail why its design of the sprinkler system for the federal building was compliant with National Fire Prevention Association (NFPA) code and contract requirements. Once more a request was made for a meeting to discuss the matter. Id., Exhibit 7. 63. By letter dated April 23, the Government rejected appellant's invoice for engineering work done for the project on the ground that the shop drawings and calculations submitted had been rejected. Appeal File, GSBCA 12175, Exhibit 6. 64. Appellant's letter of April 23 defending its design of the sprinkler system for the federal building was forwarded to EDS for comment. In a two page letter dated April 24, the EDS engineer who had reviewed and commented on appellant's submittals provided RLA with comments on appellant's letter. It remained his position, notwithstanding arguments raised by appellant in the letter of April 23, that the submittals did not comply with contract requirements. Appeal File, GSBCA 12175, Exhibit 8. The engineer faxed copies of his comments to appellant and GSA as well. Id., Exhibit 9. Revision of Appellant's Submittals on Sprinkler System Design 65. The EDS engineer contends that, after receiving a copy of his comments of April 24, appellant "agreed to comply with the Specification as written" and he, in turn, agreed to review the following revised sheets: Sheet 1 - Cover Sheet - various General Notes and Details Sheet 2 - Site Plan Sheet 3 - Basement Plan with bulk piping Sheet 4 - Fire Pump Details and Notes Sheet 5 - Standpipe riser diagram Sheet 23 and 24 - 6th Floor Piping Plan Appeal File, GSBCA 12175, Exhibit 9. The engineer claims to have received these sheets shortly thereafter from appellant but, upon review, found that they had very few of the corrections he had listed in his recommendation letter of April 10. He, therefore, made a telephone call to appellant's representative to discuss the sheets. The engineer contends that after a lengthy conversation of over an hour and a half, appellant's representative agreed to revise the sheets and send them to him by express mail. In a memorandum dated May 16, the EDS engineer described these events to RLA and further reported that, as of the date of his letter, he had yet to receive the revised sheets. Id. 66. On June 11, the GSA construction engineer conferred by telephone with Fire Security representatives. During that conference it was agreed that appellant would send to EDS by overnight mail revised shop drawings for the sixth floor sprinkler system and a flow diagram necessary to allow EDS to review the hydraulic calculations. The revised sheets were to include all revisions listed in EDS's report of April 10. The Government agreed to review these revisions along with the shop drawings for the basement, the fire pump, the first floor, the second floor, the eighth floor, and the penthouse -- as soon as they were received. It was further agreed that the balance of the revised shop drawings for the federal building would be submitted by June 25. No date was set for submittal of the courthouse drawings but it was understood that they were "to follow directly." Appeal File, GSBCA 12175, Exhibit 11. 67. Appellant's submittal log and transmittal sheets indicate that a revised submittal covering the areas agreed to in the conference of June 11 was, in fact, sent to EDS on that same date. The transmittal sheets state that the balance of the shop drawings would be provided by June 25 and the courthouse drawings by July 23. Appellant's Supplemental Appeal File, GSBCA 12175, Exhibit 22 (Documentation for Submittal 5-R2 and 5-R3). 68. On June 14, EDS provided comments to appellant concerning its submittal of June 11. At that time, appellant was advised by the EDS engineer that further revisions were required for the hydraulic calculations and that additional changes were required in the shop drawings. Appellant's president and project manager promptly wrote to the GSA construction engineer on the following day, June 15, to complain strongly concerning the comments of the EDS engineer. Appellant's president contended that the changes being sought by the engineer were minor or not really required under the contract. In a similar vein, appellant's project manager complained that several of the comments now being provided could and should have been provided earlier. Other changes were said to be simply unnecessary. The project manager also complained that the request for revised calculations was contrary to the understanding he and appellant's president had after discussing the calculations with the GSA construction engineer a few days earlier. Appellant's project manager also inquired concerning the status of Submittal 3, which provided manufacturer's data on sprinkler materials. He noted that, notwithstanding the importance of this submittal, previous inquiries as to its review status remained unanswered. Both appellant's president and project manager in their letters claimed that the present method of review was causing delay of the project. Appeal File, GSBCA 12175, Exhibits 12-15. 69. The letters of June 15 to the GSA construction engineer from the president of Fire Security and the firm's project manager reflect a high degree of impatience and frustration with EDS. The president wrote: Again and again approval cannot be achieved because of minor changes which cause a mountain of paperwork to be prepared and processed. . . . . To correct many of the comments, we simply copied pages of the bid specifications and taped them to our plans. The specifications did not instruct us to require this information on our sprinkler plans, but as we have seen from EDS, anything thinkable is cause for delaying review, approval or approved as noted. Appeal File, GSBCA 12175, Exhibits 12. In a similar vein, appellant's project director wrote: It appears that there has not been a complete review of any submittal and that the architect/engineer reviews a submittal until they find a problem. Id., Exhibit 14. Request for Additional Time 70. By separate letter also dated June 15, 1990, appellant's president requested an extension of 180 days for completion of the contract. This request is said to have been based on GSA not returning plans and submittals as called for in Section 01340 of the contract and on construction beginning by July 23, 1990. The letter advised GSA that a breakdown on the delay cost would follow once a construction date was confirmed. Appeal File, GSBCA 12175, Exhibit 17. Appellant s Continued Revision of Sprinkler System Submittals 71. The EDS engineer reviewing appellant's materials was given an opportunity to comment on the letters of June 15 from Fire Security's president and project manager. By memorandum of the same date, he replied to RLA. On the matter of the "[sprinkler] material submittal" he explained that in previous correspondence he had stated the submittal was incomplete. Furthermore, he pointed out that, in view of appellant's apparent decision to include part of the material submittal on shop drawings, it would not be possible to approve the material submittal until a complete shop drawing submittal had been made. As to review of the hydraulic calculations, he explained that this was not possible without a "flow diagram." He explained that one had been provided by appellant on June 13 but was found to be in disagreement with the calculations. In a conversation with appellant's representative on June 14, he had been told that the calculations would be revised, as would be sheets 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 22, 23, and 24. The revised materials were to be sent for review by June 18. In concluding his memorandum, the engineer noted that this plan was basically what he had agreed to with appellant six weeks earlier (Finding 65), but which appellant had chosen not to complete. Appeal File, GSBCA 12175, Exhibit 16. 72. In a memorandum to RLA dated June 20, 1990, the same EDS engineer reported that he had not yet received the revisions which appellant s representatives had agreed to provide following his discussions with them on June 14. Appeal File, GSBCA 12175, Exhibit 19. The reason for this delay is explained in a letter also dated June 20, 1990, and sent by appellant's president to the GSA construction engineer. This letter advised GSA that if the review of the balance of the drawings was going to be delayed, Fire Security was going to submit the revised sixth floor drawings as a package with the balance of the shop drawings for the federal building. Id., Exhibit 18. 73. Appellant, apparently concluding that further delay was inevitable, ultimately decided not to provide the EDS engineer with a limited number of sheets as agreed on June 14 but instead to submit a complete package of all drawings covering the sprinkler system. The EDS engineer, upon learning of this decision, wrote on June 25 to RLA: Now I understand that they [Fire Security] are redrawing all 30 sheets and will submit them this week. Please understand this: 1. THESE PLANS MUST BE REVIEWED AS IF THERE HAVE BEEN NO PREVIOUS SUBMITTALS OF PLANS, CALCULATIONS, OR MATERIALS. 2. MY LETTER OF COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IS INVALID AND NO LONGER CAN BE USED AS A CHECKLIST FOR REVIEWING THE NEW SHOP DRAWINGS. 3. THE SPECIFICATION DOES NOT ALLOW FOR PARTIAL SUBMITTALS. Appeal File, GSBCA 12175, Exhibit 20. Appellant's First Complete Sprinkler System Submittal 74. By transmittal letters dated June 27, 1990, appellant submitted a complete set of shop drawings (sheets 1 to 35) for the sprinkler system in the federal building and the court house, together with hydraulic calculations for each of the sheets. Appellant's Supplemental Appeal File, GSBCA 12175, Exhibit 22 (Submittal 5-R4, 6-R2, 14). 75. Upon receipt of the latest revisions of the shop drawings for the sprinkler system, RLA sought additional compensation from GSA for the work it was doing in reviewing appellant's submittals. RLA explained that the work entailed had become much more demanding than originally anticipated when the contract between RLA and GSA was last modified to cover this review work. RLA reported that the submittal received on June 27 was represented by the contractor as "a complete redesign of the previous submittals." Appellant's Supplemental Appeal File, GSBCA 12175, Exhibit 14. This claim for additional compensation was not immediately resolved. Id., Exhibit 17. Nevertheless, EDS continued with its review of the latest submittals. By memorandum dated July 13, 1990, the EDS engineer advised RLA that he was recommending approval of the shop drawings for the sixth floor. Appeal File, GSBCA 12175, Exhibit 22. On that same date, the GSA construction engineer met with Fire Security representatives and advised them that the sixth floor drawings were approved, that review of the other shop drawings was on-going and would be complete by July 19. Id., Exhibit 23. 76. On July 19, 1990, the EDS engineer finished his review of the thirty shop drawings for the sprinkler system in the federal building and passed on to RLA a seven-page report with comments and suggestions on the individual drawings. In his cover memorandum, the engineer stated that except for the fire pump, he could accept "all of the material submitted as complying with the Specification." He noted that the fire pump submittal had no mention of U/L listing or Factory Mutual approval. He also noted the absence of a submittal for hanger rings. Appeal File, GSBCA 12175, Exhibit 24. On July 20, GSA approved the shop drawings for the federal building sprinkler system "as noted" and returned them to appellant together with a copy of the EDS engineer's report. Appellant's Supplemental Appeal File, GSBCA 12175, Exhibit 22 (Submittal 5-R4 and 6-R2). On July 25, 1990, EDS completed its review of the shop drawings and calculations for the sprinkler system in the courthouse. On August 1, GSA returned these materials together with a copy of the EDS engineer's report and recommendations. The courthouse drawings and calculations were approved "as noted." Id., Exhibit 22 (Submittal 14). 77. In a six-page letter dated August 1, 1990, to the GSA construction engineer, appellant responded in detail to each of the comments and suggestions offered by the EDS engineer concerning the sprinkler system in the federal building. The letter offered clarifications and reports on corrections and changes as appropriate. A submittal on hanger rings was said to be forthcoming. Appeal File, GSBCA 12175, Exhibit 25. Appellant's Concern over Other Submittals 78. By letter dated August 27, 1990, appellant's project manager again wrote the GSA construction engineer this time to inquire concerning the status of other submittals, namely, Submittal 13-R2 on the fire alarm design (Finding 20) and Submittal 15-R1 on acoustical treatment. The former submittal was said to have been made on July 23, the latter on July 30. The letter warned that delay in return of the submittals would delay progress on the project. Appeal File, GSBCA 12175, Exhibit 26. Construction Progress Schedules 79. In early January 1990, while work was proceeding on the shop drawings and calculations for the sprinkler system, appellant submitted a construction progress schedule to GSA for approval. Appellant's Supplemental Appeal File, GSBCA 12175, Exhibit 22 (Documentation for Submittal 4). Under this schedule, Fire Security planned to begin installation of the sprinkler system in early May 1990. Work on the fire alarm system was scheduled to begin in late May of the same year. The schedule anticipated completion of all work by early May 1991 -- well in advance of the contract completion date in the fall of 1991. Appellant's Trial Exhibit 5; Transcript, Vol. 3 at 149-53. Fire Security's project manager who drafted the schedule testified that he considered it to be a conservative one. He explained that it was based on the company's past history of generally finishing a job earlier than expected. He did note, however, that the schedule, as proposed, did not include installation of the sprinkler system on the sixth floor of the federal building, although it was appellant's plan to proceed with that first in accordance with GSA's earlier request. Transcript, Vol. 3 at 152, 154. 80. Upon receipt of the proposed progress schedule, the GSA construction engineer forwarded it to RLA for comment. In sending the schedule to RLA, the engineer noted that it showed completion six months before the contract completion date. He questioned whether this was a realistic schedule. Appellant's Supplemental Appeal File, GSBCA 12175, Exhibit 6. In response, an RLA representative cautioned against approval of the schedule and suggested instead that the contractor not be permitted to move onto the site until all shop drawings had been approved. Id., Exhibit 7. The record contains transmittal sheets from appellant indicating that a revised schedule was submitted for approval on March 20, 1990, and another on April 18, 1990. Id., Exhibit 22 (Documentation for Submittal 4); Respondent's Trial Exhibit 4(a); Transcript, Vol. 3 at 184-87, 196-98. 81. The GSA construction engineer remained uncertain when asked at trial if a construction schedule had been approved. Transcript, Vol. 5 at 188. Furthermore, appellant's project manager, when asked why appellant's submittal log showed no return date for the construction progress schedule submittals, replied that this meant no formal response was ever received from the Government. Transcript, Vol. 3 at 147. In short, we find nothing in the record which would indicate that the Government ever agreed to appellant's anticipated early contract completion date. 82. Actual installation of the sprinkler system began in July 1990. Appellant's daily work log shows delivery of supplies and tools to the site starting July 24, 1990, and the installation of piping on the sixth floor starting July 25. Respondent's Supplemental Appeal File, Exhibit 36 at 307-08. Appellant's construction progress chart confirms that actual work on the installation of the sprinkler system began in July 1990. Id., Exhibit 10. 83. The record contains a revision of the original construction progress schedule dated August 20, 1990. Appellant's project manager testified that the purpose of the revision was to include the work which appellant planned to do on the sixth floor of the federal building. Transcript, Vol. 3 at 157. In revising this schedule, appellant made no adjustment of the schedule's anticipated completion date of early May 1991. Instead, the scheduled start date for installation of the sprinkler system was advanced from early May 1990 to January 1990 notwithstanding the fact that actual installation of the sprinkler system did not begin until late July of 1990 (Finding 82). Compare Appellant's Trial Exhibit 5 with Respondent's Supplemental Appeal File, Exhibit 10. 84. Installation of the fire alarm system began in the fall of 1990. Transcript, Vol. 1 at 249, Vol. 3 at 18. Appellant's daily work log shows some survey work still being done and equipment being received and stored for the electrical system in late August and September. Respondent's Supplemental Appeal File, Exhibit 36 at 267-69, 281. From September 1990, actual work on installing the electrical system progressed steadily. This work involved principally the installation of electrical conduits starting in late September. This work continued on through October and November. The installation of wiring starting in mid-November. Id. at 228-65. Appellant's construction progress chart confirms that actual work on the electrical raceway and fittings began in September and work on wiring in November. Id., Exhibit 10. 85. Appellant's project manager testified that all sprinkler work, including clean up, was finished in advance of the contract completion date. Transcript, Vol. 3 at 199. 86. Appellant's project manager also testified that in his opinion, the installation of the fire alarm system was substantially complete by early September 1991. Transcript, Vol. 3 at 175-76. Appellant's First Delay Claim 87. By letter dated December 12, 1990, Fire Security submitted a claim for a total of $28,637.91 for damages allegedly sustained as a result of what it termed an "unreasonably long and inefficient review process" which delayed the construction phase of the project. The claim included $3,139.29 for field office overhead; the balance was for extended home office overhead said to have been calculated in accordance with the Eichleay formula. In its claim letter, appellant stated that the most critical items of submittal which directly affected the start of the construction of the fire sprinkler system were the design drawings for the federal building. Appellant contended that the total impact of the delays in the review process is ninety-eight calendar days running from April 16, 1990, the planned date for the site placement of materials, to July 20, 1990, the date on which approval was finally received. Appeal File, GSBCA 12175, Exhibit 27. 88. A little more than a year later, by letter dated January 13, 1992, the GSA construction engineer replied to appellant's delay claim of December 12, 1990. The letter recognized a failure on the Government's part to provide a timely review of the initial submittals of shop drawings for the sprinkler system in the federal building. The GSA construction engineer refused to agree that review should or could have begun with appellant's initial partial submissions. He stated that the designs for the sixth floor and the submittal regarding sprinkler materials did not constitute a sufficiently complete package and that review could not begin until receipt of Submittals 5 and 6. Based on the assumption that both submittals were, in fact, received on January 26, 1990, and that review could, therefore, have begun on that date, he calculated a period of eighty days running from January 26 to April 16, 1990, the date on which he believed the Government completed its initial review and rejected the drawings. Taking into consideration the two weeks provided under the contract for review of submittals, the GSA construction engineer concluded that appellant was entitled to an extension of the contract completion date by a period of sixty- six days. The letter ended with a request for documentation in support of appellant's claim for direct cost but advised that the claim for underutilized overhead was not considered allowable in this situation. Appeal File, GSBCA 12175, Exhibit 29. 89. The GSA construction engineer's letter of January 13, 1992, provides no specific explanation for why the Government believed appellant was entitled to this time extension of sixty-six days. A contracting officer's decision, however, issued in January 1994, concerning the Government's claim for liquidated damages, explained that the sixty-six day no-cost extension offered to appellant was in recognition of time required by the Government to get its A&E consultant for the project under contract. Appeal File, GSBCA 12811, Exhibit 14. 90. By letter dated January 17, 1992, the GSA construction engineer forwarded to appellant a draft contract modification which would extend the contract completion date by sixty-six days and provide an equitable adjustment of the contract price to reflect cost incurred as a result of this change. Appeal File, GSBCA 12175, Exhibit 30. The contracting officer's decision on the claim which is the subject of this appeal states that resolution of this sixty-six-day time extension has remained in abeyance due to appellant's insistence on utilizing the Eichleay formula in calculating the estimated costs associated with this delay. Id., Exhibit 39 at 2. Appellant's Claim in GSBCA 12175 91. The claim which is the subject of this appeal was filed on October 9, 1992. It is a delayed reply to the GSA construction engineer's letters of January 13 and 17 agreeing to the sixty-six-day delay and proposing a contract modification. In this claim letter, appellant contends that it had planned to complete its contract on June 20, 1991, well in advance of the actual contract completion date. Instead, owing to a series of delays, all of which were allegedly attributable to the Government, the contract was still on-going even as of the date of this claim letter. Accordingly, at that point in time, appellant sought a total of $291,121 in delay damages. This figure was based on 476 days of delay at an extended performance cost of $550 per day plus profit and bond. The same letter identifies nine specific conditions said to be sources of the aggregate total delay. They are: - Failure to provide on-site G.S.A. representation for the first eight months. - Failure to process submittals in a timely manner as required by the contract; 14 days turnaround. - Class A wiring constructive change order. - Speakers not resolved in a timely manner. - Added sprinkler heads (522)[.] - Smoke detectors not resolved in a timely manner. - Final testing/Punch list delays. - Elevator Recall constructive change order. - Pump/Pipe resolution delay. Appeal File, GSBCA 12175, Exhibit 31. Fire Security's Appeal 92. One month later, on November 9, appellant advised the contracting officer that, in the absence of a reply to its claim of letter of October 9, it was appealing to this Board from a "deemed denial" of its claim. Appeal File, GSBCA 12175, Exhibit 33. The contracting officer promptly replied pointing out that the appeal was premature because, pursuant to the Federal Acquisition Regulation, the contracting officer has sixty days to respond to a claim or to advise the claimant when a decision will be issued if not issued within that period. Id., Exhibit 34. 