DENIED: May 21, 1993 GSBCA 11311 IOWA-ILLINOIS CLEANING COMPANY, Appellant, v. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, Respondent. Sam Zalman Gdanski, Chestnut Ridge, NY, counsel for Appellant. A. R. Dattolo, Office of Regional Counsel, General Services Administration, Atlanta, GA, counsel for Respondent. Before Board Judges DANIELS (Chairman), LaBELLA, and DEVINE. DANIELS, Board Judge. We consider here, and deny, an appeal by Iowa-Illinois Cleaning Company of a General Services Administration contracting officer's decision. The decision terminated for default a contract for the performance of janitorial services at the United States Post Office and Courthouse in Lexington, Kentucky. The case was submitted for decision on the basis of the written record. Findings of Fact This contract contains the standard "Default (Fixed-Price Supply and Service)" clause set out at 48 CFR 52.249-8 (1990). The clause permits the Government to terminate the contract for default if the contractor fails to "perform the services within the time specified in this contract or any extension." The clause also permits termination for default if the contractor fails to "make progress, so as to endanger performance of this contract," provided that the contractor is first given ten days to cure its failure. Appeal File, Exhibit 1 at 111-12. Appellant began work under the contract on May 1, 1991. Appeal File, Exhibit 3. A week later, the contracting officer wrote to appellant, stating that "the cleaning services . . . are not being performed in accordance with the contract." She told appellant that if it did not correct its deficiencies within ten days, the contract would be subject to termination for default. Id., Exhibit 7. According to Government inspection reports, beginning on May 14, numerous contract cleaning requirements went unfulfilled. Appeal File, Exhibits 10-12, 13-18. On May 15, two of the four individuals who had been doing the work quit their jobs, and the next day, a third followed suit. Id., Exhibits 11, 12. The agency complained to appellant that the company was neglecting its duties and had not responded to the earlier letter. Id., Exhibit 13. The record does not contain a response to this missive. It does show, however, that a Government inspector recorded that on May 20, "Contractor has no one on-site. Contract supervisor and all cleaners have left due to wage/hour dispute." Id., Exhibit 15. On May 21, a new supervisor and two subordinates appeared for work. Appeal File, Exhibit 16. Two days later, however, the supervisor "turned in building keys and stated he would not be returning for further work in this building." Id., Exhibit 18. The following day, no contractor employees came to work. Id. The inspector concluded, "It would appear that Iowa-Illinois Cleaning Corp. [sic] has no intention of performing even the basic services contained in the Contract." Id., Exhibit 19. The contracting officer terminated the contract, citing the default termination clause, because "No employees have reported to work to perform the required services." Id., Exhibit 20. Discussion When a termination for default is challenged by a contractor, the Government has the burden of persuading us, by a preponderance of the evidence, that its action was proper. Custom Production Manufacturing, Inc. v. General Services Administration, GSBCA 10393, 92-1 BCA 24,688, at 123,152 (citing Lisbon Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 828 F.2d 759, 763-65 (Fed. Cir. 1987)). The record on which we decide this case consists only of the appeal file submitted by the Government. That file in turn consists primarily of inspection reports on appellant's work made by an agency employee. These reports show that the agency was doing no more than standing on its "right to demand strict compliance with the contract requirements." Custom Production, 92-1 BCA at 123,152 (citing Orchids Paper Products Co., GSBCA 10555, 91-2 BCA 23,965, and Air, Inc., GSBCA 8847, 91-1 BCA 23,352, at 117,111 (1990)). The reports show further that the contractor endangered performance of the contract and then failed to perform mandated services. Other documents in the appeal file demonstrate that the agency gave appellant notice of its deficiencies and a chance to cure them; appellant apparently did not respond to this opportunity. We accord a presumption of regularity to business records, particularly when they are the records of a Government agency, whose officials, when acting in their official capacities, are presumed to do so in good faith. Kalvar Corp. v. United States, 543 F.2d 1298, 1301-02 (Ct. Cl. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 830 (1977); United States v. Smith, 521 F.2d 957, 964, 965 n.17, 968 n.24 (D.C. Cir. 1975); see Fed.R.Evid. 803(6), (8). The appellant must come forward with evidence to overcome this presumption. SMS Data Products Group, Inc., GSBCA 10587-P, 90-3 BCA 23,034, at 115,658, 1990 BPD 141, at 9. The appellant in this case submitted no evidence, however. It did send us, as an attachment to its brief, an undated, unsigned letter which appears to be from appellant's president to its counsel. Because this letter was provided to the Board well after the deadline for submission of evidence, it is not part of the record on which we decide the appeal. We note, however, that the letter does not contest any of the notations in the inspection reports, and indeed paints a picture of considerable confusion and conflict among the contractor and its supervisors. Thus, even if the letter were part of the record and were to be accorded any weight, it would not be helpful to appellant in rebutting the presumption that the information in the Government's records is correct. Decision We have been given no reason to conclude that the Government's default termination of appellant's contract was anything other than reasonable and in accordance with the contract's Default clause. We therefore DENY the appeal. _________________________ STEPHEN M. DANIELS Board Judge We concur: _________________________ _________________________ VINCENT A. LaBELLA DONALD W. DEVINE Board Judge Board Judge