DENIED: March 25, 1993 GSBCA 11726 MIKE CREECH Appellant, v. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, Respondent. Mike Creech, pro se, San Pablo, CA, appearing for Appellant. Jack Christensen, Office of Regional Counsel, General Services Administration, San Francisco, CA, counsel for Respondent. Before Board Judges DANIELS (Chairman), LaBELLA, and DEVINE. LaBELLA, Board Judge. This is an appeal from a contracting officer's final decision which denied appellant reimbursement for the purchase price of a car bought at a General Services Administration (GSA) auction. This appeal was docketed on February 20, 1992, but due to delays in appellant's filing a complaint, the Government's answer to the appeal complaint was not due until September of 1992. Government counsel chose to submit a motion for summary relief in lieu of an answer. A response to this motion was due by October 1, 1992, but was never received. The Board again instructed appellant to answer this motion, this time by February 10, 1993, and on penalty of dismissal, by order dated January 13, 1993. To date no response has been received. The Board herein considers respondent's motion, taking uncontested facts drawn from the Rule 4 file and appellant's previous correspondence. For the reasons stated below, the motion for summary relief is granted and this appeal is denied. Background Mr. Mike Creech, the appellant in this action, purchased a 1989 Sebring MX kit car at GSA auction No. 91FBPS-91-065, on July 12, 1991. This vehicle was listed as item number 24 on the 2 amendment to the auction information and was described as follows: COUPE: Roadster, 1989 Sebring MX Kit Car 5 Speed MT, AC, AM/FM Stereo Cassette, Convertible, Less Then [sic] 100 Miles. Powered By 8 Cyl. Engine, Vin. No. CRLCAG116KF000013. Appeal File, Exhibit 1, Item No. 24. Mr. Creech bid $12,500 on this item, and was awarded the vehicle. Appeal File, Exhibits 3, 4. The vehicle was removed from the Government's possession on July 15, 1991, by a towing company authorized by Mr. Creech to pick up the car. Appeal File, Exhibits 5, 6. Not until October 31, 1991, did Mr. Creech communicate to the contracting officer that he believed the car he purchased had been misdescribed due to his identification of the engine as one manufactured between 1979 and 1986. Appeal File, Exhibit 6. In this letter Mr. Creech asked that the Government pick up the car, refund his purchase price, and pay expenses incurred by him for the car. Id. The contracting officer declined to honor Mr. Creech's claims, which were submitted after the deadline for the submission of such claims established by the contract. Appeal File, Exhibit 7. When asked to reconsider this decision, the contracting officer issued a final decision which addressed not only the tardiness of the claim, but the fact that Mr. Creech had purchased a 1989 Sebring MX kit car, which would indicate that only the body was manufactured by Sebring in 1989, and that the chassis on which the body was mounted--including the engine-- could be any year. Appeal File, Exhibit 9. The bidder information provided to Mr. Creech, which became part of the contract he entered into with the Government, contained the following language: THE GOVERNMENT WARRANTS TO THE ORIGINAL PURCHASER THAT THE PROPERTY LISTED IN THE INVITATION FOR BIDS WILL CONFORM TO ITS DESCRIPTION. . . . NO REFUND WILL BE MADE UNLESS THE PURCHASER SUBMITS A WRITTEN NOTICE TO THE CONTRACTING OFFICER WITHIN 15 CALENDAR DAYS OF THE DATE OF REMOVAL THAT THE PROPERTY IS MISDESCRIBED AND MAINTAINS THE PROPERTY IN THE SAME CONDITION AS WHEN REMOVED. . . . . THIS WARRANTY IS IN PLACE OF ALL OTHER GUARANTEES AND WARRANTIES. Appeal File, Exhibit 1 at 6. This warranty was the sole recourse accorded Mr. Creech for misdescribed merchandise. While the Government indicated that it would list any known deficiencies of the vehicles, it in no way warranted vehicles to be free from 3 unlisted defects, but encouraged bidders to inspect the vehicles and determine the appropriate bid based on the condition of the item. The bidding literature further cautioned individual bidders that the items being auctioned had been seized by the Government, and the Government had no knowledge of, and made no representation as to the condition or treatment of, the vehicles prior to their coming into Government control. Nor did the Government warrant the present suitability of the vehicles for any use or purpose. Id. at 5. Discussion This Board has the authority to render decisions on motions for summary relief pursuant to Board Rule 8(g). However, summary relief will be granted only when there are no issues of material fact in dispute, and the party moving for relief is entitled to relief as a matter of law. GF Office Furniture, Ltd., GSBCA 11058, 91-3 BCA 24,157. The burden placed on the moving party is heavy and well-established, providing: The moving party bears the burden of establishing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. [The] court must view all the evidence in a light most favorable to the opponent (or non-movant) and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor. . . . In sum, all significant doubt must be resolved in favor of the party opposing summary judgment. Armco, Inc. v. Cyclops Corp., 791 F.2d 147, 149 (Fed. Cir. 1986). In this case the facts are not disputed. The record submitted by the Government in the form of the appeal file submitted pursuant to Rule 4 of our Rules of Procedure has not been controverted by appellant in any way. In fact, even though appellant has not responded to the Government's motion for summary relief, its complaint and notice of appeal fully support the salient facts as alleged by respondent. Mr. Creech's notice to the contracting officer of his belief the purchased vehicle is misdescribed by the bidding information is clearly untimely. Over 100 days elapsed between removal of the vehicle from the auction site and Mr. Creech's letter to the contracting officer claiming misdescription. As the contract establishes fifteen calendar days after removal as the cut off date for submission of such claims, Mr. Creech's claim must fail. However, even if we were to hold that Mr. Creech's delay was reasonable, and that he could not have discovered the date the engine was manufactured in a more timely fashion, this claim would fail because the item was simply not misdescribed. Item No. 24 advertised a 1989 Sebring MX kit car, powered by an eight cylinder engine, and that is exactly what Mr. Creech got. Mr. Creech should have known that a "kit car" is a body 4 which is then fitted with a chassis and engine by the purchaser. If he did know, then there is no way he could have reasonably read the 1989 date in the item description as pertaining to anything but the body of the automobile. In any event, appellant's claim fails. Decision Respondent's motion for summary relief is GRANTED. This appeal is DENIED. VINCENT A. LaBELLA Board Judge We concur: STEPHEN M. DANIELS Board Judge DONALD W. DEVINE Board Judge