93. By separate letter, dated November 20, 1992, the contracting officer requested appellant to provide additional information in support of its claim of October 9. The contracting officer asked appellant to identify the specific dates of each of the alleged delays and the exact nature of the delays. In addition, appellant was asked to apportion the costs associated with the various delays. The letter advised that this information was required to permit the contracting officer to adjudicate the claim fairly. The letter also advised appellant that, if the information was not provided, a final decision would be rendered by January 30, 1993. Appeal File, GSBCA 12175, Exhibit 36. 94. Appellant's appeal from a "deemed denial" was docketed by the Board. In an order issued on November 23, 1992, the Board stayed further processing of the appeal and directed instead that the Government provide within the next thirty days a contracting officer's decision or an explanation of why one should not be issued within that time. Appeal File, GSBCA 12175, Exhibit 37. 95. By letter dated November 30, 1992, appellant's president responded to the contracting officer's request for additional information (Finding 92). He refused to provide the information sought by the contracting officer. He explained that this was impossible in view of the multitude of major and minor "delays, disruptions and traumas" already experienced. The arduousness of providing specific information on the individual delays was likened to "picking fly feces out of pepper." Appeal File, GSBCA 12175, Exhibit 38. 96. In reply to the Board's order of November 23, the Government declined to provide a contracting officer's decision and moved instead that the appeal be dismissed as premature. This motion was denied by the Board. Fire Security Systems, Inc. v. General Services Administration, GSBCA 12175, 93-2 BCA  25,851. The Contracting Officer s Decision 97. On March 4, 1993, the contracting officer issued her decision. The decision briefly addressed each of the nine principal conditions identified in appellant's original claim letter of October 9 as the sources of the alleged delays. With the exception of the delay in reviewing submittals in early 1990, the contracting officer denied the existence of any Government-caused delay in the nine areas in question. She noted: "[Y]our correspondence contained absolutely no evidence in support of your claim and an unwillingness to apportion the delay, as requested." She concluded that, because appellant had failed to substantiate its allegation of Government-caused delay, the claim should be denied. Appeal File, GSBCA 12175, Exhibit 39. Discussion The claim which is the subject of this particular appeal is that asserted by appellant in its letter of October 9, 1992. Finding 90. We conclude that the earlier delay claim asserted in appellant's letter of December 12, 1990 (Finding 87), is subsumed in the October 9 claim. The broad, if not all-inclusive, wording of the October 9 claim confirms this intent. Furthermore, in denying the October 9 claim, the contracting officer refers to continued disagreement over whether appellant is entitled to Eichleay damages for the sixty-six-day delay admitted by the Government. Finally, in its posthearing brief, appellant continues to contend that alleged Government delay in approval of submittals caused Fire Security to incur overhead that was not absorbed by any direct costs to the contract. Appellant's Posthearing Brief at 61- 62. The principal difficulty with appellant's claim in this case is its lack of specificity. This is apparent from the sweeping language employed in the letter of October 9. Finding 91. It is likewise underscored in the contracting officer's letter of November 20, 1992, to appellant asking for specific information regarding the dates and nature of the alleged delays. Finding 93. Appellant's reply of November 30, in which it refused to provide specific information, does nothing to help the situation. Finding 95. From that letter it is clear that appellant is both angry and frustrated with the overall administration of its contract. Nevertheless, this alone is not enough to prevail on a delay claim. Rather, to prevail, appellant must demonstrate the extent of the alleged delay, that the delay was proximately caused by Government action, and that the delay harmed appellant. Wilner v. United States, 24 F.3d 1397, 1401 (Fed. Cir. 1994)(en banc); Servidone Construction Corp. v. United States, 931 F. 2d 860, 861 (Fed. Cir. 1991). In attempting to prove and argue this claim, counsel have sought to provide some of the details which their client declined to provide initially. Rather than attempt to address all the causes of delay enumerated by appellant in the claim letter of October 9, counsel have wisely limited their argument to delays which allegedly occurred in the Government's review of contractor submittals. Upon close scrutiny, however, the arguments fashioned by counsel and the facts garnered in support of them are insufficient to prove appellant's claim. In very broad strokes, appellant paints a picture of alleged delays in review of contractor submittals. Reference is made to the contract provision which is read as permitting the Government no more than two weeks for review of submittals. Finding 49. Against this standard, appellant points to entries in its submittal log indicating the lapse of months between submittal and final approval dates. We are told that: (i) appellant planned to start work in January 1990 but could not because it had no approved submittals by that time; (ii) an initial submittal dated November 28, 1989, was not returned to appellant until April 10, 1990; (iii) Fire Security did not get approved submittals for the sprinkler system until July 20; (iv) one submittal, this one dealing with sprinkler material, was not returned until after completion of the project; and (v) another submittal, sent to the Government on September 24, 1990, was not returned to appellant until January 14, 1991. Appellant's Posthearing Brief at 60-61. We examine each of these assertions in turn. Appellant complains that its plans to begin work in January 1990 were frustrated by the lack of any approved submittals at that time. One initial problem with this assertion is that we can find nothing in the record which indicates that appellant actually informed the Government in late 1989 that it intended to begin installation of the sprinkler system in January 1990. Rather, it was not until August of 1990 that appellant revised its progress chart to assert a scheduled start in January rather than May. See Findings 79, 83. Appellant's complaint about the lack of any approvals in January 1990, however, is premised on the assumption that the Government was obliged to review and return by that time Submittal 1, dated November 28, 1989, which consisted of two partial shop drawings for the sixth floor, and Submittal 3, dated December 26, 1989, which was an incomplete listing of sprinkler system materials. The Government's position regarding these early submittals is that they did not constitute a package sufficiently complete for review. Rather, a meaningful review could not be made until the Government was at least in receipt of shop drawings and calculations concerning the system to be installed in the federal building, i.e., Submittals 5 and 6. Finding 52. We find the Government's position to be a reasonable one. It was unquestionably unrealistic for appellant to believe that the Government would review and approve two partial shop drawings for one floor and a partial list of sprinkler materials without at least having the opportunity to review the balance of the shop drawings for the system to be installed in the same building. The contract did provide that submittals should be returned within two weeks "where possible." Finding 49. The Government's conclusion, however, in these circumstances, was obviously that the type of piecemeal review and approval which appellant sought was not possible. We find nothing unreasonable about this conclusion -- particularly when the contract explicitly ruled out partial submittals for the sprinkler system. Finding 50. Nor are we swayed by the fact that at the pre-construction conference the parties discussed beginning work on the sixth floor first. Finding 51. The contractor's apparent willingness to start work on that floor hardly obligates the Government to provide early and out-of-sequence approval of partial shop drawings for installation of sprinklers on that floor alone. GSA, RLA, and eventually even the EDS engineer reviewing appellant's submittals were willing, in the interest of time, to relax the contract requirement for a single complete submittal for the sprinkler system design. The question was to what degree it should be relaxed. Without ever getting formal approval to make partial submittals, appellant appears to have acted on the assumption that the relaxation was virtually complete. Hence it assumed that the two partial submittals made in late 1989 should have been approved by January and that other individual submittals should have been reviewed promptly and approved even before other shop drawings dealing with the sprinkler system were completed. The Government, instead, although under no contractual obligation to do so, was disposed to relax the requirement slightly. It permitted partial informal submissions so that appellant could get limited feedback from the EDS reviewing engineer even before formal submission of a total package. The Government also relaxed the complete submission requirement to the extent that the EDS reviewing engineer went forward with his official review of the design for the sprinkler system in the federal building even before completion of drawings covering the sprinkler system to be installed in the courthouse. On balance, we consider the Government's position considerably more reasonable than that of appellant and certainly not in substantive conflict with applicable contract provisions. In short, if approval of appellant's early submittals on the sprinkler system was not forthcoming in January 1990, it was not because the Government failed to complete a timely review of appellant's early submittals but rather because these submittals did not constitute a sufficiently complete design to merit formal review. Appellant contends not only that the November 28 shop drawings were still not approved in January 1990, but also that initial formal comment on them was improperly delayed until April 10, 1990. This is not a delay which we would attribute to the Government. As already recognized, the Government acted reasonably in insisting that it should have a complete package on the sprinkler system for at least the federal building before it would attempt to meet the contract standard of two-weeks-where-possible for review and return of submittals. We have found as fact that the last major submittal on the sprinkler system for the federal building, Submittal 6, was not provided until March 12, 1990, and that a complete package of all partial submittals for the sprinkler system in the federal building was not provided by appellant until even later in that same month, approximately two weeks before the EDS engineer completed his formal report on that final submittal. Findings 52, 59. Consequently, if the results of the review of appellant's submittal of November 28 and all subsequent submittals were delayed until April 10, 1990, this was hardly due to a lack of diligence on the part of GSA, RLA, or EDS. Rather, the delay was attributable to the simple fact that appellant failed to provide a complete submittal as required under the contract. Appellant further complains that final approval of the sprinkler system submissions was not received until July 20, 1990. The time required for review and ultimate approval of appellant's submittals for the system apparently was a surprise to all parties and, admittedly, a source of no little frustration for many of those involved in the review process. On the one hand, we have an experienced contractor anxious to operate as efficiently as possible but hamstrung by certain exacting contract provisions. On the other, we have a meticulous engineer intent on making a thorough and meaningful review of appellant's submissions. This is a case where the facts are particularly important. In laborious, if not wearisome, detail, we have made numerous findings regarding the preparation, review, revision, and eventual approval of appellant's various submittals for the sprinkler system. Having made these findings, we conclude that the EDS engineer, although at times exacting, nevertheless acted in a reasonable fashion. Indeed, his willingness to undertake an informal "review" of appellant's numerous submittals, his readiness to confer with appellant on problematic submissions, his prompt response to submissions and correspondence from appellant, and, ultimately, his agreeing to begin his formal review before appellant had made a complete single submittal -- as the contract required -- were to his credit. See Findings 54, 56, 60, 65, 68, 71. Appellant's conduct, by contrast, was marked with a degree of ambivalence. Fire Security officials, disagreeing as they did with much of what the engineer recommended, still, on occasion, displayed a willingness to satisfy him. Unfortunately this resolve often gave way to renewed argument, formal complaint, and additional delay. See Findings 65-69, 71-73. Appellant makes much of the fact that the return of one submittal, namely, that concerning sprinkler materials, was delayed until after completion of the project. Finding 55. The facts, as developed for the record, indicate that this submittal may well have been overcome by events and that its eventual return by GSA after project completion was little less than a mere formality. Appellant did indeed complain more than once over the absence of Government approval of this submittal. Findings 57-58. The record, however, also shows that more than once the submittal was revised. It was changed in May and again in August of 1990. Finding 55. Furthermore, comments of the EDS engineer in his memorandum of June 15, 1990, indicate that appellant had decided to include information on sprinkler materials in its revised shop drawings. Finding 71. If this occurred as related -- and appellant has made no effort to rebut the engineer's statement -- eventual approval of the shop drawings themselves would presumably have obviated the need for any approval of the revised submittal concerning sprinkler materials. Before concluding our discussion regarding the alleged delay in the review of appellant's submittals on the sprinkler system, a comment must be made regarding the Government's own apparent admission that it was responsible for a delay in this part of the review process. The GSA construction engineer in his letter of January 13, 1992, to appellant, indicated a willingness to grant appellant a no-cost extension of sixty-six days. Finding 88. This delay was thought to be attributable to the absence of a contract with RLA covering the review of submittals. See Findings 89, 114. As a result of the de novo review process, the factual record now before us provides an understanding of the facts relevant to appellant's claim which is considerably more accurate than that previously available to GSA officials. These facts, as now developed, do not support the proposition that the Government was accountable for such a delay. First, we find that the GSA construction engineer was incorrect both in calculating when such a delay began and when it concluded. The last major submittal of drawings and calculations for the sprinkler system in the federal building was not made on January 26. Submittal 5 was provided on January 26. Submittal 6, however, was not provided until March 12, 1990. Finding 52. Furthermore, subsequent to that date, towards the close of March, appellant made a formal submission of all shop drawings covering the sprinkler system in the federal building -- what we have referred to above as "appellant's almost complete package." It is this submission which the EDS reviewing engineer agreed to treat as a "complete" submittal. Findings 59-60. His unrebutted testimony is that in less than a two week period, he completed his review of this submittal. Second, the GSA construction engineer's conclusion that the review process continued until April 16 is likewise incorrect. The EDS engineer's report is dated April 10, 1990. It is true that the last of the shop drawings and hydraulic calculations were provided to appellant on April 16. Nevertheless, the record indicates that on April 10, Fire Security was provided with a copy of the EDS engineer's report of April 10 and was advised by GSA that the design was not approved. Finding 61. We must reject, therefore, the contention that review of the shop drawings and hydraulic calculations was delayed from January 26 to April 16 by the Government. We likewise reject the alleged cause of such a delay, namely that it was attributable to the Government's need for additional time to complete negotiations with RLA before a formal review could commence. See Finding 89. We now know that on March 5, 1990, negotiations with RLA were completed and its amended contract with GSA to provide for review of appellant's submittals was signed. Finding 56, n. 2. We also know, however, that the balance of the shop drawings covering the sprinkler system in the federal building (Submittal 6) was not even provided to the Government until March 12. Finding 52. In addition, the "complete" package covering the proposed system for the federal building and which the EDS engineer agreed to review even in the absence of drawings covering the courthouse was received even later in the same month of March. We cannot accept the proposition, therefore, that the amendment of the RLA contract had any significant impact on the review process when negotiations were complete and the modification was signed well in advance of events which would signal the formal start of the official review process. To the contrary, evidence in the record indicates that RLA's contractual concerns did not slow down the review process in any way. Prior to amendment of the RLA contract to cover review of appellant's submittals, the EDS engineer was encouraged to at least work informally with appellant on submittals. He clearly did so. Finding 54, 56. As the review process continued after amendment of RLA's contract in March, RLA concluded that the extensive services being rendered to review appellant's submittals were exceeding what had been agreed to in the amendment. The review continued, however, notwithstanding RLA's continuing concerns. Finding 75. Having concluded, therefore, that there was no actual Government-caused delay from January 26 to April 16, we obviously can find no basis for any claim which appellant believes it has to direct or indirect costs allegedly incurred during this same period. The last delay in review of submittals alleged by appellant in its posthearing brief concerns Submittal 13-R3. This was not a submittal relating to the sprinkler system, but rather a revision of the proposed design for the fire alarm system. As we have already seen, this submittal was originally provided by appellant on April 10, 1990, but was subject to revision and supplementation over the ensuing months. See Findings 15-25. Submittal 13-R3, a substantive revision, was sent to RLA by appellant by transmittal letter dated September 24, 1990. Finding 26. There does appear to have been some delay in reviewing this revised submittal, but not for as long a period as appellant contends. Appellant's project manager states that a revised submission was provided to the Government on September 24, 1990, but not returned until January 14, 1991. The return date of January 14 given by the project manager and appearing in the revised submittal log which he prepared is in conflict with the date shown in a contemporaneous submittal kept by another employee of Fire Security. That log states that Submittal 13-R3 was returned to appellant on December 3, 1990. Appellant's project manager states that he rejected the date of December 3 in favor of January 14 because the latter date appears on a "received" stamp appearing on the return submittal. Appellant, however, has not included this "received" stamp in the record. Finding 32. Given this conspicuous lack of support for the project manager's explanation, we consider it more advisable to accept the date of December 3 which appears in the contemporary log rather than the date of January 14 which appears in the project manager's revised log. Using the December 3 date, we find that the time taken to review Submittal 13-R3 after its submission on September 24 was approximately ten weeks. Deducting the minimum period of two weeks allowed for review under the contract, we find that approximately eight additional weeks were taken by RLA and GSA to review and approve Submittal 13-R3. We know of course from the record now before us that this particular revised submittal was an extensive one and represented an effort on the part of appellant to satisfy, in part, objections raised by RLA to an earlier design. See Findings 16-31. The Government, however, has not provided us with any detailed explanation of why so much time was required to process the revised submittal. Nevertheless, even if we were to give appellant the benefit of the doubt and conclude that the additional eight weeks taken to review Submittal 13-R3 were unjustified, appellant still falls considerably short of proving any entitlement to relief for this period of alleged delay. The length of time taken to give approval to a contractor's submittal does not establish ipso facto an unreasonable delay on the part of the Government. It is still the contractor's burden to show where the work was actually delayed because of the lack of approval. Bruno Law v. United States, 195 Ct. Cl. (1971). If there was, in fact, an unjustified delay in the review of Submittal 13-R3, appellant has failed to show how that delay actually had any impact on progress in the installation of the fire alarm system. On the contrary, the record shows that installation of the fire alarm system did in fact begin well in advance of the December 3 approval date for Submittal 13-R3 and that the system was well on its way to completion in advance of the contract completion date when the controversy regarding class A versus class B wiring erupted. Findings 35, 84, 86. One might ask if a more timely return of Submittal 13-R3 would have averted the controversy regarding the installation of class B rather than class A wiring. We think not. Appellant did not raise that issue when the submittal was actually returned -- presumably because it believed then, as it does now, that class B wiring meets contract requirements. We think it unlikely, therefore, that the issue would have been raised had the submittal been returned to appellant at an earlier date. In short, having examined the specific periods of delay identified by counsel for appellant in support of its claim, it is our conclusion that appellant is not entitled to relief on any of them. We, therefore, deny Fire Security's appeal of the contracting officer's decision denying appellant's claim for costs associated with these alleged delays. GSBCA 12811: Liquidated Damages Finding of Facts (continued) Substantial Completion of the Project 98. By letter dated April 9, 1992, appellant advised GSA's construction engineer assigned to the project that it would be ready for inspection for certification of substantial completion the week of April 20, 1992. Respondent's Supplemental Appeal File, GSBCA 12811, Exhibit 12. 99. An inspection did begin on April 20, 1992. Respondent's Supplemental Appeal File, GSBCA 12811, Exhibits 17-18. The first and second days of the test consisted of testing the audibility of the fire alarm and the water-flow alarms. Transcript, Vol. 4 at 147. On the third day of the acceptance test, the alarm system was put in a ground fault condition and numerous invalid replies and responses showed up on the control panel. Id. at 148. At that point, it was evident that the fire alarm system failed the acceptance test. Id. at 148-49. 100. In an effort to correct the numerous invalid responses and replies, a factory representative of the fire alarm manufacturer visited the site on May 8, 1992. The problem was not corrected at that time. Respondent's Supplemental Appeal File, GSBCA 12811, Exhibit 23; Transcript, Vol. 5 at 147-48. 101. By letter dated May 18, 1992, GSA's construction engineer directed appellant to provide a schedule for fire alarm corrective work in order to coordinate the work with the field office manager and the building's occupants. Respondent's Supplemental Appeal File, GSBCA 12811, Exhibit 26; Transcript, Vol. 5 at 149. 102. On June 29, 1992, appellant orally requested a retest of the alarm system during the week of August 3, 1992. Respondent's Supplemental Appeal File, GSBCA 12811, Exhibit 37. GSA's construction engineer replied, by letter dated July 28, that it was unclear whether correction of the defects observed during the first test in April had been completed. He, therefore, directed appellant to provide a status report on the correction of the defects. Id. In response, appellant acknowledged that the defects had not yet been corrected and that the system would not be ready for testing on August 3. Id., Exhibit 38. 103. By letter dated September 18, 1992, appellant advised the Government that it was now ready for a final inspection. Respondent's Supplemental Appeal File, GSBCA 12811, Exhibit 39. In a letter dated September 29, GSA's construction engineer noted that, as of September 20, invalid responses were still being received on the system. He repeated his earlier request for a list of all actions taken to correct defects noted in the first test. Id., Exhibit 40. 104. On October 15, 1992, the GSA construction engineer again wrote to appellant pointing out that there were continuing problems with the system and insisting again on a point-by-point checklist as a precondition to final inspection. Respondent's Supplemental Appeal File, GSBCA 12811, Exhibit 43. 105. In a memorandum dated November 3, 1992, the building manager complained to the GSA construction engineer that the system continued to give false alarms -- some of which had resulted in partial evacuation of the building. He noted the system had been partially silenced and that correction of the majority of the items identified to the contractor during the testing in April was still incomplete. Respondent's Supplemental Appeal File, GSBCA 12811, Exhibit 45. 106. On January 15, 1993, appellant forwarded the fire alarm point-to-point test to the GSA construction engineer. Appellant's subcontractor verified that when each area was put into a ground fault condition, the system would continue to operate normally. Respondent's Supplemental Appeal File, GSBCA 12811, Exhibit 50. 107. Prior to acceptance of the new system, the old fire alarm system continued to function and provide service to the building. Because the old system did not monitor the newly installed sprinkler system, the new system was used to monitor for any activation of a sprinkler head. The audible alarms in the new system were silenced, however. Furthermore, the new system did not report to the central reporting station but rather to the guard's room where a monitor was located. If a problem was reported by the new system, therefore, this required a call from the guard's room to the central reporting station. Transcript, Vol. 2 at 235-36; Vol. 5 at 164. 108. The retest of the system was eventually scheduled for March 8, 1993. Respondent's Supplemental Appeal File, GSBCA 12811, Exhibit 53. During the testing it was discovered that some of the ground fault problems encountered were attributable to incorrect wiring. Id., Exhibit 54. These conditions were eventually corrected and, thereafter, GSA concluded that the system was substantially complete. Transcript, Vol. 5 at 159-62; Respondent's Supplemental Appeal File, GSBCA 12811, Exhibits 54-61. 109. By letter dated March 30, 1993, GSA advised appellant that the project was substantially complete on March 18, 1993, and that liquidated damages for the project would "end on that day." Appeal File, GSBCA 12811, Exhibit 1. Assessment of Liquidated Damages 110. The contract contains the following provision regarding liquidated damages: If the Contractor fails to complete the work within the time specified in the contract, or any extension, the Contractor shall pay to the Government as liquidated damages, the sum of $650.00 for each day of delay. Appeal File, GSBCA 12120, Exhibit 1 at 00800-6. 111. The GSA contract specialist assigned to appellant's contract, when called by the Government to testify, explained that the $650 daily rate is based on rate charts contained in a GSA Public Building Service handbook. Transcript, Vol. 5 at 208. On cross-examination, however, he admitted that he had no personal knowledge regarding the selection of this rate since it was established in 1989, prior to his coming to work for GSA in December 1990. He further explained that his conclusion that the contracting officer utilized the rate chart in selecting the $650 daily figure is based on his understanding that, at the time the solicitation was prepared in 1989, it was the policy and practice of the Public Building Service in his region to do so. Id. at 214- 16, 218-19. 112. By letter dated November 5, 1993, the contracting officer advised appellant that she was assessing liquidated damages in the amount of $287,300 based on a delay of 442 days and the daily damage figure of $650. Appeal File, GSBCA 12811, Exhibit 12. 113. In her final decision, issued on January 28, 1994, the contracting officer explained that the total delay in completion of the project amounted to 508 calendar days but that a sixty-six day no-cost extension should be granted in recognition of time required by the Government to get its A&E consultant for the project under contract. Appeal File, GSBCA 12811, Exhibit 14. See Finding 89. 114. The contract specialist assigned to the contract testified that he drafted the contracting officer's final decision regarding liquidated damages. He explained that the period of delay was based on the contract provision calling for completion of the project 720 days from receipt of notice to proceed. See Appeal File, GSBCA 12120, Exhibit 1 at 00800-1; Finding 1. The notice to proceed was issued and received on November 3, 1989. Id., Exhibit 4; Finding 2. This, according to the contract specialist, resulted in a completion date of October 25, 1991. With the no-cost extension of sixty-six days (Findings 88-89), he concluded that the period for the assessment of liquidated damages should begin on January 1, 1992, and run until March 18, 1993, the date on which the project was considered to be substantially complete. Transcript, Vol. 5 at 208-10. The 442 days for which liquidated damages are sought by the Government, therefore, run from January 1, 1992, to March 18, 1993. Transcript, Vol. 5 at 209-10. 115. Of the $287,300 sought by the Government as liquidated damages for appellant's delay, $111,838.10 has already been set-off from amounts otherwise due appellant under the contract. The balance is still outstanding. Appeal File, GSBCA 12811, Exhibit 14. 116. Government witnesses also testified concerning the financial impact of appellant's failure to complete the alarm system on schedule. The GSA construction engineer explained that, prior to the installation of the new alarm system, there were no smoke detectors on site. After an incident involving arson, GSA mounted a fire watch using contract guards to monitor the premises on a continual basis. This arrangement continued until the new alarm system was fully operational. Transcript, Vol. 5 at 165-66. The contract specialist testified that, as a direct result of appellant's failure to complete the alarm system on schedule, it was necessary to extend this fire watch and to find additional funds to support the extended contract. He also testified that the expenditure of time and resources by GSA's contracting and technical personnel in dealing with the delay and its consequences, particularly with the need for testing and retesting of the system, constituted an additional financial burden for the Government. Id. at 211-12. Discussion Appellant contends that the assessment of liquidated damages in this case should be denied because the Government has not met its burden of proof. According to appellant, a liquidated damages provision is presumed to be fair and reasonable unless challenged, as it has been in this case. Once the provision has been challenged, appellant believes that the burden of proof shifts to the Government. See Appellant's Posthearing Brief at 64-65. We disagree with appellant. A bare allegation of unreasonableness is not enough to shift the burden of proof to the other party. E.g., Rivera-Cotty Corp., ASBCA 32291, 86-3 BCA  19,148. For the burden to shift, the challenging party must first establish a prima facie case against the reasonableness of the rate. In support of its argument, appellant refers us to U.S. Floors Inc., ASBCA 36356, 88-3 BCA  21,153. A close reading of that opinion, however, reveals that a convincing case against the reasonableness of the liquidated damages rate was, in fact, established through testimony of the contracting officer and the Government's civil engineer. Neither of these witnesses, when questioned, was able to provide information which would have enabled the board to conclude that the rate included in the contract should have been deemed reasonable at the time the contract was awarded. Id. at 106,792. In the instant case, appellant has done little more than allege that the liquidated damage rate is unreasonable. Appellant has called no witnesses of its own to establish that the rate constitutes a penalty or bears no reasonable relationship to the expected actual damages. Instead, appellant bases its argument solely on testimony provided by the contract specialist on cross-examination and on the failure of the Government to provide any other evidence in defense of the rate. The contract specialist readily admitted that he has no personal knowledge of how the actual liquidated damage rate was selected. His testimony, therefore, can neither help nor hinder appellant's effort to challenge the reasonableness of the rate. If anything, his unrebutted testimony regarding the agency's policy and practice supports the reasonableness of the rate. See Finding 111. As to the failure of the Government to provide other evidence in defense of the rate, we see no need for it to do so in this case. In a similar case where a Government contractor sought to avoid the assessment of liquidated damages, the United States Court of Claims stated: In the final analysis, the contractor has the burden of showing that the contested liquidated damages bear no reasonable relationship to the probable loss that the Government was likely to have suffered from a delay in performance. Jennie-O Foods, Inc. v. United States, 580 F.2d 400, 414 (Ct. Cl. 1978). Accord DJ Manufacturing Corp. v. United States, 86 F.3d 1130, 1134 (Fed. Cir. 1996). See also James Walford Construction Co., GSBCA 6498, 83-1 BCA  16,277, at 110,785; Lewis J. Miller & Associates, GSBCA 4417, 76-1 BCA  11,719 (citing Hughes Bros, Inc., v. United States, 134 F. Supp. 471 (Ct. Cl. 1955)). In the absence of a prima facie case against the reasonableness of the contract's liquidated damage rate, we see no reason why the holding in the Jennie-O decision would not apply with equal force to appellant in this case. We consider the rationale behind it to be obvious. The liquidated damage rate is a contract term to which the parties have agreed in advance of actual breach. It is only logical, therefore, that, in the event of breach, the party seeking to avoid enforcement of that term should bear the burden of proving that it is inherently unreasonable. We conclude, therefore, that in this case, the burden of proving that the liquidated damage provision is unenforceable rests with appellant. Furthermore, given appellant s failure to establish a prima facie case against the reasonableness of this provision, we do not consider that this burden has in any way shifted to the Government. This is not to say that, in a case such as this, the party seeking compliance with the contract s liquidated damage provision does not have an initial burden of establishing the facts upon which the assessment of liquidated damages is based. Spiess Construction Co., ASBCA 48247, 95-2 BCA  27,767, aff'd on reconsideration, 96-1 BCA  27,952; Lemar Construction Co., ASBCA 37294, 90-3 BCA  23,151, reconsideration denied, 91 BCA  23,564 (1990); Sauter Construction Co., ASBCA 27050, 84-2 BCA  17,288. We see this burden, however, as one which is separate and distinct from that which the breaching party must bear to prove the unenforceability of the same contract provision. Respondent has met its burden of establishing the facts in support of an assessment of liquidated damages. Completion of the project was delayed considerably beyond the 720 days established under the contract. The facts established in the record indicate that this delay was attributable to the time required to replace the class B wiring of the initiating devices with class A wiring and to make the alarm system ready for successful acceptance testing in accordance with contract requirements. Findings 41-45, 98-109. Furthermore, as already determined in GSBCA 12175, notwithstanding earlier admissions of the Government to the contrary, we can find no basis in the facts, as now developed for the record in this case, which would lead us to conclude that appellant was entitled to an extension of the contract completion date by sixty-six days. The Government s earlier assumption that review of submittals had been delayed by negotiations with its A&E contractor was, in fact, incorrect. Finally, respondent has demonstrated that appellant's failure to provide a fully operational system, as scheduled, did, in fact, have a financial impact on the Government. Finding 116. The Government is, therefore, entitled to liquidated damages in accordance with the applicable contract provision. The Government's calculation of liquidated damages, however, is obviously in error based as it is on the mistaken assumption that appellant was entitled to a sixty-six day extension of the contract completion date. See Findings 89, 113. The recalculation of the Government's claim to correct for this error is a relatively simple task involving nothing more than application of the contract formula to facts already established herein. Nevertheless, strictly speaking, this relates to an issue of quantum. Since we have agreed with the parties that this decision will be limited solely to entitlement, we make no award at this time of a specific amount in liquidated damages. GSBCA 12163: The Pump/Pipe Dispute Findings of Fact (continued) Contract Requirements The Sprinkler System 117. The contract calls for the design and installation of a wet pipe automatic sprinkler system complete and ready for operation in the federal building and in the courthouse. Appeal File, GSBCA 12120, Exhibits 1 at 15310-8, 3 at 2 (unnumbered). The contract's summary of work to be done states that there is already an existing automatic fire sprinkler system servicing portions of the federal building which should either be replaced or incorporated into the new system. In addition, the contract provides that there are existing fire hose standpipes which are to be used in the new system. Id., Exhibit 1 at 01010-2. 118. Not all the fire hose standpipes in the existing standpipe system for the federal building and courthouse, however, were to be incorporated into the new sprinkler system. The author of the sprinkler system specification testified that, on inspecting the site initially, prior to drafting the specification, he determined that there were several standpipes in the buildings, all of them "dry." These pipes were not cross-connected; each was independent of the others and had its own fire department connection. He further explained that, for purposes of installing the new sprinkler system, GSA planned to tap into the base of a previously installed riser in the basement which was already connected to the public water system and used to feed the existing sprinkler system in that limited area. From there the new system would be extended to include two existing standpipes in the federal building and two in the courthouse -- one already existing and the other to be added. Transcript, Vol. 6 at 168, 173, 187, Vol. 7 at 95-100. 119. The standpipes to be incorporated into the sprinkler system retained their fire department connections. The standpipe system, therefore, was to remain as it was. During his site visit, the author of the sprinkler system specification conferred with the local fire marshal concerning the standpipe system and plans to install a new sprinkler system. The fire marshal assured him that the fire department could provide the necessary water at the necessary pressures for the standpipe system if required to do so. The only change in the standpipe system, therefore, would be that there would now be water in the few standpipes to be incorporated into the sprinkler system and additional water pumped into these pipes by the fire department in the event of fire would feed the new sprinkler system as well. Transcript, Vol. 6 at 169- 72. 120. Although the author of the overhead sprinkler specification concluded after inspecting the standpipe system that some remedial work might be appropriate so far as interconnection of the standpipes was concerned, neither the local fire marshal nor GSA believed this to be necessary. Transcript, Vol. 6 at 168-70. Rated Working Pressure for System Components 121. The contract provides that above-ground piping for the sprinkler system shall be in accordance with Chapter 3 of NFPA Publication No. 13. Appeal File, GSBCA 12120, Exhibit 1 at 15310- 7. NFPA No. 13 provides that pipe and tube used in sprinkler systems shall be designed to withstand a working pressure of not less than 175 pounds per square inch (psi). Appellant's Supplemental Appeal File, GSBCA 12163, Exhibit 20 (NFPA No. 13 at 3-1.1.1). 122. The contract also provides that valves and fittings shall be suitable for 175 psi working pressure. Appeal File, GSBCA 12120, Exhibit 1 at 15310-7 to 8. The Fire Pump 123. A principal part of the sprinkler system called for in the contract is a diesel fire pump to push water through the system. The pump is to be rated at 500 gallons per minute (gpm). Churn pressure for the pump should not exceed 130 psi when added to the static street pressure. Appeal File, GSBCA 12120, Exhibit 1 at 15310-8. The contract further provides that a static pressure of 80 psi should be used in determining the maximum churn pressure. Id. at 15310-2. 124. A relief valve is also required for the fire pump to prevent pressure on the fire protection system in excess of that pressure which the system is capable of withstanding. Appeal File, GSBCA 12120, Exhibit 1 at 15310-9. 125. The sprinkler system fire pump is to be sized to supply only the sprinkler demand plus the demand of a 100 gpm hose. Appeal File, GSBCA 12120, Exhibit 1 at 15310-4. The author of the specification testified that this was in accordance with GSA standards. Transcript, Vol. 6 at 170. The Fire Protection portion of the GSA Safety and Environmental Management Program Handbook does, in fact, provide: Where fire pumps are needed to meet the pressure requirements of the sprinkler system, the pump must be sized for the sprinkler demand only. The pump must not be sized to meet the interior hose stream demand, which will be supplied by the fire department through Siamese connections. Appellant's Supplemental Appeal File, GSBCA 12163, Exhibit 20 (GSA Handbook PBS P 5900) at 38. The pump is to be equipped to run automatically for one-half hour per week. Id., GSBCA 12120, Exhibit 1 at 15310-9. The Jockey Pump 126. In addition to the diesel fire pump, the contract calls for the installation of a "jockey pump." Appeal File, GSBCA 12120, Exhibit 1 at 15310-9. Appellant's expert in fire prevention engineering explained that a jockey pump is a very small electric pump -- considerably smaller than the main diesel fire pump. Its purpose is to bring the pressure back up in the sprinkler system (without need of turning on the main pump) when, for one reason or another, the pressure falls off slightly. Transcript, Vol. 4 at 44-45. The contract requires that the jockey pump maintain the pressure in the system at between 140 and 150 psi. Appeal File, GSBCA 12120, Exhibit 1 at 15310-9. 127. In his testimony at trial, the author of the contract specification on the overhead sprinkler system explained why the jockey pump was to maintain the system at a pressure between 140 and 150 psi. He stated that he considered it best not to stress the system beyond what was necessary. The system was expected to last for a long time. He conceded that he was aware the system would be tested at 200 psi and the sprinkler heads are tested at 500 psi. Nevertheless, because of the thousands of fittings and connections in the system and because the rated pressure for system components was a minimum of 175 psi, he thought is best "not to push the envelope" but rather to establish a working pressure of 140 to 150 psi. Transcript, Vol. 6 at 163-66. Applicable Publications 128. The contract specification for the overhead sprinkler system opens with a provision entitled: "Applicable Publications." It states: The publications listed below form a part of this specification. The publications are referred to in the text by basic designation only. Latest Edition shall be used. Appeal File, GSBCA 12120, Exhibit 1 at 15310-1. Among the eight publications listed in this section of the specification are three publications of the NFPA. They are: No. 13 Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems No. 14 Standard for the Installation and hose systems No. 20 Standard for Installation of Centrifugal Fire Pumps. Id. 129. A provision of NFPA No. 14 which is of particular importance in this dispute is found in Chapter V. That chapter concerns the water supplies for standpipe systems. The important provisions for this case are sections 5-3, 5-4, and 5-5. They deal with minimum supplies of water. The minimums are set out in terms of volume and residual pressure. The provisions refer to three classes of service. For each class of service, a residual pressure of 65 psi must be maintained at the topmost outlet of each standpipe and at the hydraulically most remote hose connection. In addition, for class I and III service, a volume of 500 gpm must be available at these same points. For class II service, a volume of 100 gpm is required. Appellant's Supplemental Appeal File, GSBCA 12163, Exhibit 20 (NFPA No. 14 at 5-3, 5-4, and 5-5). 130. Another provision in Chapter V of NFPA No. 14, namely 5-1, concerns factors governing the water supply requirement for standpipe systems. This provision notes that selection of the water supply depends on a variety of factors and conditions. For this reason, the provision concludes, the selection of water supplies for each installation "shall be determined in cooperation with the authority having jurisdiction." Appellant's Supplemental Appeal File, GSBCA 12163, Exhibit 20 (NFPA No. 14 at 14-9). In this case, the "authority having jurisdiction" for the federal building and courthouse would be GSA itself or someone at GSA. Transcript, Vol. 6 at 167-69, 174. Applicability of NFPA No. 14 to the Contract 131. There is considerable disagreement between the parties on the applicability of NFPA No. 14 to the contract. Appellant believes that because this publication is incorporated by reference with no express limitation, provisions such as that found in Chapter V regarding pressure and volumes at the topmost outlet of each standpipe (Finding 129) are applicable to the work to be done under the contract. Appellant's expert in fire prevention engineering paraphrased the sprinkler system specification as saying: "[G]ive me a system that won't provide the water for fire department use." Nevertheless, he believed that because NFPA No. 14 is incorporated by reference into the specification, that appellant was nonetheless required to meet the pressure and volume requirements for the topmost outlets on all standpipes incorporated into the sprinkler system. Hence, in his opinion, there is a conflict between these provisions. Transcript, Vol. 4 at 80. 132. Appellant's president contends that the contract's reference to NFPA No. 14 required him to provide the requisite pressure and volume at the topmost outlet of any standpipe incorporated into the sprinkler system. Appeal File, GSBCA 12163, Exhibit 14. However, when asked whether Fire Security had complied with a requirement in NFPA No. 14 regarding acceptable pressure for 2« inch hose valves on standpipes, he observed that the over-pressurized valves were already installed on the existing standpipe and he did not consider that to be part of his contract. Transcript, Vol. 7 at 101-05. 133. The author of the sprinkler specification was recognized by the Board as an expert in fire sprinkler engineering and operations. Transcript, Vol. 6 at 124-32. He expressed the opinion that NFPA No. 14 is of limited application to this contract. He explained that GSA opted not to have remedial work done on the building's standpipe system, as such, and that, therefore, the contractor installing the sprinkler system had no need to be concerned with such matters as the pressure and volume at the topmost outlet of standpipes or with the interconnection of the pipes in the standpipe system or with the requisite number of standpipes in the standpipe system. Transcript, Vol. 6 at 170, 180-82, 187-89. On the other hand, because some standpipes were to be integrated into the sprinkler system, he believed that provisions in NFPA No. 14 such as those dealing with the mechanical portion of tie-ins or use of standpipes would be applicable. Id., Vol. 6 at 247, Vol. 7 at 8. Contractor as "Specialist" 134. A provision in the specification for the overhead sprinkler system entitled "Specialist" states that the system installer shall have been regularly engaged in the business of contracting to install automatic fire sprinkler systems for at least five years. This same provision prohibits the contractor from subcontracting any portion of the on-site installation of the sprinkler system. Appeal File, GSBCA 12120, Exhibit 1 at 15310-4. Appellant's Sprinkler System Proposal 135. The A&E firm retained by GSA to review appellant's submittals associated another firm, EDS, to develop the specification for the overhead sprinkler system and to review the contractor's submittals for the system. Finding 16. The EDS engineer tasked with review of appellant's sprinkler system submittals, noted in his report on the proposed sprinkler system that the churn pressure for appellant's fire pump was 100 psi and that the static pressures shown on appellant's riser diagrams were in excess of 130 psi. He pointed out that the contract specification provided that the combined static city pressure (defined to be 80 psi) and pump churn pressure should not exceed 130 psi. See Finding 123. Appellant's proposed system, however, would have an actual combined pressure of 180 psi, which would actually be in excess of the maximum operating pressure anticipated in the contract. The EDS engineer recommended that the fire pump be set to operate at 130 psi, pointing out that since the jockey pump was specified to operate between 140 and 150 psi, the fire pump should be set to operate at a pressure below this to reduce shock to the building sprinkler system. Appeal File, GSBCA 12163, Exhibit 4 at 5. 136. At trial, the EDS engineer provided additional detail regarding his concern with "shock" to the building sprinkler system. He explained that he had deliberately specified that the accumulated churn pressure of the fire pump should not be in excess of 130 psi so that when it was started each week for a thirty minute test in a system being held by the jockey pump at a pressure between 140 and 150 psi, there would be no jolt to the system. Transcript, Vol. 6 at 163, Vol. 7 at 78. His concern with the accumulated pressure of 180 psi from appellant's proposed pump was that, in a system being maintained at a pressure between 140 and 150 psi, this would produce a jolt to the system each week the pump was tested. Over a prolonged period of time this could be damaging to the system. The alternative of setting the jockey pump to maintain the system at a pressure in excess of 180 psi would only expose the system to unnecessary stress. Id. at 164. 137. Appellant contends that the concern of the EDS engineer over jolts to the system from the proposed higher pressure pump could be readily addressed through the use of a reducing or relief valve. During the cross-examination of the EDS engineer, counsel for appellant asked the witness if a reducing valve could be used to reduce the pressure from the fire pump. He was asked: Q. . . . There is a relief valve on the system near the fire pump, isn't there? A. Yes, sir, there is. Q. And in the case of excessive pressure, it just triggers that valve and dumps the water into the sewer line, does it not? A. Yes, sir. Q. And that itself would prevent any jolt or shock to the system, would it not? A. It was set at -- if it was set at less than the churn pressure, it would be discharging[,] yes. Transcript, Vol. 7 at 81. 138. Appellant's president, however, when asked at trial about the jolting effect, stated that if the pressure observed on the system near the fire pump were 180 pounds, to avoid any shock to the system, the jockey pump would have to be set at a higher pressure. In addition, he noted that if the churn pressure is 180 and the system is to operate at 175 psi, NFPA No. 13 permits the use of a pressure-reducing valve which would reduce the pressure to 165 on the outlet side of the valve. Transcript, Vol. 7 at 111-12. 139. In reviewing appellant's submittals for the sprinkler system in the federal building, the EDS engineer also noted that the riser diagrams showed pressures for 500 gpm flow for hose allowance. He observed in his report that it was not necessary for the fire pump to supply volume and pressure to the standpipes for large hose allowance. Appeal File, GSBCA 12163, Exhibit 4 at 5. 140. By letter dated April 23, 1990, Fire Security responded to the comments of the EDS engineer. Finding 62. The letter states in part: As a result of our research, we determined that the criteria set as the pressures for the fire pump could cause problems meeting N.F.P.A. requirements at the upper levels and elected to base our proposal on a different pump to feel safe that the system would work. It is our contention that the specifications gave us this latitude because of the contract clauses that require the bidder to be a specialist and require the bidder to do ample site investigation and [sic] conditions to provide a wet pipe automatic sprinkler system, complete and ready for operation. Appeal File, GSBCA 12163, Exhibit 5. The letter closed with a request for a meeting to discuss these matters. 141. By memorandum dated April 24, 1990, the EDS engineer provided RLA with comments on appellant's letter of the previous day. He observed that while the specification requires the contractor to be a specialist it does not, by that fact, allow a bidder to ignore the requirements of the specification. The same memorandum notes that NFPA No. 14 is not relevant since the contract specification excludes the requirement for the fire pump to supply large hose water to the standpipe. The memorandum closes with the statement that a pump is available with a churn pressure of 50 psi and producing 500 gpm at 48 psi. Appeal File, GSBCA 12163, Exhibit 6. 142. The comments of the EDS engineer were shared with appellant by the GSA construction engineer assigned to this project. By letter dated June 15, appellant's president referenced discussions with the construction engineer and confirmed his disagreement with the EDS "interpretation" of the specification. He advised that this interpretation would cause a substantial increase in pipe sizes throughout the federal building and the courthouse. Appeal File, GSBCA 12163, Exhibit 9. 143. Appellant's expert in fire protection engineering has explained why the substitution of a pump with less pressure would, in fact, lead to increased costs in labor and material. He stated that at lower pressures, larger pipes are required to satisfy the water requirement. The larger pipes are, of course, more expensive and require more labor for handling and installation. Transcript, Vol. 4 at 78-79. 144. The response of the EDS engineer to appellant's letter of June 15 was simply that, to his knowledge, the contract specification for the fire pump remained unchanged and that his reading of it did not constitute an "interpretation." Appeal File, GSBCA 12163, Exhibit 11. 145. By letter dated August 27, 1990, appellant's project manager advised the GSA construction engineer that Fire Security was complying with GSA's directives to provide a fire pump meeting set criteria in the specification for the overhead sprinkler system. In the letter, he noted, however, that the same specification also requires compliance with NFPA No. 14 and, in particular, with the requirement that there be a minimum residual pressure of 65 psi at the standpipe's topmost outlet. He closed with the statement that Fire Security would take no responsibility for this deviation from NFPA No. 14. Appeal File, GSBCA 12163, Exhibit 14. Appellant's First Request for Adjustment 146. By letter dated October 10, 1991, appellant submitted to the GSA construction engineer a claim for $528,029, certified by Fire Security's project manager. In presenting the claim, appellant contends that its original proposal to provide a higher pressure fire pump was in compliance with the "NFPA requirement and contract documents." The Government's insistence on use of a pump with lower pressure, consequently, is said to have constituted a change in contract requirements. The claim represents the costs allegedly incurred as a result of this change. Appeal File, GSBCA 12163, Exhibit 17. Government's Reply 147. In early June 1992, the GSA construction engineer responded to appellant's letter of the previous October 10. He explained that GSA found no merit in the request for an adjustment due to the rejection of a pump that did not comply with contract requirements. In particular, he noted that the contract provided that the churn pressure should not exceed 130 psi when added to the static street pressure. The churn pressure on the original pump submitted was 180 psi and would have required the jockey pump to maintain a static pressure of between 200 and 210 psi -- when in fact the contract required a system pressure to be maintained between 140 and 150 psi. Appeal File, GSBCA 12163, Exhibit 22. Fire Security's Appeal From a Deemed Denial 148. On November 2, 1992, Fire Security appealed from a deemed denial of its constructive change claim based on the Government's insistence on installation of a lower pressure fire pump. Appeal File, GSBCA 12163, Exhibit 23. The Board, after docketing the appeal, issued an order calling for a contracting officer's decision or, alternatively, an explanation of why one could not be issued. Id., Exhibit 24. In response the Government moved for dismissal of this appeal on the ground that no properly certified claim had ever been submitted by appellant. Board Correspondence File. On January 12, 1993, the Board issued a show cause order directing appellant to answer why the appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Id. Appellant's Claim 149. By letter dated January 13, 1993, appellant submitted to the contracting officer a revised claim for a total of $594,029. The claim included the constructive change claim of $528,029 originally sought by appellant in its letter of October 10, 1991, to the GSA construction engineer. In addition, the claim seeks $66,000 based on an alleged delay of 120 days. Although no details were furnished regarding the alleged period of delay, this claim was certified by the company president. Appeal File, GSBCA 12163, Exhibit 26. Contracting Officer's Decision 150. In a decision dated March 12, 1993, the contracting officer denied appellant's certified claim of January 13. The contracting officer's position is essentially that expressed earlier by the GSA construction engineer in his letter of early June 1992 to appellant. See Finding 147. The high pressure fire pump originally proposed by appellant was found to be in conflict with various requirements of the contract. The contracting officer noted that the fire pump, as originally proposed by Fire Security, was determined to have a churn pressure of 100 psi which, when added to the static pressure of 80 psi, produced an accumulated churn pressure of 180. This conflicted with the contract's limitation of 130 psi for the accumulated churn pressure. In addition, the higher pressure was said to be in conflict with another express requirement, namely, that the jockey pump should maintain system pressure between 140 and 150 psi. Finally, the contracting officer noted that the use of the higher pressure pump would require setting the pump's relief valve at a pressure above 175 psi. Because this valve is intended to be set to prevent pressure on the system in excess of that which the system is capable of withstanding and because the minimum pressure rating in the contract for pipes, fittings, and valves is 175 psi, the relief valve should be set at that pressure rather than a higher pressure. Appeal File, GSBCA 12163, Exhibit 27. 151. The contracting officer's decision denied the delay portion of appellant's claim on the ground that no evidence was presented in support of an alleged Government-caused delay. The decision closes with the observation that appellant's claim letter clearly demonstrates an intention "to undercut the competitors and disregard the contract requirements through the inclusion of this non-conforming, lower priced, higher pressure pump as a part of your bid." Appeal File, GSBCA 12163, Exhibit 27. 152. In a complaint dated April 5, 1993, Fire Security took issue with the Government's position as explained in the contracting officer's decision as well as in prior correspondence from GSA on the same subject. See Board Correspondence File. On October 12, 1993, counsel for appellant filed a supplemental and amended complaint increasing the amount of the delay claim not in terms of alleged days of delay but to reflect a revised calculation of appellant's alleged rate of damages per day. The revised claim totals $607,469. Id. Discussion Fire Security seeks to recover the extra costs of using larger pipe for the sprinkler system as a constructive change. The allegation is that appellant was required to use larger pipe based on GSA s misinterpretation of applicable contract provisions. Findings 146, 149. The Applicability of NFPA No. 14 Appellant believes that the incorporation of NFPA No. 14 by reference into the contract was enough to make provisions such as those found in Chapter V regarding pressure and volume at the topmost outlet of each standpipe applicable to the work to be done under its contract. Finding 129, 131. A key issue here, therefore, is whether NFPA No. 14 applies in its entirety to the contract specification for an overhead sprinkler system. We conclude that it does not. NFPA No. 14, by its very title, concerns the "Installation of Standpipes and Hose Systems." Finding 128 n. 12. Appellant's contract does not call for the installation of a standpipe system or for any remedial work to be done on the existing standpipe systems. Findings 119-20. Rather, it calls for the installation of a sprinkler system. Findings 117-18. Appellant's own expert indirectly concedes this fact when he acknowledges that the specification in effect says: "Give me a system that won't provide the water for fire department use." Finding 131. In this dispute, the Government has the higher ground. The contract provided that a limited number of existing standpipes in the standpipe systems for the federal building and the courthouse were to be incorporated into the new sprinkler system. Finding 117. We agree with respondent, therefore, that, for this contract, provisions of NFPA No. 14 are of limited application. Certainly any provision of that publication bearing on the mechanical tie-in and/or mechanical use of the standpipes incorporated into the sprinkler system would be applicable. See Finding 133. Other provisions of NFPA No. 14, however, which relate to the standpipe system as a whole, clearly go beyond the scope of this contract. Similarly, provisions which may apply to the continuing role of the integrated standpipes in the standpipe system of the federal building or the courthouse are certainly beyond the scope of appellant's contract as well. Invoking requirements of NFPA No. 14, appellant initially insisted on a sprinkler design which would supply water to the topmost outlet of the integrated standpipes from the sprinkler system pump. Findings 142-145. Even under NFPA No. 14, this is not a decision to be made unilaterally by the contractor, but rather one which is to be made in cooperation with the "authority having jurisdiction" -- in this case, GSA. See Findings 119, 130. The record indicates that, before the sprinkler system specification was written, GSA decided that the standpipe system in both buildings would continue to be supplied as it had in the past. Findings 119-20. For this reason, in accordance with agency policy, the contract provided that the sprinkler system pump was to be sized to provide water for the sprinkler system only. Finding 125. During the late spring and early summer of 1990, when the parties were engaged in discussions concerning the pressure of the proposed fire pump, Fire Security, invoking the contract "Specialist" provision (Finding 134), suggested that, as a "specialist," the contractor should be afforded a certain degree of latitude in what it proposed in the system design. Finding 140. We do not consider that this clause justifies such latitude. Rather, we agree with the EDS engineer's comment on this argument, namely, that the contract may require a specialist but that fact alone does not authorize a bidder to ignore requirements of a contract specification. Finding 141. It is our conclusion, therefore, that the provisions of NFPA No. 14 on which appellant has relied to justify departure from actual pressure requirements of the contract do not apply. Given this conclusion, we affirm the contracting officer's decision that the higher pressure fire pump proposed by appellant was non- compliant. See Finding 150. Conflicting Provisions Even if, arguendo, one were to accept appellant's contention that all provisions of NFPA No. 14 are applicable to this contract and that there is, therefore, a conflict in contract provisions, under well established precedent, a conflict of this nature would be resolved in the Government's favor. The provisions of NFPA No. 14 of particular concern to appellant are those which require a stated pressure and volume at the topmost outlet of standpipes. Findings 129, 131. These are general provisions in a publication of general application. They are not written with any specific standpipe or hose systems in mind. Neither were they written for or tailored for the contract under which this dispute has arisen. In contrast, the contract provisions which the EDS engineer stated to be in conflict with the higher pressure pump proposed by appellant and the provisions of NFPA No. 14 which allegedly required it, are unique to this contract. See Findings 123, 126, 135. The author of the sprinkler system specification has provided highly credible testimony regarding the operating pressure to be maintained in the system by the jockey pump and why it was considered best in this case to maintain the system at a pressure between 140 and 150 psi. Findings 121-22, 127, 136. The contract's limitation on accumulated churn pressure (Finding 123), its provision for a relief valve on the fire pump (Finding 124), and the prescribed setting for the jockey pump (Finding 126) all reflect the Government's planning in this regard. The pressure parameters for the required sprinkler system were clearly stated in the contract and deliberately chosen by the author of the specification. It is well settled that where an agreement contains general and specific provisions which are in any respect inconsistent or conflicting, the provision directed to a particular matter controls over the provision which is general in its terms. Smoot v. United States, 237 U.S. 38, 42 (1915); Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Hill, 193 U.S. 551, 558 (1904); Hills Materials Co. v. Rice, 982 F.2d 514, 517 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Dravo Corp. v. United States, 480 F.2d 1331, 1335 (Ct. Cl. 1973); Kenneth Reed Construction Corp v. United States, 475 F.2d 583, 587 (Ct. Cl. 1973); Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. United States, 397 F.2d 826, 848 (Ct. Cl. 1968); Hol-Gar Manufacturing Corp. v. United States, 351 F.2d 972, 980 (Ct. Cl. 1965). In this case, appellant's alleged effort to comply with the pressure requirement of NFPA No. 14 for the topmost valve of the standpipes is in substantive conflict with specific pressure requirements set out in the contract for accumulated churn pressure and jockey pump pressure setting. This is obvious from the comments provided by the EDS engineer on appellant s proposal to use a higher pressure fire pump. See Findings 135-36. Given the more specific tenor of the contract provisions of concern to him, they certainly would control over the more general provisions of NFPA No. 14 which appellant alleges were also part of the contract. Appellant also argues that there really is no conflict between the provisions of NFPA No. 14 concerning pressure at the topmost valve of the standpipes and the relatively lower pressure requirements of the sprinkler system. Posthearing Brief at 18. According to counsel for Fire Security, any seeming conflict would have been resolved readily if the Government had been open-minded enough to consider installation of an ordinary relief valve. This, they allege, "would have allowed the Fire Security system to meet all major requirements of the specification and NFPA." Id. at 23. The exact nature of this relief valve fix of appellant remains unclear. If the purpose of the relief valve would be to bring the normal operating pressure of the proposed pump within the limits established under the contract for the jockey pump, namely 140 to 150 psi, then we fail to see how the pressure requirements of the topmost valve of the standpipes could still be met. On the other hand, if installation of the proposed pump -- even with the relief valve -- were to result in a higher operating pressure, then the contract s relatively lower pressure requirement for the system and the rationale supporting it would be ignored. The testimony of appellant s president suggests that, under Fire Security s original pump proposal, the pressure requirement would, in fact, have been ignored. He spoke of a higher pressure setting for the jockey pump, a churn pressure of 180 psi and an operating pressure of 175 psi which, with the addition of a pressure-reducing valve would be reduced to 165 psi at the outlet side of the valve. Finding 138. Certainly this arrangement would still render the proposed pump non-compliant with the contract s stated pressure limitations. See Findings 123, 126. Appellant argues that even the EDS engineer agreed at trial that a relief valve could have been used. Appellant s Posthearing Brief at 20. He did so testify. However, the question was asked solely in relation to the specific issue of how a shock to the system could be avoided in the event a higher pressure pump were to be installed. We do not understand his statement as agreement that, by utilizing the valve, the pump would have been deemed compliant. We also note that, although this witness agreed that a relief valve could be used to prevent shock to the system, it was understood that, in this situation as outlined to him, the valve would be set at less than churn pressure and excess water would be dumped into the sewer line. Finding 137. Apart from the wasteful discharge of public water with such an arrangement, we fail to see how, with such a significant reduction in pressure, appellant would still be in compliance with the pressure requirement of NFPA No. 14 for the topmost valve of a standpipe. In short, we are unconvinced that appellant s relief valve fix resolves all possible conflict between requirements of NFPA No. 14 which appellant contends are applicable to this contract and the specific pressure requirements contained in the contract s overhead sprinkler specification. We remain convinced that, if these NFPA provisions are applicable to the contract, a conflict would exist. We understand that, when all is said and done, this is the conclusion ultimately reached by appellant s own expert as well. Finding 131. Appellant s relief valve fix does not resolve the conflict which would exist among the provisions in question but rather forces the parties to opt for one set of provisions over the other. As already stated, in the event these provisions of NFPA No. 14 should be applicable to the contract and conflict, therefore, would exist, the law is clear. The specific provisions of the contract must control. Conclusion For the reasons set out above, we conclude that appellant is not entitled to any adjustment in contract price as a result of the position taken by GSA regarding an acceptable fire pump for the sprinkler system. GSA s position was in accord with specific contract provisions. The costs of any delay associated with appellant s disagreement with GSA on this matter are, consequently, to be borne by appellant. GSBCA 12349: Hydraulic Calculation Claim Findings of Fact (continued) 153. The contract specification for the overhead sprinkler system does not call for any specific size pipe. Rather, it leaves selection of pipe sizes to the discretion of the contractor. Under the contract, however, the contractor must demonstrate through hydraulic calculations that the pipe proposed will provide the water at a density called for in the contract specification. Appeal File, GSBCA 12120, Exhibit 1 at 15310-2; Transcript, Vol. 4 at 19-20. 154. The contract calls for a basic or "shell" piping system capable of delivering water at a density of .21 gallons per minute (gpm) per square foot over the hydraulically most remote 1500 square feet of the system. The piping system must be capable of supplying this density to a hypothetical twelve sprinklers (assuming a spacing of these sprinklers such that each one covers an area not in excess of 130 square feet). Appeal File, GSBCA 12120, Exhibit 1 at 15310-2. 155. Appellant's expert explained that under NFPA No. 13, Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems, various levels of occupancy are defined in terms of the hazards involved. Office areas are considered "light hazard occupancy." Areas where more water would be required to suppress a fire are considered "ordinary hazard occupancy." Areas posing an even greater threat are "extra hazard occupancy." Transcript, Vol. 4 at 24-25. In reviewing the contract provisions for the overhead sprinkler system, this expert recognized the density requirement of .21 gpm per square foot as providing ordinary hazard protection. Id. at 25-26. 156. While the contract calls for a piping system capable of delivering water at a density of .21 gpm even over the hydraulically most remote 1500 square feet, it does not require actual installation throughout the building of sprinklers capable of delivering water at that density level. Rather, the contractor is required to plan for the installation of sprinklers capable of ordinary hazard coverage (i.e., delivering water at .21 gpm per square foot) for a surface area of no more than 25,000 square feet. This is to cover such areas as library stack rooms, laboratories, tape libraries, printer rooms, store rooms, and shops. The sprinkler system for the remainder of the building is to be designed for "light hazard occupancy," i.e., providing water, when necessary, at a density of .1 gpm per square foot even to the hydraulically most demanding 1500 square feet with a sprinkler spacing not to exceed 225 square feet. Appeal File, GSBCA 12120, Exhibit 1 at 15310-3. Appellant s expert testified that he estimated the federal building to comprise approximately 540,000 square feet and the four-story courthouse to comprise 90,000 square feet. Transcript, Vol. 4 at 31, 95. 157. The contract specification itself explains the reason for this unusual requirement that the piping system be sized to provide a density of water greater than the density actually called for from the majority of the sprinklers to be installed throughout the building. The heavier density requirement for the piping system is said to be included [i]n order to maintain flexibility for future changes in the building . . . . Appeal File, GSBCA 12120, Exhibit 1 at 15310-2. The author of the specification confirmed this when he explained that the contract requirements for the piping system were intended to ensure proper protection of areas which may, at a later date, be transformed from office space into areas requiring greater hazard protection, such as laboratories or record storage areas. Transcript, Vol. 6 at 149. 158. Appellant's witnesses, including its expert, testified that this two-fold requirement for a piping system theoretically capable of providing sprinkler coverage at the ordinary hazard level but an actual sprinkler system which will provide only light hazard coverage for the majority of the building area is extremely unusual. In essence, this was seen as requiring the contractor to design and justify, through hydraulic calculations, two systems, one theoretical and one actual. Transcript, Vol. 4 at 27-34, 90- 91, Vol. 6 at 13-15. The author of the sprinkler system specification agreed that this was an unusual requirement and the first one of this nature that he had ever written. He repeated, however, that his purpose in drafting the specification in this fashion was to "establish and maintain a capacity for the system to accommodate any future tenant improvements . . . that might be more demanding than a typical office." Id., Vol. 6 at 215-16. 159. Appellant's expert testified that in multi-story buildings, identifying the most hydraulically challenging point is not always a simple task. Thus a building owner may on occasion ask the designer of a proposed sprinkler system to run more than one set of calculations. Three or four sets to double-check the reliability of the system are not unusual. In a complicated building, a designer may even be asked to do a half dozen calculations. Transcript, Vol. 4 at 105-07. The employee of appellant responsible for supervising the preparation of the hydraulic calculations for this contract testified that for the sprinkler system designed for the federal building and courthouse, he would have expected to do approximately six sets of calculations. Id. at 106-07. 160. The contract itself is silent on the precise number of hydraulic calculations required. A section of the contract specification for the overhead sprinkler system discusses shop drawing and material submittals for the system. One provision of this section reads: A. Detailed working drawings in accordance with Section 1-9 of NFPA No. 13 and Section 1-4.3 of NFPA No. 20 shall be prepared and shall be submitted to the Contracting Officer for approval prior to fabrication of piping. 1. Shop Drawings shall include Piping Plans and Reflect Ceiling Plans. 2. Hydraulic calculations shall be a part of this submittal. . . . . 4. Partial submissions are not acceptable. Appeal File, GSBCA 12120, Exhibit 1 at 15310-5. 161. Appellant's employee responsible for the hydraulic calculations for the contract testified that Fire Security submitted eighty-six sets of calculations for the federal building/courthouse project. When asked why this many calculations were done, he replied: When we started this project, we did one floor. We were working on the sixth floor. They asked us to do the sixth floor first because that was undergoing renovation. And when we sent that in, we sent that in with the sixth floor calculations and the standpipe calculations. Somewhere in there we were told that we were going to do calculations on all the systems, a hypothetical set and an actual set. Transcript, Vol. 6 at 18. This same witness identified the EDS engineer responsible for reviewing the submittal on the sprinkler system as the individual who directed appellant to provide these calculations with the shop drawings. He stated that these instructions were given in one of many phone conversations with this engineer. Id. He also testified that the alleged demand for so many calculations was brought up once to the GSA construction engineer assigned to the contract. The construction engineer is said to have advised appellant's representatives to follow the instructions received from the reviewing engineer. Id. at 20-21. 162. The EDS engineer responsible for review of appellant's submittal on the sprinkler system testified that he did not direct appellant to submit any particular number of hydraulic calculations. He stated that it was appropriate for the contractor to make that determination. Transcript, Vol. 6 at 205. In his written report of April 10, 1990, which discusses the shop drawings and calculations submitted by Fire Security, the EDS engineer did, in fact, recommend additional calculations in connection with seven different shop drawings and also stated that all areas that are not typical should have hydraulic calculations performed. Appeal File, GSBCA 12175, Exhibit 4 at 9, 15, 17-19, 21, 24, 29; Transcript, Vol. 6 at 210, Vol. 7 at 45-51. In commenting on appellant's calculations, the EDS engineer testified: It's not my job to teach them how to do hydraulic calculations; but all that work I felt was unnecessary. I tried to give them a little guidance. Transcript, Vol. 6 at 209. With regard to his recommendations that additional calculations be undertaken by Fire Security, this witness explained these were prompted by what appeared to be errors and unique areas not typical of the rest of the system. Id. at 210. 163. Appellant has submitted for the record three large binders containing over eighty different sets of hydraulic calculations. These calculations, with the exception of eight, refer to shop drawings for the overhead sprinkler system proposed for the federal building and courthouse. The remaining eight also relate to the sprinkler system but refer to bid drawings. For several of the referenced drawings, there are two sets of calculations, one being for light hazard occupancy and the other, labeled "hypothetical," for ordinary hazard occupancy. The calculations were prepared over a period of approximately fourteen months. The earliest set is dated September 7, 1989. The most recent set is dated November 29, 1990. Appellant's Supplement to the Appeal File, GSBCA 12349, Exhibit 2. 164. By letter dated November 19, 1992, appellant's project manager requested GSA to issue a change order in the amount of $42,127. This amount was said to represent appellant's increase in design costs resulting from the Government's insistence on the re-running of hydraulic calculations on various areas of the building. According to appellant, GSA required a total of eighty- six sets of calculations when, in fact, under the applicable NFPA standard, not more than six sets were required. Appeal File, GSBCA 12349, Exhibit 2. 165. In a letter dated December 22, 1992, the contracting officer rejected appellant's claim for this increase in design costs. The letter points out that because the calculations are a contract requirement and the responsibility of the contractor, no basis exists for an equitable adjustment of the contract price to compensate the contractor for the cost of rerunning these figures. Id., Exhibit 4. Fire Security appealed this decision of the contracting officer. Id., Exhibit 5. Discussion Appellant seeks to be compensated for the multitude of hydraulic calculations done during the course of this contract. Counsel argues that these calculations represent extra work over and above that required by the contract and that this work was called for by GSA. Appellant's Posthearing Brief at 54. We are not convinced by the evidence presented in support of this claim. Appellant's expert explained that no more than a half dozen calculations should have been sufficient to demonstrate that the proposed system could deliver sufficient water to the most remote section of the system. Finding 159. Appellant's employee responsible for the calculations likewise was of the opinion that approximately six sets of calculations would be sufficient. Id. This may well be true, but it has little bearing on our inquiry here. The contract, as written, envisioned a single submission of plans for the overhead sprinkler system. Findings 50, 160. Perhaps, if appellant had made a single submittal which included a relatively small number of hydraulic calculations focusing on the hydraulically most challenging or remote areas, this would have been sufficient. This, however, did not occur. Instead, as we have seen in Fire Security's delay claim, GSBCA 12175, appellant did not make a single submittal but rather passed on shop drawings and calculations to the EDS reviewing engineer in a piecemeal fashion over a period extending from November 1989 to July 1990. This obviously confused matters considerably. The questions to be resolved here, therefore, are whether, in this particular factual context, appellant's calculations were over and above what was required in the contract and, if they were, were they called for by GSA. Appellant complains first of all about the need to provide hypothetical as well as actual calculations. This is said to be a highly unusual requirement and not in keeping with trade practice. This, however, means nothing if the language of the contract supports the requirement. It clearly does. Findings 154-56. Indeed, appellant's expert as well as the Fire Security employee responsible for the hydraulic calculations both recognize that, given the contract requirement, a contractor would be required to design and justify through hydraulic calculations two systems, one theoretical and one actual. Finding 158. Appellant's complaint, that its hypothetical calculations constituted extra work is, therefore, without merit. Appellant also contends that "excessive calculations were due to GSA's refusal to accept the better-than-specification system." Appellant's Posthearing Brief at 53. This contention is closely related to appellant's change claim concerning the proposed fire pump and piping size (GSBCA 12163). Our conclusion in deciding that claim was that the so-called "better-than-specification" system proposed by Fire Security was, in fact, non-compliant. The work associated with the necessary revision and resubmission of numerous hydraulic calculations based on a corrected design, therefore, is clearly for appellant's account and not extra work for which a contractor might be compensated. Apart from the pump/pipe controversy and the need for hypothetical as well as actual calculations, a great number of calculations prepared by appellant concerned areas in addition to those which might be considered hydraulically the most remote or challenging. Fire Security submitted numerous calculations for the various floors of the federal building and the courthouse. An important issue here, therefore, is whether this work was done at the behest of GSA. In support of the contention that these calculations were required by GSA, appellant offers us the testimony of Fire Security's employee responsible for preparing the calculations. He testified that when appellant made its first partial submission of plans for the sixth floor, "we sent that in with sixth floor calculations and the standpipe calculations." Finding 161. Perhaps this approach was prompted by the contract provision that expressly states hydraulic calculations shall be a part of the contractor's submittal concerning the overhead sprinkler system. See Finding 160. If the contract required calculations with the complete submission, inclusion of them in partial submissions was certainly a prudent course of action. This same employee of appellant also testified: "Somewhere in there we were told that we were going to do calculations on all the system, a hypothetical set and an actual set." When pressed on this point, the witness explained that this instruction was received from the EDS reviewing engineer in one of the many phone conversations with him. Finding 161. It is our understanding from information provided in connection with appellant's delay claim (GSBCA 12175) that these conversations occurred after appellant began to make its partial submissions. See Findings 54, 56. In the absence of any more convincing evidence, therefore, we conclude that it was appellant's own decision, from the first, to include in the various, partial submissions relating to the overhead sprinkler system, hydraulic calculations which corresponded to the shop drawings included in the submission. The EDS engineer was apparently prepared to defer, if possible, to appellant on the issue of how the calculations should be made and how many were required. He testified that he did not consider it his job to teach appellant how to do the calculations but that he did try to provide a little guidance. See Finding 162. It was certainly appropriate, however, once he perceived how appellant planned to do the calculations, that he insist on their being done correctly, thoroughly, and consistently. Any comments or recommendations he may have offered in this regard do not constitute a call for extra work. On occasion, the EDS engineer did ask for corrections of the calculations, recommend additional calculations, and call for calculations to be done for non-typical areas. Finding 162. When seen in context, however, these actions on his part were reasonable -- as was the statement he allegedly made after receipt of the "sixth floor calculations," that he expected to see similar calculations for the rest of the system. Appellant's employee responsible for the hydraulic calculations also testified that at one time the need for so many calculations was brought up to the GSA construction engineer assigned to the contract. The GSA engineer is reputed to have deferred to the EDS reviewing engineer. Finding 161. This certainly was reasonable under the circumstances. Given the problems encountered during the review of the proposed sprinkler system design and the consequent need to correct, supplement, and revise numerous calculations, it comes as no surprise that appellant found the method it had initially adopted for making hydraulic calculations extremely taxing. As already noted, however, we have concluded that the decision on how to prepare and present the hydraulic calculations (piecemeal, through partial submissions, albeit contrary to contract requirements) was made initially by appellant. Appellant, therefore, and not GSA, is responsible for the consequences of this decision. Appellant's claim for compensation for excessive hydraulic calculations is, therefore, denied. We conclude that the hypothetical calculations were in fact required by the contract. Other calculations were occasioned by appellant's failure to propose an overhead sprinkler system which complied with contract requirements. Additional calculations were required to correct errors or to complete the presentation of submittals using the approach appellant initially elected to follow. Appellant may indeed have hit on a "make-work" approach to making the hydraulic calculations. We remain unconvinced, however, that this was initially attributable to any specific demand from GSA or its A&E contractors. On the other hand, once appellant had embarked on this course, we find nothing unreasonable in the Government's insisting that appellant stick with the methodology and approach it had originally chosen. GSBCA 12351: Claim for Rigid Coupling Findings of Fact (continued) 166. The symbol legend applicable to the initial shop drawings submitted by appellant for the overhead sprinkler system contained a diamond-shaped symbol after which was written: "denotes groove coupling." Appellant's Supplemental Appeal File, GSBCA 12351, Exhibit 1, Sheet 1; Transcript, Vol. 6 at 37-38, 46. 167. Grooved couplings are used to join sections of pipe on the ends of which a groove has been cut and a gasket installed. The ends are joined with a metal fitting or coupling, with the metal part of the coupling fitting into the grooves and the gasket sealing the joint. Transcript, Vol. 6 at 22-23, 191-92. Pipe lengths can be joined much more quickly using this method rather than by using threaded or welded fittings. Id. at 190-91. 168. In this case, the parties are concerned with two types of grooved couplings, "rigid" and "flexible." The rigid coupling, by design, joins the pipe sections firmly and in such a way as to make it impossible for the pipe to flex at the joint. The sections, thus joined, react as a single solid pipe. By contrast, where a flexible coupling is employed, there is a certain degree of tolerance or flexibility at the joint. Transcript, Vol. 6 at 26, 192-93, 195. 169. It is considerably more difficult, and therefore more expensive, to install rigid couplings than flexible couplings. The rigid couplings require precise alignment and a close end-to-end fit -- a difficult task for one individual working alone. Transcript, Vol. 6 at 26-29, 195. 170. The contract specification for the overhead sprinkler system does not specify whether grooved couplings shall be rigid or flexible. Appeal File, GSBCA 12120, Exhibit 1 at 15310-1 to 15310- 14; Transcript, Vol. 6 at 196-97. The author of the specification explained that rigid couplings would not necessarily be required throughout the system. For example, if lateral bracing is already in place in a given area, flexible couplings would be sufficient. Transcript, Vol. 6 at 196, 202-3. 171. A Fire Security engineer involved in the design of the sprinkler system and the preparation of the shop drawings testified that reference to "groove coupling" in the initial shop drawings was intended to mean "flexible coupling." When asked about the diamond design in the symbol legend and the accompanying reference to "grooved coupling" he explained: I intended for it to mean a flexible coupling. It's the industry standard. Even though it doesn't say that, that is what is intended. Transcript, Vol. 6 at 38. 172. The symbol legend appearing on a subsequent set of revised shop drawings for the sprinkler system indicates that the grooved couplings identified by the diamond symbol will be rigid couplings. Appellant's Supplemental Appeal File, GSBCA 12403, Exhibit 2, Sheet 1. The same Fire Security engineer testified that this change represented a revision of the original design. He explained that the change from flexible couplings to rigid couplings was made after a call from the EDS reviewing engineer saying that he wanted rigid couplings on the project. Transcript, Vol. 6 at 38-39, 47. This change, in addition to being reflected on the revised shop drawings, was also reflected in Fire Security's material submission (Submission 3R-1) of May 11, 1990. Transcript, Vol. 6 at 29-35; Appellant's Trial Exhibit 12; Appellant's Supplemental Appeal File, GSBCA 12175, Exhibit 22. 173. In his twenty-nine page report (Finding 60) of April 10, 1990, concerning appellant's submittal of shop drawings and calculations for the sprinkler system in the federal building, the EDS engineer commented on Fire Security's plan to use grooved couplings. The report noted that the symbol for grooved couplings on Sheet 1 did not differentiate between flexible and rigid couplings. The engineer, therefore, suggested: Show symbol for both rigid or flex couplings, or state which is to be installed. Appeal File, GSBCA 12175, Exhibit 4 at 2-3. 174. When asked to explain this recommendation, the engineer testified: Well, the plans did not differentiate between rigid coupling and flexible couplings. It simply said grooved couplings. And so, my suggestion was: Show us where you're going to put the rigid couplings, where you're going to put the flexible couplings; and, then we'll see if they comply with the requirements of [NFPA] pamphlet 13 . . . related to earthquake bracing . . . . Transcript, Vol. 6 at 197. 175. The EDS engineer testified that he did not tell Fire Security representatives that they had to use rigid coupling rather than flexible coupling. Transcript, Vol. 6 at 201. He did recall, however, one discussion in which he stated: [I]f you don't want to differentiate where you have flexible coupling or rigid coupling, and you don't want to determine where rigid is appropriate and flexible is appropriate, you can put in rigid at your option but that's your option. Transcript, Vol. 6 at 201. 176. The record contains a copy of the symbol legend which appears on Sheet 1 of Fire Security's revised shop drawings for the sprinkler system. Next to the diamond symbol identifying grooved couplings, which had been revised to indicate that these would be rigid couplings (Finding 172), is the handwritten note: "All couplings to be rigid." Appeal File, GSBCA 12351, Exhibit 2 at 10 (unnumbered). The EDS engineer testified that he personally added this handwritten note to the revised plan. When asked at trial about the note, he explained: So, I told them two months before, show me where you're going to do rigid and show me where you're going to [use] flexible. When they came back and said we're putting in rigid, I wanted to be sure that they understood that, and I wanted the inspector to be sure that that's what went in. Transcript, Vol. 6 at 203. 177. By letter dated November 19, 1992, appellant submitted a claim for $28,861. The letter transmitting the claim explained that, although the contract had not required it, GSA, during the submittal process, had required all couplings to be rigid. The Government, therefore, was asked to issue a change order for the additional costs attributable to the use of rigid couplings. Appeal File, GSBCA 12351, Exhibit 2. 178. A letter in the record, dated December 22, 1992, and signed by a GSA contracting officer, denied appellant's claim for the additional cost of installing rigid couplings. The contracting officer explained that the decision to use rigid coupling in lieu of earthquake bracing was a decision made by Fire Security itself and not the result of any direction from the Government. Appeal File, GSBCA 12351, Exhibit 4. 179. Appellant contends that the GSA letter of December 22, 1992, is not a contracting officer's decision in that it does not reference the contract's dispute clause or state that it constitutes a final decision. Appeal File, GSBCA 12351, Exhibit 7. On March 24, 1993, therefore, Fire Security appealed from a deemed denial of its claim for costs associated with the use of rigid couplings. Id., Exhibit 5. Discussion The fundamental issue raised in this appeal is, of course, a factual one. Did the Government direct appellant to use rigid grooved couplings? To prevail on its claim, Fire Security must prove that this did, in fact, occur. Based on the record before us, we are convinced that it did not. The relevant documentary evidence does not support appellant's contention. The EDS engineer's twenty-nine page report of April 10 certainly made clear that the choice of which type of grooved coupling would be used rested with appellant. Finding 173. As to the handwritten note on the revised symbol legend (Finding 176), that was obviously written after appellant had decided to use rigid couplings. The only evidence which appellant has in support of the allegation that the Government insisted on the use of rigid couplings is the testimony of a Fire Security employee who states that the EDS engineer told him in a phone conversation that he wanted them. Finding 172. This alleged "demand" was never reduced to writing and is certainly inconsistent with the written observation and recommendation on the grooved couplings in the EDS engineer's report of April 10. Furthermore, the allegation of the Fire Security employee is denied by the EDS engineer himself. Finding 175. His own explanation is especially credible since it does not conflict with the limited relevant documentary evidence but rather meshes neatly with it. We know from the facts of this and related claims that the decision to employ rigid couplings was made at a time when appellant was experiencing serious difficulties in getting its proposed sprinkler system approved. Given the delays already experienced and the prospect of further delay based on the EDS engineer's critical report of April 10, the decision to go with rigid grooved couplings may well have been a good one from a business point of view. It eliminated any possibility of disagreement over the appropriateness of flexible or rigid couplings in different areas of the building. It also eliminated the need for earthquake bracing in the immediate areas of the couplings. In short, appellant has failed to convince us that the decision to use rigid couplings throughout was made at the insistence of the Government. Rather, circumstances suggest that it was in the immediate interest of Fire Security to opt for this alternative rather than risk the loss of additional time and the economic consequences of further delay. Fire Security's appeal from a denial of the claim for the additional costs allegedly associated with the use of rigid couplings is, therefore, denied. Whether the contracting officer's letter of December 22 1992, Finding 178, was a decision or whether this appeal is rather from a deemed denial is, at this juncture, of no real significance. GSBCA 12403: Claim for Extra Sprinkler Heads Findings of Fact (continued) Appellant's Estimate of Sprinkler Heads 180. After installation of the overhead sprinkler system, appellant reviewed the as-built drawings and determined that a total of 6044 sprinkler heads had actually been installed. Transcript, Vol. 6 at 50-52; Appellant's Supplemental Appeal File, GSBCA 12403, Exhibit 7. This represented an increase of 868 sprinkler heads from the 5176 sprinkler heads Fire Security originally estimated to be necessary. Of the additional 868 sprinkler heads, however, 328 represented additional sprinkler heads added to the contract at various times by contract modifications. Transcript, Vol. 6 at 60-61; Appeal File, GSBCA 12120, Exhibits 6, 8-9, 11-12, 14-16, 19-21, 23. This appeal does not concern any of these 328 sprinkler heads. Transcript, Vol. 6 at 60-61. 181. The remaining 540 extra sprinkler heads are said by appellant to be the result of an incorrect estimate. Fire Security contends, however, that its error in estimating the number of sprinkler heads required was attributable to inadequate and incomplete bid drawings. Transcript, Vol. 6 at 61-62. 182. The solicitation leading to appellant's contract did not call out or indicate on any bid drawing the number of sprinkler heads required. Appeal File, GSBCA 12120, Exhibit 1. Rather it left to the contractor the task of designing a system which would comply with NFPA No. 13, Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems, with a sufficient number of sprinkler heads to meet the water density sprinkling requirements of the contract. 183. Appellant's estimator explained that in preparing Fire Security's bid, he relied on information provided in the solicitation's bid drawings to prepare his estimate of the number of sprinkler heads which would be required for the proposed system. Transcript, Vol. 6 at 53-54. The record contains several of these drawings. They show sprinkler heads drawn in by appellant's estimator while in the process of making his estimate. Appellant's Supplemental Appeal File, GSBCA 12403, Exhibit 1; Transcript, Vol. 6 at 49-56, 96. All of the bid drawings provided for the record by appellant bear the date of "7/17/89." Appellant's Supplemental Appeal File, GSBCA 12403, Exhibit 1. 184. While appellant's estimator originally determined that the proposed sprinkler system would require 5176 sprinkler heads, he later concluded it was impossible to estimate the exact number of heads to be installed. His testimony was as follows: Q. Why couldn't you estimate the exact number that you installed? A. My estimate was based on what walls that were shown on the drawings. They had a ceiling detail shown on the drawing, and I went primarily by that to do an estimate. Q. What was the problem with that? A. That, when we got to the job site and we were doing the survey work, the lights were not shown the way the[y] were on the ceiling plan. The walls, a lot of walls had changed. Q. What do you mean "walls had changed"? A. Well, they got what I call portable walls that can be moved around. Q. Is that what has been referred to as demountable partitions? A. Right. Transcript, Vol. 6 at 61-62. 185. Appellant's president also testified regarding the alleged unreliability of bid documentation used by Fire Security's estimator to calculate the number of sprinkler heads. He testified that the solicitation contained a drawing entitled "Existing typical federal building RCP [Reflective Ceiling Plan]." Transcript, Vol. 6 at 95-97. The drawing purportedly showed the typical ceiling grid layout, duct diffuser layout, and overhead lighting layout. Id. at 110. Appellant's president personally participated in the detailed survey of the buildings made after award. Id. at 72. He testified that the reflective ceiling plan provided by the Government was not typical, that the ceiling grids were found not to be straight as indicated on the plan, that the duct diffusers were "moved around," and that the "lights were rearranged in different patterns." Id. at 110-11. 186. Appellant's design estimator was asked at trial why the discrepancies between conditions found at the site and conditions described in the Government's bid documents could not be detected during a pre-bid walk-through. He replied that these discrepancies were detected during the detailed survey undertaken by appellant after contract award. This survey took several months and was clearly not the type of survey a vendor would undertake prior to submitting a bid. Furthermore, the additional heads were not confined to any one area in the building but were located throughout at different floors and in different areas. Transcript, Vol. 6 at 62-64. 187. Appellant's president also testified that the additional sprinkler heads were located throughout the building and not in any one or two locations. He explained that it would be very hard to identify specifically: The only comparison we would have would be to look at what we call our bid drawings, as compared to our shop drawings. Transcript, Vol. 5 at 50. 188. Another fire sprinkler contractor who had collaborated with appellant in the past, and was interested in assisting as a subcontractor on this project, obtained its own copy of the Government's bid documents. Allegedly working independently of Fire Security, this contractor estimated that 5168 sprinkler heads would be required for an overhead sprinkler system and used this estimate to prepare a quote which it submitted to Fire Security for consideration. Transcript, Vol. 6 at 65-66, 94-95; Appellant's Supplemental Appeal File, GSBCA 12403, Exhibit 3. 189. Appellant's expert testified that he has examined the as-built drawings for the overhead sprinkler system installed by Fire Security. In his opinion, the number of sprinklers satisfies the requirements of NFPA No. 13 and is not in excess of the number required, i.e., the buildings are not "over-sprinkled." Transcript, Vol. 4 at 92. He also commented briefly on the manner by which a sprinkler contractor estimates the number of sprinkler heads required for a given building. He confirmed that, in making estimates, contractors rely heavily on building prints or drawings and on the limited information gathered in a preliminary walk- through. When conditions are found to be different from those represented on bid drawings, this can account for a variance between actual and estimated requirements for sprinkler heads. A variance of 10% would, in his opinion, represent a "good size[d] change." Transcript, Vol. 4 at 93-99. Appellant's Site Visit 190. Appellant's president and design estimator visited the federal building and courthouse site on August 23, 1989. They had come to attend the pre-bid conference for this contract. Appeal File, GSBCA 12120, Exhibit 2 at 7. Following the conference, those attending were taken on a tour of the building. In particular, they were taken to the sixth floor of the federal building where there was some demolition and construction for a new project. The building manager, who conducted the tour, explained that this area of the sixth floor was typical of the construction throughout the building. From the sixth floor, the visitors were led to other floors in the building. Appellant's president testified: "[F]rom there, we walked the hallways of the building, poked our heads in and looked at a few different spots, just to show it was the typical." Transcript, Vol. 5 at 38-41. The following day, these two Fire Security representatives returned to the site for another walk-through. They remained on site for several hours. They returned yet another time on the third day, at which time they walked around the exterior of the building and inspected what would be the staging area. Id. at 42-43. Contract Provisions 191. The contract contains the prescribed clauses regarding differing site conditions and site investigation by the contractor. The Differing Site Condition clause provides in part: (a) The Contractor shall promptly, and before the conditions are disturbed, give a written notice to the Contracting Officer of (1) subsurface or latent physical conditions at the site which differ materially from those indicated in this contract, or (2) unknown physical conditions at the site, of an unusual nature, which differ materially from those ordinarily encountered and generally recognized as inhering in work of the character provided for in the contract. Appeal File, GSBCA 12120, Exhibit 1 (GSA Form 3506 at 7). The Site Investigation and Conditions Affecting the Work clause provides in part: (a) The contractor acknowledges that it has taken steps reasonably necessary to ascertain the nature and location of the work, and that it has investigated and satisfied itself as to the general and local conditions which can affect the work or its cost . . . . The contractor also acknowledges that it has satisfied itself as to the character, quality, and quantity of surface and subsurface materials or obstacles to be encountered insofar as this information is reasonably ascertainable from an inspection of the site, . . . as well as from the drawings and specifications made a part of this contract. . . . (b) The Government assumes no responsibility for any conclusions or interpretations made by the Contractor based on the information made available by the Government. Id. Appellant's Claim 192. By letter dated December 12, 1990, appellant advised the contracting officer that the inaccuracy of the bid documentation had led Fire Security to underestimate by more than 500 the number of sprinkler heads required to meet contract requirements. With the letter was a detailed proposal to increase the contract price by $175,961.94 to compensate the contractor for this unexpected increase in material and labor costs. Appeal File, GSBCA 12403, Exhibit 1. 193. By letter dated November 19, 1991, the GSA construction engineer for this project replied to appellant's proposal. The proposal was rejected. The engineer's letter reminds appellant that section 3.01 of the specification for the sprinkler system expressly provides: Prior to bid, visit the job site and become familiar with local conditions including verification of the location of the existing utilities. Drawings are schematic and advisory, and are not intended to show actual routing of pipe. Appeal File, GSBCA 12403, Exhibit 2. The letter also reminds appellant that the contract's Site Investigation and Conditions Affecting the Work clause expressly states that the Government assumes no responsibility for any conclusions or interpretations made by the Contractor based on the information made available by the Government. The letter concludes that the contract plans were "intended to be a reference to the existing site conditions, and not an exhaustive detailing" and that it was incumbent on appellant "to investigate any conditions that may affect the design of the system." Id. 194. In a letter dated February 17, 1993, appellant once more wrote the contracting officer regarding its proposal for a price increase based on the need to install additional sprinkler heads. The letter is highly critical of the GSA engineer's letter of November 19, 1992. It concluded with a renewed request for the price increase and advised that if a decision were not rendered in sixty days, an appeal would be taken from a deemed denial. Appeal File, GSBCA 12403, Exhibit 3. Appellant, however, did not wait for this sixty-day period to expire. By letter dated March 24, Fire Security appealed to this Board from a deemed denial of its claim for compensation for additional sprinkler heads. Id., Exhibit 4. This appeal was docketed as GSBCA 12350 but subsequently dismissed by the Board as premature. Id., Exhibits 5, 8. On April 5, 1993, the contracting officer issued a decision in reply to appellant's letter of February 17. The claim was denied. Id., Exhibit 6. 195. The contracting officer's decision, like the GSA construction engineer's letter which proceeded it, refers to the same contract provisions relied upon by the GSA engineer and likewise reminds appellant of its duty during the pre-bid walk-through to familiarize itself with observable building conditions. This decision, however, interjects an additional note not contained in the earlier letter from the GSA construction engineer. The contracting officer writes: Furthermore, the Government does not recognize any additional compensation associated with the alleged office layout changes, since these assertions have not been clearly demonstrated or supported by the evidentiary record. Appeal File, GSBCA 12403, Exhibit 6. The contracting officer's decision was appealed on April 12, 1993, and subsequently docketed by the Board as GSBCA 12403. Id., Exhibit 9. Discussion Appellant makes two arguments in support of its claim for additional compensation for the installation of 540 sprinkler heads over and above its original estimate. The first is that these sprinkler heads represent new work beyond that called for under the contract. The second argument is that these additional sprinkler heads were required only because appellant encountered a differing site condition. We find no merit in either argument. Do the 540 Sprinkler Heads Represent New Work? Appellant's contract does not call for a specific number of sprinkler heads. Finding 182. Rather, it sets out specific water density sprinkling requirements for sprinklers and requires the contractor to design a system which meets these requirements and the various other requirements of NFPA No. 13. Id. Appellant's expert has testified that, in his opinion, the number of sprinklers shown on shop drawings prepared by Fire Security satisfies the requirements of NFPA No. 13 and is not in excess of the number required, i.e., the buildings are not "over-sprinkled." Finding 189. Accordingly, we conclude that the total sprinkler heads installed pursuant to these drawings meet the contract requirement and do not represent any new work not covered by the contract as amended. Did Appellant Encounter a Differing Site Condition? Fire Security contends that it encountered a differing site condition justifying compensation for the cost of installing 540 sprinkler heads in excess of its original estimate. Appellant's Posthearing Brief at 35-37. The alleged differing site condition is said to be "type 1," i.e., "subsurface or latent physical conditions at the site which differ materially from those indicated in this contract." See Finding 191. Fire Security contends that in doing its detailed site survey after contract award, "a lot of walls" were found to be different from how they were configured on the Government's bid drawings. Furthermore, ceiling grids, light layouts, and air conditioning diffusers encountered during the detailed site survey were found to differ from layouts shown on a "typical reflective ceiling plan" provided with the solicitation. Findings 184-87 To prevail on a type 1 differing site condition claim, a contractor must first prove by a preponderance of the evidence that "the conditions 'indicated' in the contract differ materially from those it encounters during performance." P.J. Maffei Building Wrecking Corp. v. United States, 732 F.2d 913, 916 (Fed. Cir. 1984); see also Arundel Corp. v. United States, 515 F.2d 1116, 1128 (Ct. Cl. 1975). Appellant contends that during the site survey following contract award it discovered that various office layouts were not as described in the bid documentation. The Government suggests that this late discovery was attributable to a less than thorough site investigation. In addition, the Government attempts to avoid responsibility for any alleged errors by citing exculpatory provisions in the contract. Findings 193, 195. Appellant s representatives spent a considerable amount of time visiting the project site. Finding 190. For purposes of establishing a claim under a type 1 differing site condition, we consider the visit was adequate. Moon Construction Co. v. General Services Administration, GSBCA 11766, 93-3 BCA  26,017 (contractor can satisfy site inspection prerequisite by touring a building, looking at its features carefully, and spotting and considering at that time glaring, patent discrepancies between drawings and features found); Alart Plumbing Co., GSBCA 6487, 84-1 BCA  17,229. As to GSA's reliance on the contract's exculpatory provisions, we consider this unnecessary. Appellant's claim under the Differing Site Conditions clause fails for a much more fundamental reason. It fails for lack of substantial evidence. In her decision rejecting appellant's claim, the contracting officer expressly noted that, although Fire Security had alleged office layout changes, "these assertions had not been clearly demonstrated or supported by the evidentiary record." Finding 195. Notwithstanding this observation, the record still suffers from this same deficiency. Perhaps the most serious alleged deficiency in the bid drawings is the positioning of office walls on the various individual bid drawings used by appellant's design estimator. While we have the testimony of the estimator that "a lot" of walls had changed, we have been furnished with no particulars in this regard. We recognize that the walls were not permanent and, as demountable partitions, were susceptible to modification. Nevertheless, some specific evidence beyond the mere allegation of "a lot of changes" is required before we can conclude that the alleged changes in wall configuration produced a material difference between the site, as it actually was at the time of contract award, and as it was depicted on the bid drawings. Appellant points out that an independent fire sprinkler contractor working from the same bid documentation made an estimate of the number of required sprinkler heads which was very close to the estimate made by Fire Security's design estimator. Finding 188. We find this fact inconclusive at best. As evidence, it is circumstantial and tells us nothing regarding the alleged discrepancy between physical conditions at the site and conditions as represented in the bid drawings. Appellant's case would have been served more effectively by a comparative analysis of the bid drawings with the appellant's notations and the shop drawings prepared after the detailed site survey. Indeed, appellant's president recognized the value of such an analysis. Finding 187. None, however, was provided. This need for more detailed evidence, particularly with regard to when the alleged changes in office walls took place, is even more acute given the temporal limitation traditionally imposed on conditions justifying relief under the clause. It is well established that, notwithstanding the language of the clause, the clause is applicable only to conditions existing when a contract is executed and not to changes in conditions during performance. Olympus Corp. v. United States, 98 F.3d 1314, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 1996). The interval between the date on the Government's bid drawings (July 17, 1989) and the date of contract award (August 10, 1989) is relatively short. See Findings 1, 183. In the absence of more specific evidence, we are not prepared to accept as fact that during so brief a period there was a material change in the configuration of office walls in the federal building and courthouse sufficient to justify the relief appellant seeks under the contract's Differing Site Condition clause. The situation involving the layouts of the ceiling grids, the light fixtures, and air conditioning diffusers is slightly different from that involving configuration of the walls. Presumably, these layouts are less subject to change. They also were not described with the same detail in the solicitation as the office wall configurations were. Nevertheless, the allegation that these layouts were found to vary from the typical reflective ceiling plan likewise remains virtually unsubstantiated. The bare allegation is made by appellant's president that the "typical reflective ceiling plan" was not typical. Finding 185. Somewhat surprisingly, however, no documentary evidence has been provided in support of the allegation. Presumably, if the problem was as widespread as claimed, this alleged failure of the reflective ceiling plan to indicate actual conditions could have been readily demonstrated by a comparison of it to data gathered during the detailed site surveys. In the absence of oral or documentary specific evidence, we remain unconvinced that the reflective ceiling plan was, in fact, atypical and a significant contributing cause to the inaccuracy of appellant's estimate of required sprinkler heads. We conclude, therefore, that appellant is not entitled to additional compensation for installation of the 540 sprinkler heads either as new work or under the Differing Site Condition clause. GSBCA 12120: Ceiling Tile Claim Findings of Fact (continued) Removal and Replacement of Ceiling Tile 196. From an analysis of the as-built drawings for the overhead sprinkler system installed in the federal building, appellant estimated that, to install the sprinkler system in that building, it was necessary to remove and replace 302,240 square feet of ceiling tile. These tiles were five feet by five feet in size. Appellant's Supplemental Appeal File, GSBCA 12120, Exhibit 9; Transcript, Vol. 5 at 13-15. 197. The solicitation said nothing concerning the condition of the ceiling tiles in the federal building other than to note that the contractor would be expected to provide 90,000 square feet of new 5'x 5' ceiling tile to replace existing damaged ceiling tile. No mention is made of where in the building this "existing damaged ceiling tile" might be. Appeal File, GSBCA 12120, Exhibit 1 at 01010-2. Appellant's Site Inspection 198. During appellant's site inspection, appellant's president and the company's design estimator were taken to the sixth floor where demolition and construction were underway for a new project. In the area where the demolition had already occurred, they were able to climb onto scaffolding to view a complete section of the building. From that point, they were able to see the ceiling height where the ceiling grid had been cut away. They were able to see how high the walls went up, the thickness of the light fixtures and duct work, the space that would be available to run piping, and the area of the structure above the suspended ceiling. The GSA representative conducting the walkthrough is said to have assured the participants that the construction they were viewing was typical of the entire building. Appellant's president testified that where the ceiling grid had been removed, the 5'x 5' tiles had been taken out. The portion of the grid which did remain extended across the remainder of the building and still held the 5'x 5' tiles. The area above the remaining ceiling grid and tiles was not illuminated. One's vision was, therefore, limited to larger objects such as duct work and light fixture mountings. Items lying flat on the ceiling would not have been detected. Transcript, Vol. 5 at 40-42. 199. Appellant's president further testified that during his site inspection, he did not remove and inspect any 5'x 5' ceiling tiles. In the sixth floor area where the tiles had been removed, none had been left behind to permit inspection. In other parts of the building where he was taken, the tiles were in place within ceiling grids and appeared to be in good condition. He observed no sagging tiles or vinyl on the bottom of the tile peeling off the tile's insulated backing. Owing to the height of the ceilings (which he believes was nine feet) and the size of the tiles, actual removal of the tiles for closer inspection would not have been practical. As for the 90,000 new tiles called for under the contract, this witness explained that he understood that provision to apply to existing tiles damaged during installation of the sprinkler system. He considered this to be a correct interpretation of the requirement since the contract gave no indication of where existing damaged tiles were located. Transcript, Vol. 5 at 95-100. Appellant's Plan at the Preconstruction Conference 200. The record contains a letter to the GSA construction engineer for this project from an official at RLA, the A&E firm assisting GSA with the project. The letter, dated January 16, 1990, reports on a conversation the RLA representative had with an engineer from Braccia/Tai Associates (BTA), another consulting firm assisting on the project. The conversation concerned comments made by Fire Security representatives during the preconstruction conference on November 3, 1989. At that time, Fire Security had apparently indicated it did not intend to remove the ceiling tiles to make way for construction of the sprinkler system, but rather planned to push them up out of the ceiling grid and on the tiles on either side which would remain in place. The RLA letter expressed concern that this method would result in significant damage to existing tiles. The letter also expressed concern over appellant's plan to use new tile to replace any existing damaged tile. The RLA representative explained that this was not what was originally intended by the designers and would create an unsightly ceiling system. He pointed out that the original plan was for the contractor to replace damaged tile first with borrowed existing tile. Only when the supply of existing tile was used up should the new tile be utilized. In this way one could avoid installing an unsightly ceiling system which would mix new and existing tiles in the same area. Appeal File, GSBCA 12120, Exhibit 26. Removal of First Ceiling Tiles 201. In mid-November 1989, appellant began its detailed survey of the federal building. Respondent's Supplemental Appeal File, Exhibit 36 at 353. Appellant's president, who participated in the early phase of the survey, testified regarding a problem that emerged as ceiling tiles were first removed to permit measurements of the area above them. The tiles were found to be in poor condition. Vinyl covering was peeling from the insulated backing of the individual tiles. The backs of the tiles were filled with a considerable amount of dirt and dust. The tiles were frequently found to have heavy objects or debris on them to weight them down. Rather than just raise the tiles and push them temporarily aside to rest atop other tiles while measurements were taken, appellant's employees found it necessary to remove the tiles completely from the grid and place them on the floor to avoid further damage. The time taken to remove the tiles with care and to replace them in the grid, while ensuring that the loose vinyl was once more neatly tucked in place on all sides behind the t-bar of the ceiling grid, was considerable. In addition, more time was required, after the removal and replacement of the tiles, to clean the floor area where the tiles rested prior to replacement. Transcript, Vol. 6 at 72-75. Appellant's president has had considerable experience in the fire sprinkler industry. He has run his own company since 1977 and is licensed for general construction and sprinkler work in approximately ten states. Id., Vol. 3 at 241-42. He testified, however, that this was the first time in his career he had encountered a problem of this type with ceiling tiles. Id., Vol. 6 at 73-74. Exploring Alternatives 202. By letter dated December 13, 1989, appellant provided to the GSA construction engineer an estimate of the cost of removing and replacing all existing 5'x 5' ceiling tile in the federal building with new 5'x 5' tile. As an alternative, appellant also provided an estimate of the cost of replacing the 5'x 5' grid and tiles with a 2'x 4' grid and tiles. Appeal File, GSBCA 12120, Exhibit 25. 203. In late January 1990, the GSA construction engineer conferred with engineers from RLA and BTA regarding the replacement of the ceiling tiles and grids in the federal building. He explained that officials in Honolulu wished to replace the existing 5'suspended ceiling with a 2'x 4' ceiling and to do this by a change order to the existing contract for installing the fire protection system. The engineering consultants advised against such a move. The were of the opinion that a change order approaching the magnitude of the original contract would provoke a protest from vendors who had shown an interest in the original procurement. They also explained that the concern of the local officials about a "patch-work looking ceiling" composed of old and new tiles could readily be resolved by first using existing tiles to replace damaged tiles. Appeal File, GSBCA 12120, Exhibits 27-28. 204. In furtherance of the idea of changing the ceiling design in the federal building, GSA issued Proposal Request (PR) No. 2. Under the contract's Equitable Adjustment Clause, the Government, when contemplating a contract change, has the right to request the contractor to submit proposals for the work being considered. Appeal File, GSBCA 12120, Exhibit 1 (GSA Form 3506 at 27). Under PR No. 2, the contract requirement for 90,000 square feet of new 5'x 5' tile was to be deleted from the contract. Instead, the contractor would remove all existing 5'x 5' tile and the ceiling grids and replace them with 2'x 4' tiles and new, appropriately sized ceiling grids. Appeal File, GSBCA 12120, Exhibit 29. 205. In response to PR No. 2, appellant dispatched its project manager from the mainland office to the project site in Hawaii to gather the information required to prepare a proposal. The project manager testified that a visit to the site was necessary in order to obtain information, beyond that provided in the contract, regarding the existing tiles, grids, and demountable partitions. The project manager also testified that this visit to the site was made in January 1990 and that its sole purpose was to gather the information necessary to prepare the proposal. Transcript, Vol. 5 at 7-9. 206. By letter dated February 5, 1990, Fire Security submitted a proposal in response to PR No. 2. The proposal in the record, apart from any product literature included with it, consists of not more than six and one half pages. The proposed amount for the work requested amounts to $2,262,385. In pricing the proposal, Fire Security included a deduction of $162,000 from the contract price for the costs of the 90,000 square feet of new tile called for under the contract. Appeal File, GSBCA 12120, Exhibit 29. 207. Fire Security's project manager testified that the proposal which he prepared and submitted after his trip to the project site was discussed for some time but was eventually rejected by GSA. Transcript, Vol. 5 at 9. A letter, in the record, to appellant from GSA, dated December 26, 1990, does, in fact, advise Fire Security that the proposal is rejected. The letter states: Due to the estimated high dollar value of this work order, the Government has made a decision to cancel this request and issue a new solicitation. To preserve the integrity of the bidding process and fairness to other prospective offerors, additional competition will be sought. Appeal File, GSBCA 12120, Exhibit 30. Confirmation of Conditions Described by Appellant's President 208. The on-site supervisor for one of appellant's subcontractors, Synergy, testified that once work began, he personally observed the problems encountered by appellant's employees as they removed the large 5'x 5' ceiling tiles. He confirmed that the loose and peeling vinyl skin on the tiles was a continual problem. Their replacement in the ceiling grid was particularly difficult and time-consuming. He was of the opinion that the reason for the extraordinary amount of fine dust and for the various weighted objects found above the tiles was that the area above the ceiling tiles served as the "return air" for the building's air conditioning system. The various weighted objects found on numerous ceiling tiles served to keep the tiles from being moved by the air-flow above. Transcript, Vol. 3 at 50-58. This witness testified that he had worked in the electrical contracting industry for approximately twenty-one years. During that time he had worked in various buildings with suspended ceilings. It is his testimony that, for an office building, the dirt and dust above the ceiling tiles in the federal office building was probably the worst he had ever seen. Id., Vol. 3 at 13, 52, 54. 209. Fire Security's construction superintendent for the federal building and courthouse project also testified regarding the condition of the ceiling tile in the federal building. He confirmed that the loose or detached vinyl skin made replacement in the ceiling grids particularly difficult and time consuming. He also described in some detail the problems encountered in removing tiles from the ceiling grid when they were laden with dust and debris. Transcript, Vol. 3 at 103-06. This witness has had considerable experience as a construction project supervisor. He has worked in this capacity since 1969. He stated that he has worked in all aspects of fire sprinkler system installation. Id. at 83-85. It was his testimony that, in working with similar ceilings elsewhere, he had not encountered "booby-trap" conditions such as those which existed with the ceiling tiles of the federal building in Hawaii. Id. at 102. 210. Appellant's expert in fire protection engineering also testified that, while he had on occasion encountered materials above a dropceiling, he had never encountered conditions such as those described by those present at the federal building and courthouse site. He further testified that, in his experience, these are not conditions which a competent contractor would assume to be present. Transcript, Vol. 4 at 109. 211. A sample of ceiling tile provided for the record by appellant does, in fact, support the representations made by the various witnesses of appellant concerning the deteriorated condition of the existing ceiling tile. Appellant's Supplemental Appeal File, GSBCA 12120, Exhibit 1. A Change in the 5'x 5' Ceiling Tiles 212. In mid-July 1990, appellant submitted a 5'x 5' ceiling tile for approval. By letter dated January 23, 1991, appellant wrote the GSA construction engineer assigned to the project to complain that no response to the submittal had been received. In the absence of a reply, appellant advised GSA that it planned to continue to reinstall existing tiles. Appeal File, GSBCA 12120, Exhibit 31. In early June 1991, GSA replied to appellant's letter. At that time, appellant was told that a change order was in preparation, and that the order would change the tile specification to a "white cloth nubby, foil backed fiberglass" type of tile manufactured by Capaul Corporation or an approved equal. Id., Exhibit 32. PR No. 17 was issued shortly thereafter announcing this change in tile type. Fire Security's project manager submitted a proposal in response. No trip to the site was required to prepare this proposal. Transcript, Vol. 5 at 12-13; Appeal File, GSBCA 12120, Exhibit 33. After some negotiation, the contract was amended to require that the 90,000 square feet of new tiles be fiberglass rather then vinyl coated. To accommodate this change, the parties agreed in February 1992 to a contract price increase of $33,795. Appeal File, GSBCA 12120, Exhibit 34. 213. A contract amendment confirming the change in the type of tile to be used to replace the 90,000 square feet of damaged existing tile was signed by appellant's project manager on February 6, 1992. In a letter dated February 14, 1992, and addressed to appellant, the GSA construction engineer stated that PR No. 17, which called for a change from vinyl to fiberglass tile, was canceled and that a proposal was in preparation which would delete the requirement for replacement tile altogether. The copy of this letter in the appeal file, however, although date-stamped, is unsigned. Appeal File, GSBCA 12120, Exhibit 35. We are unable to determine, therefore, whether it was sent to appellant. Possibly it was not, for the same contract amendment, already signed by Fire Security's project manager, was eventually signed by the contracting officer as well on February 25, 1992. Id., Exhibit 34. Appellant's Claim 214. Whatever the status of this contract amendment following PR No. 17 may be, appellant, in a letter dated June 12, 1992, made quite clear that it understood the Government's intention to be to delete the contract requirement for 90,000 square feet of replacement tile. The letter offers appellant's version of all that has transpired thus far concerning the ceiling tiles and concludes that, based on the Government's actions and inactions, Fire Security is entitled to an equitable adjustment in the amount of $227,992. The elements of appellant's certified claim are stated as follows: Proposal Preparation Price Price replacement of existing tiles with new 2 x 4 tile and grid $ 20,000.00 Price using different tile for 90,000 sf of replacement tile $ 10,000.00 Price proposal in bid not used $ 5,000.00 "Jewel Setting" Labor Price $148,000.00 Subsistence for Additional Labor $ 46,073.00 Price for Time Extension 126 days x $260.19 $ 32,784.00 Profit, Overhead, Bond 21% x 261,857.00 $ 54,990.00 Total $316,847.00 Anticipated Profit on Breach $ 15,680.00 Credit for Deletion of Tile Replacement in Contract ($104,535.00) Charge to G.S.A. $227,992.00 Appeal File, GSBCA 12120, Exhibit 36. The letter which presented this claim also requested resolution of this matter within thirty days or, failing resolution, a contracting officer's decision within sixty days from expiration of the thirty-day period. The letter further advised that if no decision was issued, an appeal would be taken from a deemed denial. Id. 215. By letter dated July 15, the GSA construction engineer responded in detail to appellant's claim. The claim, in all its aspects, was denied. Appeal File, GSBCA 12120, Exhibit 37. Fire Security, in a letter dated August 19, 1992, in similar detail, took issue with virtually every point of the construction engineer's letter and argued that GSA's "[a]rguments, reasoning and logic are without merit." Id., Exhibit 38. 216. By letter also dated August 19, 1992, GSA provided Proposal Request No. 24 to appellant. This PR formally called for the deletion of the 90,000 square feet of new replacement tile. Appeal File, GSBCA 12120, Exhibit 39. 217. There is no indication in the record that appellant ever submitted a response to PR No. 24. Instead, in October 1992, Fire Security filed a notice of appeal from a deemed denial of its claim of June 12. Appeal File, GSBCA 12120, Exhibit 41. The appeal was thereafter docketed, and the contracting officer was directed by the Board to issue a decision within thirty days or provide an explanation of why this was not possible. Id., Exhibit 42. The Contracting Officer's Decision 218. The contracting officer's decision issued in response to the Board's order denied appellant's claim in its entirety. With regard to the claim of $35,000 for proposal preparation costs, the decision states that no basis exists to reimburse a contractor for "unconsummated contract modifications." Appeal File, GSBCA 12120, Exhibit 43 at 1. 219. As to the request for costs associated with the alleged "jewel setting" aspect of ceiling tile replacement, the contracting officer states that this problem should have been anticipated for all but the 90,000 square feet of replacement. To the extent that there was more labor involved in replacing in the ceiling grid the 90,000 square feet of tile with existing rather than new tile, this labor, according to the contracting officer, was offset by labor and other costs saved by not having to obtain and install new replacement tile. Among the costs mentioned are the costs associated with the disposing of the used tiles and the costs associated with the "inventory, delivery and proper storage of the new tiles." Appeal File, GSBCA 12120, Exhibit 43 at 1-2. 220. Appellant's claim of a 126-day time extension was denied as devoid of any basis in the record. Furthermore, the contracting officer concluded that the time saved by deletion of the requirement of new tiles offset any additional time which may have been spent installing used tile rather than new tile in the ceiling grids. Appeal File, GSBCA 12120, Exhibit 43 at 2. 221. Appellant's allegation of contract breach was likewise denied as being without merit. The contracting officer insisted that the Government has the right to request submission of proposals from the contractor but no duty to award a contract or contract change at what is considered to be an excessive price. Appeal File, GSBCA 12120, Exhibit 43 at 2-3. 222. The contracting officer's decision concludes with a claim for a "credit" of $104,535. The decision notes that PR No. 24, which entailed deletion of the replacement tiles, had been the subject of negotiations and that "[a]s a result of these negotiations, an agreed amount totaling $104,535 for material costs for the new ceiling tile is currently due as a credit to the Government." Appeal File, GSBCA 12120, Exhibit 43 at 3. Appellant's Response to the Contracting Officer's Decision 223. Following release of the contracting officer's written decision, the Board requested Fire Security to state its position regarding the decision. By letter dated February 17, 1993, appellant confirmed its continued disagreement with the contracting officer and its desire to have the Board resolve this dispute. Board Correspondence File, GSBCA 12120. On April 6, 1993, Fire Security filed its complaint. The complaint states: Fire Security requests that the Board sustain this appeal, rule that the refusal to approve the submitted new tile sample was a Breach of Contract, or a constructive change order, or a differing site condition, under the related contract clauses. Id. 224. On August 24, 1993, retained counsel entered a notice of appearance replacing appellant's president as the representative of Fire Security in this appeal. On December 8, 1993, counsel filed an amended complaint for this dispute. In the amended complaint, the original claim of $227,992 was increased to a total of $271,006.40. Absent from the amended complaint was appellant's original demand of $5000 as the cost of preparing the original bid to provide 90,000 square feet of replacement tile. The amended complaint also reduced the costs claimed for preparing a reply to PR No. 17 and PR No. 24, from $20,000 (PR No. 17) to $4096 and from $10,000 (PR No. 24) to $1318. The amount sought for "jewel setting" labor was increased by $313 to $148,313. The amount sought for subsistence for additional labor remained unchanged at $46,073. The amount sought for a time extension was increased from $32,784 to $80,060.40, and the claim for profit, overhead and bond was raised from $54,990 to $80,001. The amount sought for anticipated profit allegedly lost by the elimination of 90,000 square feet of replacement tile from the contract remained unchanged at $15,680. Similarly, as in the original claim, appellant still provided in the amended complaint for a credit for the material cost of this deleted tile. The amount remained unchanged at $104,535. First Amended Complaint  12. 225. In their prehearing brief, counsel for appellant advised the Board that, on further consideration, the original claim demand had been revised downward. The quantum of $271,006.40 sought in the first amended complaint was reduced to $175,266,40 by the elimination of two items. The first was a claim for $80,060.40 originally sought for a time extension of 126 days. The second item was $15,680 sought as anticipated profit on the 90,000 square feet of replacement tile eliminated from the contract. All other elements of the claim remained unchanged. As thus amended, the remaining elements of the claim are as follows: A. 1. proposal preparation price for obtaining proposal to replace existing tiles with new 2'x 4' tile and grid $ 4,096.00 2. price proposal made at the request of GSA for using a different tile for 90,000 square feet of replacement tile $ 1,318.00 3. "Jewel setting" a. labor price for additional labor cost necessary for additional time and effort taken for jewel setting $148,313.00 b. subsistence for additional labor as set forth in Union Contract $ 46,073.00 Subtotal $199,800.00 c. profit - 10%, overhead - 25.8%, bond - 1.2% on $199,800.00 $ 80,001.00 Subtotal [$279,801.00] B. Credit for deletion of tile replacement in contract ($104,535.00) Due and owing by GSA to FSS[Fire Security] $175,266.40 Appellant's Prehearing Brief at 3. The Government's Counterclaim 226. In its answer to appellant's complaint, GSA also addressed the counterclaim for $104,535 raised in the contracting officer's decision. GSA's pleading states: As set forth in the Contracting Officer's final decision dated December 4, 1992, respondent is entitled to an equitable adjustment in the amount of $104,535.00 for this change in the scope of work. Answer at 2. The pleading concludes with a claim for this amount plus interest and costs. Id. 227. The Government's counterclaim was not specifically addressed in appellant's letter of February 17 which took issue with the decision. Nor was it mentioned in the initial complaint filed by appellant's pro se representative or in the first amended complaint filed by counsel of record. See Findings 223-24. It is addressed, however, by counsel in a pleading filed on December 8, 1994, entitled "Answer to Counter Claim." In this pleading, appellant denied GSA's claim to an equitable adjustment of $104,535, plus interest, and suggests instead "there should be offset in the amount sought by GSA against recovery by FSS [Fire Security Systems]." Correspondence File, GSBCA 12120. Discussion In deciding this claim, as amended to date, there are a number of separate elements which must be considered. The first is whether the condition of the existing 5'x 5' ceiling tiles in the federal building was a differing site condition. We also must decide whether appellant is entitled to the costs associated with unaccepted proposals for additional work. Finally, there is the matter of the Government's counterclaim for a credit representing the material cost of the 90,000 square feet of replacement tile deleted from contract work. A Differing Site Condition On review of the record before us, we conclude that the condition of the ceiling tiles in the federal building did indeed constitute a differing site condition. We do not, however, consider that the condition of the tiles in this case constituted a type 1 condition. Under the applicable contract clause (Finding 191), a type 1 condition exists when latent physical conditions exist at the site which differ materially from those indicated in the contract. In this case, the contract says nothing expressly regarding the condition of the ceiling tiles. We have only a stated requirement for 90,000 square feet of replacement tile. Finding 197. Respondent contends that a requirement of this magnitude for replacement tile is a clear indication that the overall condition of the tiles was poor and that the deteriorated condition of the tiles differed in no respect from that which was implied by the requirement for replacements. We are not convinced that the inescapable conclusion to be drawn from the requirement for replacement tiles was that virtually all the tiles to be removed were in poor condition. On the contrary, it would appear equally as probable that tiles which did not require replacement would be in good condition. Appellant's president offers yet another interpretation equally as plausible. He notes that, since the location of the damaged tile was not given, he considered the replacement requirement referred to existing tiles damaged during installation of the sprinkler system. Finding 199. In short, we find that the contract said virtually nothing either directly or indirectly concerning the condition of the ceiling tiles and, for this reason, find no type 1 differing site condition. A type 2 differing site condition is said to exist when the condition encountered at the site is an unknown physical condition of an unusual nature differing materially from those ordinarily encountered and generally recognized as inhering in work of the character provided for in the contract. See Finding 191. We recognize that a contractor's burden of proof for establishing a type 2 condition is relatively heavy when compared to the burden for establishing a type 1 condition. Parker v. United States, 433 F.2d 771, 778 (Ct. Cl. 1970). Nevertheless, in this case, appellant has satisfactorily met the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the condition encountered was unknown and unusual. With regard to what appellant should have known, we believe that the site inspection actually conducted was sufficient for its purpose. As already noted in discussing appellant's request to be paid for the installation of additional sprinkler heads (GSBCA 12403), we conclude that appellant's site visit satisfied any requirement normally associated with claims brought under the Differing Site Condition clause. Moon Construction Co.v. General Services Administration, GSBCA 11766, 93-3 BCA  26,017. This conclusion is only strengthened by additional findings made here regarding the ceiling tiles in particular. Appellant's president has testified that there were no tiles available in the sixth floor area for close inspection and that the area of ceiling grid and tiles which was visible on the sixth floor was not illuminated. The condition of the tiles seen elsewhere in the building appeared to be good. The tiles were fitted into the ceiling grids, and he observed no sagging tiles or vinyl peeling off the bottom of the insulated backing of the tiles. Owing to the height of the ceilings, actual removal of a 5'x 5' tile would not have been a simple task. Findings 198-99. See also Finding 190. As for appellant's actual knowledge of the condition of the tiles, we are convinced that their actual condition was unexpected. We find the testimony of appellant's president particularly credible in this regard. Finding 201. It is clear from comments made at the preconstruction conference and attributed to Fire Security officials, that the company's original plan was simply to displace temporarily the ceiling tiles without actually removing them from the ceiling grids. Finding 200. It is equally clear, however, that, once the actual condition of the tiles became known to appellant during the initial detailed survey, it became apparent that this method could not be used and that considerably more care and -- even more significantly -- more time would be required for the tile removal and replacement phase of the operation. Finding 201. The record amply demonstrates that the condition of the ceiling tiles was not only unknown but also unusual. We find the testimony of appellant's witnesses on this issue highly credible. Findings 201, 208-11. The experience of these witnesses cannot be ignored. For all intents and purposes, what at site inspection appeared to be a routine task became something of a nightmare. Particularly significant in this regard is the fact that the Government has not attempted to rebut the testimony of appellant's witnesses regarding the condition of the ceiling tiles. Rather, its argument is simply that appellant should have divined the condition of the existing tile from the amount of replacement tile called for in the contract and from a more conscientious site inspection. Respondent's Posthearing Brief at 17. We disagree. The purpose of a the Differing Site Conditions clause is to prevent the contractor from bidding on a worst-case scenario and adding a contingency factor to the bid. Foster Construction C.A. v. United States, 435 F.2d 873, 887 (Ct. Cl. 1970). Appellant, with a preponderance of substantial evidence, has convinced us that the conditions encountered in the removal and replacement of ceiling tile in the federal building were unknown and unusual and that this, in turn, required significantly more labor than originally anticipated at the time appellant's final bid was prepared and submitted. We conclude, therefore, that Fire Security is entitled to relief under the contract's Differing Site Conditions clause. As to the individual components of the differing site condition claim, as amended, we leave those matters for resolution in appellant's case on quantum. Proposal Preparation Costs The general rule with regard to the recovery of proposal preparation costs when the proposal is rejected is that a response to a request for an estimate for proposed changes is not considered to be extra work and the costs of preparing such estimates are usually considered as part of the overhead included in the total contract price. See Finding 204. Exceptions to the general rule are situations in which elements of strong Government compulsion are found which alter the voluntary nature of the contractor's efforts or where the contractor has expended significant efforts or incurred substantial costs beyond that which would normally be contemplated for a change order. B.G. Carvin Construction Co. v. General Services Administration, GSBCA 12770, et al., 95-1 BCA  27,445 (and cases cited therein). In appellant's claim for recovery of proposal preparation costs, we find nothing which justifies reimbursement based on the exceptions set out in Carvin other than the trip to Hawaii which Fire Security's project manager was required to make from the home office on the mainland. In his testimony, he explained why the trip was necessary and that it was made for the sole purpose of being able to prepare a detailed proposal in response to PR No. 2. Finding 205. We consider this travel cost to be a substantial cost beyond that which would normally be contemplated for a change order. Appellant is, therefore, entitled to recover it. We find nothing of a similar extraordinary nature, however, in the other costs incurred to prepare a response to PR No. 2 or the proposal to change from vinyl to fiberglass tile (PR No. 17). See Findings 206, 212. The Government's Counterclaim The contracting officer's decision states that PR No. 24, which entailed deletion of the replacement tiles, had been negotiated, and that agreement had been reached that the Government was due a credit of $104,535 for material costs. Finding 222. In its pleading for this appeal, respondent clarifies that the "credit" sought by the contracting officer would, in fact, be an equitable adjustment of the contract price. Government's Answer and Counterclaim, GSBCA 12120, at 2. The record does not support the contracting officer's contention that agreement was reached on a credit for the material cost of the 90,000 square feet of replacement tile. We have been provided nothing which suggests that appellant ever submitted a proposal in response to PR No. 24. Finding 217. Notwithstanding the absence of an agreement, however, we see no reason why the Government would not be entitled to a price adjustment to reflect the elimination of this requirement. There was a requirement in the contract for 90,000 square feet of new 5'x 5' ceiling tile to replace existing tile. Finding 197. Appellant presumably included the cost of this item in its bid. The requirement was, in fact, eventually eliminated from the contract. Finding 216. Up until the present, there did not even appear to be any dispute that the elimination of this item would entitle the Government to a credit. In discussing the various changes considered in lieu of the original contract requirement, appellant, from the start, has indicated a willingness to credit the Government for the elimination of this contract item. The credit initially proposed by appellant was $162,000, Finding 206. This was subsequently reduced to $104,535. Findings 213, 224-25. The Government, in asserting a claim for the price reduction, seeks the lesser figure of $104,535. Finding 222. There is, therefore, no dispute either on the actual amount of the adjustment. Indeed, counsel confirmed this fact during a prehearing conference with the Board. Conference Memorandum, December 16, 1994, at 4. Rather, the dispute at this juncture is simply whether the Government is entitled to any credit at all. An examination of appellant's Answer to the Government's counterclaim reveals that the precise dispute is whether the Government is entitled to an adjustment even if appellant recovers nothing on its own claims. In its Answer, appellant appears to oppose any adjustment other than that which might be effected through an offset against a recovery which Fire Security would realize on its own claims. See Finding 227. In briefing this appeal, Fire Security provides us with no explanation of why it would not oppose a credit if it were to prevail on its own claim but presumably would oppose the credit if it were awarded nothing. Given the facts before us, we see no reason for the distinction appellant would have us make. The Government is entitled to the price adjustment sought regardless of whether appellant is successful or unsuccessful on its own claim. Although the amount of the credit is clear and not in dispute, just what this ultimately means, in terms of dollars and cents, is a matter which must be left to the next phase of this litigation where quantum will be considered. In the absence of evidence regarding billings and payments under the contract, it is impossible to determine at this point whether the Government is entitled to a refund based on the price adjustment. Obviously, for the same reason, we must defer ruling on respondent's claim for interest on its counterclaim. Decision Having concluded that appellant is not entitled to the cost of replacing class B wiring with class A wiring to initiating devices, we DENY Fire Security s appeal of the contracting officer s decision denying a claim for recovery of this cost. (GSBCA 12406). Having concluded that appellant is not entitled to any costs for alleged delay in the review of submittals regarding the proposed sprinkler or alarm system, we DENY appellant's appeal of the contracting officer's decision rejecting that claim. (GSBCA 12175). We DENY Fire Security's appeal of the contracting officer's determination that the Government is entitled to liquidated damages for appellant's failure to complete the contract as scheduled. We make no determination at this time, however, on the specific quantum of that claim. (GSBCA 12811). Having determined that appellant is not entitled to a contract price adjustment and delay damages based on the Government's insistence on the installation of a lower pressure pump than that proposed, we DENY Fire Security s appeal of the contracting officer s decision rejecting the claim. The Government demands were in accord with contract requirements. (GSBCA 12163). Having concluded that appellant is not entitled to an equitable adjustment for time and resources used to prepare and rework hydraulic calculations, we DENY Fire Security s appeal of the contracting officer s decision rejecting that claim. (GSBCA 12349). Having concluded that appellant is not entitled to recover the difference between the cost of installing rigid couplings in lieu of flexible couplings, we DENY Fire Security s appeal from the contracting officer s refusal to allow that claim. (GSBCA 12351). Having concluded that appellant is not entitled to recover for the installation of 540 sprinkler heads either as new work or work required as a result of differing site conditions, we DENY Fire Security s appeal from the contracting officers decision rejecting that claim. (GSBCA 12403). Appellant's appeal of the contracting officer's decision denying the cost of proposal preparation is DENIED except for appellant's claim for the cost of travel to Hawaii to prepare a reply to PR No. 2. The appeal of the contracting officer's denial of that portion of the claim is GRANTED. We make no determination at this time on the amount of that claim. Fire Security's appeal of the contracting officer's decision denying a differing site condition claim for the removal and replacement of ceiling tile in the Federal Building is GRANTED. We make no determination on the amount of that claim at this time. Fire Security's appeal of the contracting officer's decision that the Government is entitled to a contract price adjustment in the amount of $104,535 for the deletion of a contract requirement for replacement of 90,000 square feet of damaged existing ceiling tile is DENIED. We make no determination at this time as to the amount of money, if any, to which respondent is entitled as a result of this specified price reduction. (GSBCA 12120). Within forty-five days from the date of this decision, counsel for the parties are directed to submit to the Board a jointly proposed schedule for further proceedings to resolve issues concerning quantum in GSBCA Nos. 12811 and 12120. __________________ EDWIN B. NEILL Board Judge We concur: __________________ __________________ ANTHONY S. BORWICK CATHERINE B. HYATT Board Judge Board Judge